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The thesis develops a theory of legislative cooperation in bicameral legislatures. At 
its core is a distinction between two decision-making scenarios leading to a 
concurrent majority in the two chambers. In an inter-institutional scenario, the 
chambers oppose each other as unitary actors. In a trans-institutional scenario, the 
constituent actors enter into cooperation across the boundaries of their chambers. The 
central argument is that formateurs face a strategic decision on which of these two 
routes to take. They can stick to their intra-institutional coalition, or they can 
abandon it and propose a logroll across issues within a bill that is carried by a 
majority across the chambers.  
 
The thesis comprises three papers, united by the general topic of trans-institutional 
legislative cooperation, and each demonstrating the crucial role of the formateurs. 
The empirical analysis focuses on co-decision legislation proposed in the bicameral 
system of the European Union between 1999 and 2009. In particular, it draws on a 
new dataset on early-stage and final-stage coalitions in the European Parliament and 
the Council of the EU. This is based on an extensive analysis of more than 18,000 
Council documents and 19,000 amendments in the EP presenting for the first time a 
systematic insight into early-stage coalitions. 
 
Three central findings emanate from the application of the theoretical framework to 
the new data. First, formateurs can obtain an outcome closer to their preferences by 
choosing between inter- and trans-institutional scenarios. Second, the transaction 
costs of exchanges across institutional boundaries are lower if formateurs’ 
preferences are similar. Third, the decisions of the formateurs potentially produce 
winners and losers as some actors are included and others are excluded from the 
coalitions. These findings build on and further develop theories of bicameral 
coalition formation and legislative organisation. They highlight that the strategic 
environment in which actors operate surpasses their individual chamber, and explain 
how this affects the process and outcome of decision-making. This leads to important 
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Trans-institutional cooperation in bicameral systems 
 
 
This thesis investigates the determinants of bicameral coalition formation. Bicameral 
legislatures usually have conflict resolution mechanisms in place to facilitate a 
concurrent majority in the two chambers, which is required to pass legislation 
(Tsebelis & Money, 1997). The standard view of bicameral decision-making focuses 
on a sequence of intra-cameral decision-making followed by inter-cameral 
bargaining that pits the chambers against each other. In line with this, the majority of 
empirical studies focus on decision-making in one of the chambers or inter-
institutional negotiations, in which at least one chamber is conceptualised as a 
unitary actor. In contrast, this thesis argues that actors can instead enter into 
cooperation across the boundaries of the chambers. As a consequence, trans-
institutional coalitions rather than the chambers oppose each other. Crucially, which 
scenario comes about is the strategic decision of key actors in the legislature.  
 
Within three papers I develop a theory of trans-institutional legislative cooperation 
and analyse its implications. The empirical analysis is based on different subsamples 
of 844 legislative acts proposed between 1999 and 2009 under the European Union’s 
(EU) co-decision procedure. In particular, I draw on an original dataset on early-
stage and final-stage coalitions in the Council of the EU and European Parliament 
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(EP) based on an analysis of more than 18,000 Council documents and 19,000 
amendments proposed in the EP. 
 
The first paper lays out the theoretical argument for trans-institutional cooperation 
and highlights the role of intra-institutional “formateurs”, such as the EU Council 
presidency and the EP’s rapporteur, who hold agenda-setting power in coalition 
formation. In a first step, I propose a micro-mechanism of coalition formation that 
builds on the insight that formateurs choose coalitions strategically. On this basis, I 
develop a typology of coalition dynamics. The paper provides empirical evidence of 
the rival inter- and trans-institutional scenarios between the EP and the EU Council 
as well as of the key role of the two chambers’ formateurs. The paper finds that the 
presidency and the rapporteur create more compact coalitions and that the rapporteur 
in particular benefits from this.  
 
The second paper focuses on transaction costs of legislative exchanges in bicameral 
systems. Its central argument is that similarities between formateurs reduce the 
transaction costs of exchanges, and hence facilitate legislative cooperation. 
Therefore, decision-making speed can be modelled as a function of the 
characteristics of the proposer and negotiators of the two chambers. Event-history 
analysis provides evidence that the preference alignment of the formateurs is an 
important predictor of the duration and, therefore, the efficiency of decision-making.  
 
The third paper asks who wins and who loses in the process of bicameral coalition 
formation, when the fate of amendments is not determined in one chamber alone. 
After intra-cameral coalition formation, the formateurs may either stick to their 
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proto-coalition, or shift coalitions by including new members while excluding others. 
The paper demonstrates that the formateur represents the crucial link in this process 
of intra- and inter-cameral decision-making.  
 
In a nutshell, the thesis challenges established theories of legislative organisation and 
models of decision-making by positing a generalisable theory of bicameral coalition 
formation, which is tested on the basis of a novel dataset on EU decision-making. 
 
The remainder of the introduction is structured as follows. First, I provide a stylised 
presentation of the bicameral system of the European Union and key debates in the 
literature on decision-making and legislative organisation. On this basis I develop the 
argument and define key concepts. Subsequently, I outline the implications of my 
argument and contribution to the literature. As a common foundation of the 
following papers, I then explain the empirical strategy devised to identify early and 
final-stage coalitions, as well as the extensive data collection effort I undertook to 
this end.  
 
Bicameral decision-making in the EU 
 
Bicameral decision-making in the EU combines features of presidential and 
parliamentary systems, but generally resembles that of other bicameral systems (Hix 
& Hoyland, 2011; Tsebelis & Money, 1997). The legislature comprises the European 
Parliament, a directly elected lower house, and the Council of the European Union, 
an upper house in which the member states are represented through their ministers. 
The executive consists of the European Commission—a supranational bureaucracy 
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elected by the EP upon a proposal by the EU’s heads of state and government in the 
European Council. As in parliamentary systems such as Germany or the United 
Kingdom, it is the executive, not the legislature that proposes legislation. Unlike 
these systems however, and more in line with presidential systems such as the United 
States, the executive does not fall if not supported by the legislature. Hence, 
coalitions are formed on an issue-by-issue basis, and conflict between the differently 
composed chambers has to be solved accordingly. 
 
To this end, the ordinary legislative procedure, oftentimes referred to as “co-decision 
procedure”, combines the two standard mechanisms of bicameral conflict resolution 
(Tsebelis & Money, 1997). In the so-called “navette procedure”, a legislative 
proposal shuttles back and forth between the two chambers. Eventually, a conference 
committee composed of members of the two chambers can be convoked to propose a 
compromise.  
 
This proceeds as follows. After submission of the Commission’s legislative proposal, 
a first reading takes place in the Council and the EP. The proposal is adopted as soon 
as both chambers agree on a common text. In the first reading, the EP amends the 
text, and if the Council adopts these amendments, the legislative act is adopted. 
Otherwise, in the second reading, the EP can subsequently adopt the Council’s 
amendments, and failing this, the Council has a second chance to adopt the EP’s 
amendments. If no agreement has been found in this back and forth between the 
chambers, a conference committee is summoned, called conciliation committee in 
the EU. This can draw up a proposal on which the chambers decide in a straight up 
or down vote. 
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State of the Art 
 
The formal rules of this procedure have been the subject of a large body of literature 
that seeks to explain decision outcomes in the European Union (Crombez, 2000; 
Hagemann & Høyland, 2010; Steunenberg, 1997; Thomson, Stokman, Achen, & 
König, 2006; Thomson, 2011). A first strand focuses on the sequential moves of 
players, voting thresholds and voting power, and the location of the status quo. In 
contrast, a second strand has challenged the assumption that these formal rules 
impose strong constraints on legislative interaction, and emphasises informal 
bargaining rather than the formal procedure (Achen, 2006; Thomson et al., 2006; 
Thomson, 2011).  
 
The debate between these camps has put the search for a micro-mechanism of 
coalition formation at the forefront of the research agenda. The thesis proposes a 
mechanism that feeds into the debate. It puts emphasis on the key role of formateurs 
in the two chambers and it is dynamic in that it suggests that formateurs decide 
which of various possible scenarios of coalition formation emerges.  
 
Legislative organisation is crucial in this context. Standard theories developed with 
regard to the U.S. Congress explain the emergence of parties and committees 
(Aldrich, 1995; Cox & McCubbins, 1993, 2004; Shepsle & Weingast, 1987; 
Weingast & Marshall, 1988). These are often applied to the EU, and in particular the 
EP (e.g. Kaeding, 2004; Yordanova, 2009). However, the theories are based on 
unicameral conceptions of the legislature (see e.g. Gailmard & Hammond, 2011). 
This raises the question of what impact bicameralism has on legislative organisation. 
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The thesis suggests that bicameralism creates an incentive for delegation beyond 
party leadership and committees, thus extending standard theories of legislative 
organisation.  
 
At the same time, the dynamics of bicameral decision-making and legislative 
organisation represent a burgeoning field in the broader literature on interaction of 
intra- and inter-cameral decision-making (Diermeier & Myerson, 1999; Gailmard & 
Hammond, 2011; Hoyland, 2006; Yordanova, 2011a). These studies suggest that the 
strategic environment of actors extends beyond their own chamber. This has 
important implications for how legislatures organise, and what institutions they 
adopt. This goes beyond the standard view that bicameralism matters if chambers are 
not congruent, and significantly expands our understanding of the effect of 
bicameralism (see Heller, 2007). The thesis ties in with this literature by zooming in 
on the strategic decisions of key actors who have to weigh the benefits of different 
coalition dynamics, as the next section explains in detail. 
 
The argument explained 
 
This thesis argues that key actors in bicameral decision-making, so-called 
formateurs,
1
 form a proto-coalition in their chamber, and then face a strategic 
decision between inter- and trans-institutional decision-making scenarios. As a 
consequence, legislative exchanges for support can take place across the institutional 
boundaries of the chambers. The transaction costs of these exchanges influence both 
                                                 
1 The term formateur is French and refers to an individual who literally forms or shapes. 
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the process and outcome of the negotiations in that they affect their efficiency as well 
as who wins and who loses.  
 
The process of coalition formation unfolds over two stages: an early, intra-cameral 
stage at committee level, and a final inter-cameral stage at plenary level. Let us 
define these terms by breaking down the process into its key components. (Key terms 
are in bold.) 
 
First, the formateur is an agenda setter within the chamber, who can propose a 
coalition and underlying agreement. In some countries with parliamentary systems, 
formateurs are tasked with forming a government (Lijphart, 1986). In Belgium and 
the Netherlands, the head of state chooses an “informateur” who in turn appoints the 
“formateur” to form a government coalition. But even where this institution does not 
formally exist, we can identify an informal formateur if for instance after an election 
all members of parliament accept that the largest party is given the first attempt at 
constructing a coalition with other parties in order to form a government. Just as 
formateurs of governments distribute portfolios and hence control over specific 
policy areas, formateurs in legislative decision-making (see Yoshinaka, McElroy, & 
Bowler, 2010) can offer certain rewards to those joining their coalition (Laver & 
Shepsle, 1990; Shepsle, 1979). They do so by accommodating actors’ preferences, 
i.e. their requests for changes (if any) to a legislative proposal. Each of the papers 
highlights the key role of these formateurs in the EU’s legislative process. 
 
Second, when accommodating these actors, the formateur proposes a proto-coalition 
of which they become members. A proto-coalition in Robert Axelrod’s (Axelrod, 
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1970, 1972) original formulation is a coalition of actors that “expands stepwise until 
it reaches political viability” (Diermeier, 2008). I slightly broaden this definition in 
that I also allow for the possibility that the proto-coalition “minimises” step by step. 
Importantly, as the term “proto” suggests, it is a “pre-coalition”, or “working 
coalition” that may still be in flux. A further difference to Axelrod’s definition is that 
his proto-coalition can do without a formateur and that coalition formation takes 
place in an institution-free environment, whereas I argue that formateurs are crucial 
in this process and form coalitions around themselves. As a consequence, I do not 
focus on rival coalition formation, such as attempts by coalition outsiders to form a 
blocking minority. I stress that the formateur brings together a number of actors, and 
may subsequently include or exclude members. The inclusionary and exclusionary 
dynamics will be crucial in particular in the first and third papers, which focus on the 
direction and consequences of these changes. 
 
It is important for my purpose that coalitions are by their very nature unanimous. 
Therefore actors that do not support the final coalition will be excluded from it, and 
the formateur will propose a new coalition. I draw on this micro-mechanism of 
coalition formation—a formateur proposing a proto-coalition and then building the 
final coalition upon it—because experimental evidence shows that it is a good 
approximation of how coalition formation works in practice (Diermeier, Swaab, 
Medvec, & Kern, 2008).  
 
Third, the coalition is cohesive because of issue-linkage resulting in a logroll 
(Tullock, 1959). The basis of a logroll is a legislative exchange, by which I mean a 
trade of political support over issues. For this to be possible, I assume a 
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multidimensional/ multi-issue policy space. Legislators trade votes and offer to 
support other actors’ demands on issues about which they care less in exchange for 
support on issues about which they care more. This give-and-take binds together the 
coalition. The existence of logrolling is well known. In the US context, logrolling 
often carries a negative connotation, because it is tied to pork-barrel politics that 
result in omnibus bills and overall inefficient outcomes. In other words, individual 
legislators are seen to extort excessive prices, such as investment in their 
constituency, for their support of a piece for legislation. However, generally 
speaking, logrolling is nothing but a form of reciprocity (Keohane, 1986). There are 
different levels at which such issue-linkage may take place. For example, 
Kardasheva (2009a) focuses on package deals across several acts. McKibben (2013) 
focuses on issue-linkage in one chamber only. Here, in contrast, I focus on issue-
linkages within individual proposals and across chambers, which is arguably the 
most straightforward case.  
 
Fourth, the distinction between two scenarios of bicameral decision-making is at the 
heart of the thesis. Inter-institutional decision-making suggests that the chambers 
are pitted against each other with at least one conceptualised as a unitary actor. This 
is the standard story of bicameral negotiations in the literature (e.g. Tsebelis & 
Garrett, 2000; Tsebelis & Money, 1997), and in line with unicameral theories of 
legislative organisation (Aldrich, 1995; Cox & McCubbins, 1993, 2004; Shepsle & 
Weingast, 1987; Weingast & Marshall, 1988). The chambers form their positions, 
and then engage in inter-cameral bargaining to come to an agreement. Trans-
institutional decision-making in contrast pits actors in coalitions across institutional 
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boundaries against each other. This implies that actors cooperate across institutional 
boundaries, and that what happens in one chamber might affect the other. 
 
Putting these pieces together, we arrive at a causal mechanism that has important 
implications for our understanding of legislative politics in bicameral systems. The 
next section expounds this in more detail. 
 
Contribution to the Literature 
 
Engaging with debates in comparative politics and EU politics, the thesis provides 
compelling evidence for the co-existence of trans- and inter-institutional coalition 
dynamics, the key role of the formateur in deciding between different decision-
making scenarios, and winners and losers in the process. Based on a large new data-
set on early and final-stage coalitions that I developed, it distinguishes four types of 
coalition dynamics and shows that formateurs can strategically choose coalitions that 
advance their preferences (paper 1). The characteristics of the formateurs influence 
the duration of the legislative process and highlight their key role as gatekeepers and 
facilitators of exchanges (paper 2), ultimately producing winners and losers (paper 
3). Thus this thesis points at adversarial dynamics in bicameral coordination. 
Decision-making in the EU is usually described as an inclusive process in which acts 
are made “yesable” to an increasing number of actors (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 
2006). While we find support for this general dynamic, it is only one side of the coin. 
Inclusionary and exclusionary dynamics co-exist, and the thesis sheds some light on 
the question why actors lose in the EU.  
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The existence of trans-institutional coalition formation and the key role of formateurs 
have important theoretical implications for models of bicameral decision-making. At 
a general level, the institution of formateurs brings bicameral systems closer to stable 
outcomes by avoiding “cycling” (Riker, 1962), and it can reduce search costs for 
agreements. The micro-mechanism suggests that rather than debating whether 
procedural or bargaining models perform better at explaining outcomes, we need to 
investigate the scope conditions of which route actors take. The thesis suggests that 
formateurs are at the heart of this trade-off and thus need to be more prominently 
included in explanations of decision outcomes. 
 
Likewise, the central role of the formateur has important implications for legislative 
organisation. The second paper suggests that standard approaches to 
institutionalising legislative exchanges are impeded by uncertainty regarding their 
enforceability under bicameralism. This is because the market for legislative 
exchanges expands across the two chambers. This challenges unicameral theories 
and empirical studies of bicameral systems. For instance, theories of legislative 
organisation are based on unicameral reasoning and neglect the lack of certainty 
regarding the enforceability of the trades they institutionalise. Likewise, exchanges 
within chambers only capture one part of the story. In inter-cameral negotiations, the 
thesis argues that the formateur might have an incentive to backtrack on these trades.   
 
These findings also have important normative implications: since constituent actors 
in the legislature matter they need to be held accountable. The two chambers of the 
EU have developed different systems to delegate authority. While in the Council, the 
presidency rotates every six months, rotation in the EP is based on specific 
23 
 
legislative files. In both cases, control mechanisms limit agency drift by the 
formateur acting on their behalf. In the Council, no legislative file is negotiated by 
one presidency alone. In the EP, party groups appoint shadow rapporteurs who can 
keep a close eye on the rapporteur. The thesis highlights the importance of these 
mechanisms and the need for a better understanding of their workings and 
effectiveness. 
 
If coalition formation results in winners and losers, this has important implications 
for the legitimacy of policy and, in the case of the EU, European integration. The 
thesis suggests that these arguably change over time as preference alignments in the 
chambers change. 
 
Empirical strategy: identifying coalitions under formal and informal 
procedural choices  
 
This section presents the empirical strategy devised to create a dataset on early- and 
final-stage coalitions in the EP and Council. While final-stage decision-making has 
been the subject of a vast, established literature, our knowledge of early-stage 
coalitions is much sparser. For the EP, roll-call vote data and its possible 
shortcomings have been analysed in depth (Carrubba et al., 2006; Hix, Noury, & 
Roland, 2007). For the Council, contestation in voting behaviour and the lack thereof 
have been debated (Hayes-Renshaw, van Aken, & Wallace, 2006; Heisenberg, 2005; 
Mattila & Lane, 2001). In contrast, only few studies exist that scrutinise early-stage 
decision-making, such as in the committees of the EP and working parties of the 
Council, and even fewer aim at identifying coalitions at that stage (Finke, 2012; 
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Fouilleux, Maillard, & Smith, 2005; F. M. Häge, 2007; Frank M. Häge, 2013; Hurka, 
2013). A simple explanation for this is data availability, which is generally more 




In order to overcome these widely acknowledged challenges, this thesis embarks on a 
major data collection effort based on novel methods of identifying coalitions. It takes 
as its starting point 844 co-decision acts proposed under the ordinary legislative 
procedure between 1999 and 2009. This period was chosen because it provides some 
continuity in the institutional framework given the reform of co-decision that entered 




Co-decision 2 is marked by a shift from formal, sequential decision-making to more 
simultaneous informal bargaining between the co-legislators in trilogues with the 
European Commission (Farrell & Héritier, 2003, 2004). It includes the possibility to 
conclude legislation after the first reading of the procedure. When legislation is 
controversial enough to be amended, actors have a procedural choice between opting 
for formal sequential or informal, simultaneous decision-making. These choices have 
important implications for the identification of coalitions. At this point I will explain 
the different options, and their implications will be highlighted in the following 
sections when discussing the identification of coalitions in the Council and the EP. 
 
When the European Commission proposes a piece of legislation, and the EP and 
Council seek to amend it. They can now opt for the formal route, under which the 
                                                 
2 This is likely to change as the European Parliament has recently introduced roll-call votes at 
committee level. A recent ECJ ruling in the field of transparency also safeguards the availability of 
information on policy positions in Council minutes. 




European Parliament adopts its amendments, and the Council adopt its amendments 
after that. If the Council is in perfect agreement with the EP, they will adopt the 
amendments of the EP, and the act is adopted at first reading. If the Council prefers 
an ever-so-small change, at least a second reading in the EP will be required.  
 
In order to avoid a second reading, the EP and Council have a strong incentive to opt 
for the informal route and coordinate their amendments before the EP adopts its 
opinion. The EP then already adopts with its first-reading opinion those amendments 
of the Council that the chamber deems acceptable. With the Council’s amendments 
already included in the EP’s opinion, the Council does not need to introduce 
additional amendments and the act can be adopted at first reading. If agreement is not 
possible, a reversal to the formal route, and thus a continuation of the negotiations in 
a second round of readings is possible, so there is a general incentive to try an 
informal agreement.  
 
When opting for this informal route, the coordination of amendments can take place 
on the basis of a mandate. The two institutions first independently adopt mandates 
for their negotiators, then coordinate on a compromise, and adopt this at first reading. 
Alternatively, negotiators can meet without mandates and present a feasible 
compromise to their chambers. The implications of this will be discussed below. 
 
In sum, co-decision 2 created an incentive for actors in the two chambers to 
coordinate their amendments in order to adopt legislation at the first reading. The 
factors driving such agreements have been discussed in the literature (Rasmussen & 
Reh, 2013; Rasmussen, 2011; Reh, Heritier, Bressanelli, & Koop, 2013). Under this 
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procedural choice, any amendments requested in the Council already need to be 
adopted by the European Parliament prior to their adoption in the Council. Whereas 
the formal sequence of the procedure stipulates that the EP first adopt its opinion and 
the Council then react to it, informalisation means that by default the EP and Council 
each prepare to agree a compromise at first reading.  
 
The following describes in detail the empirical strategy and data sources at the heart 
of this project. As starting point, I adapted Reh et al.’s (2013) data (including 
legislation adopted in this period) based on information available in the EP’s 
Legislative Observatory. First, we focus on early-stage coalitions in the Council, and 
then on those in the EP. Each section starts by answering the question of how 
coalitions were identified, and then delves into the more technical part on data 
collection. Second, we discuss the more conventional identification of final-stage 
coalitions in the two institutions.  
 
 
Council of the European Union: identifying early-stage coalitions 
based on reservations 
 
After the Commission has published its legislative proposal, member state 
delegations reacting to a proposal have different options at hand. First they can make 
simple suggestions for changes to the text. These can be genuine improvements to 
the text, but mostly they are low salience proposals based on the preferences of the 
delegation. Consider the following two examples: 
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“The AT delegation pointed out that the preamble should include a reference 
to act XYZ.” 
“CZ: would prefer to delete paragraph d”. 
These examples are indicative of the normal deliberative negotiating style in the 
Council. The presidency and other member states may judge these proposals on their 
merits, and they might be taken on board or not. Either way, these interventions do 
not usually impede agreement. 
 
A second option is more formal. Member states can enter reservations on specific 
points or entire proposals (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006; Nedergaard, 2007, pp. 
162–3; Westlake & Galloway, 2004, p. 226). Westlake and Galloway (2004) 
differentiate between procedural and substantive reservations. Procedural 
reservations usually come in the form of scrutiny or parliamentary (scrutiny) 
reservations. If member state representatives do not have instructions from their 
capital yet because the inter-ministerial coordination process has not been concluded, 
they can enter a scrutiny reservation. In essence, this means that a country’s position 
on a specific clause is still undecided or that a new proposal will have to be discussed 
with superiors in the national administration. In addition, member states frequently 
lodge parliamentary (scrutiny) reservations. Here, the justification is that a national 
parliament has to be consulted on a member state’s position. The rationale in the 
negotiation is hence similar to a scrutiny reserve: in one case it is the executive that 
still needs time, in the other the legislature. Nevertheless, procedural reservations 
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have in common that they “are not considered important, since most will evaporate 
in due course” (Westlake & Galloway, 2004, p. 226).4 
 
Substantive reservations in contrast are high-salience objections to texts and 
compromises. Westlake and Galloway explain that, “When a member state 
representative, at whatever level (Council, Coreper or working party) cannot agree to 
something in a text proposed by the Commission or the presidency, they place what 
is known as a reservation on it (often referred to in Franglais as a ‘reserve’)”(ibid.). 
These reservations are costly for member states in that they constitute requests for 
accommodation. In the give-and-take of Council negotiations, member states have an 
incentive to only enter a reservation in severe cases so as to save political capital. 
Hence, “a formal reservation is the sternest and most inflexible variety. It means that 
a member state cannot accept a provision on substantial rather than procedural 
grounds” (ibid.). As a consequence, reservations are not the default option for 
expressing disagreement or requesting changes to texts. Instead, often footnotes with 
comments by member states co-exist with reservations. While a delegation may 
hence note that it would prefer Option A over Option B, or may highlight 
inconsistencies in the text, reservations may be held up at the same time in case of 
serious disagreement. 
 
In sum we can thus differentiate between ordinary interventions, procedural and 
substantive reservations. Substantive reservations mean that a country has not been 
accommodated on an issue of high salience to them, and we infer from this that it is 
not part of the presidency’s proto-coalition. Interventions in Council meetings are 
                                                 
4 Other procedural reservations are “waiting reservations”, which in substance correspond to scrutiny 




recorded in documents that delegations use in their meetings to come to an 
agreement. A summary of the state of play and/or footnotes to the draft legislative 
text can mention substantive reservations. In order to identify coalition membership, 
we thus need to collect information on reservations. The next section describes the 
data collection effort in more detail. 
 
Data collection: early-stage coalitions in the Council 
 
Reservations were hand-coded from Council documents with essential support by 
software. The first challenge was to obtain the documents from the Council website. 
The second was to code the countries having entered reservations. The third was to 
identify the correct document containing reservations in terms of timing in order to 
code valid coalitions. In the following, I go through these steps. 
 
Obtaining the documents and making them machine readable 
 
Documents relating to the different legislative procedures can be downloaded from 
the Council register of documents in portable document format (PDF) after search 
for the reference number of the legislative procedure (Council of the European 
Union, 2014). As downloading these documents manually is extremely time-
consuming and prone to error, I used software to extract information about the 
documents, created a list of all links to documents, and then downloaded them with 




In order to obtain information about the population of documents, I built two 
“crawlers” in the import.io application (Import.io, 2014). Crawlers are web-scraping 
tools that extract information from websites and transform the data into machine-
readable datasets. The first crawler collected information on the number of 
documents per legislative procedure, and thus the number of result pages. On this 
basis I created a list of all websites containing these documents. The second crawler 
then retrieved from these websites the document number, title, date and accessibility 
status of each document relating to these procedures. In numerical terms, a total of 
21,507 documents matching the 844 procedures were listed in the register. 18,443 of 
these were fully accessible, 598 only partially (meaning that parts are redacted), and 





From the document numbers, I created a list of links to the documents, which I fed 
into a download manager in groups of several hundreds. This programme in practice 
successively opened the websites and downloaded the files into a specified folder. 
The result of this step was the population of accessible documents in PDF-format.  
 
For the further steps, the PDF-documents had to be converted into computer-readable 
text files. PDF-files come in two forms. They can have a text file embedded or 
simply contain an image of the text. As the latter is not searchable, the text has to be 
extracted through optical character recognition (OCR). I used Adobe Professional 
software for bulk-conversion of the documents into text files with interposed OCR. 
                                                 
5 There are theoretical reasons for using available documents only. Documents containing reservations 
by member states that are not public might be so at their request. If that is the case, and they wish to 
keep this information private, they are unlikely to oppose the legislation if not accommodated. This 
would bias the results. For the procedures eventually selected, I requested non-accessible documents 
finding only marginal changes to the information in publicly available documents. 
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In short, the software checked whether OCR was necessary, and then converted the 
files into text format. 
 
While these steps are straightforward, it should be noted that the sheer extent of the 
data collection effort means that a seemingly simple step such as downloading the 
documents or converting them into text files can easily bring a software or computer 
to its knees. The chosen software is thus also a result of these practical 
considerations. Despite using powerful hardware and software these are matters of 
weeks rather than days or hours. Likewise, the management of more than 18,000 
files is not feasible manually, but required the use of code. Once this first step was 
completed, I could, however, draw on a fully searchable database sorted by 




Reservations in Council minutes follow a specific format, making it possible to 
search the text for specific formulations. The standard procedure in content analysis 
is the creation of a dictionary that contains these formulations, and that can then be 
used to search the text (Neuendorf, 2002, pp. 126–130). It is also possible to create 
more complex search terms that link words to a particular context (key word in 
context, “KWIC”) and search for concordance (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 131). These 
searches can be performed in software such as WordStat. 
 
I performed a comparable search routine with GREP software (PowerGREP, 2014). 
Grepping software globally searches for a regular expression and prints (global 
regular expression print, hence grep) the results on the screen or in an output file. In 
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essence, this software performs the same task as content analysis software for 
keyword-in-context or concordance analysis, but following a more efficient 
procedure and in a more stable environment. The search term is a regular expression 
(regex), which in principle allows complex patterns of text to be matched. 
 
As my aim was to identify reservations, I needed search terms (i.e., a “dictionary“ in 
content analysis terms) that covered the interchangeable nouns reservation(s) and 
reserve(s), as well as the verb to reserve in its inflected variants. This boils down to 




In plain English, this means that the software prints all lines in which the term 
“reserv” is found given certain conditions: 
 The term is preceded by a space, standard punctuation mark or it positioned 
at the start of a line. This means that the search term only returns a result if 
“reserv” is at the start of the word. Thus, it returns “reservation”, but not 
“preservation”. 
 The term is not preceded by “parliamentary” or “scrutiny”. This means that 
the search term will not return “scrutiny reservation” or “parliamentary 
reservation”. 
 The term is not case-sensitive. This means that both “Reserve” and 
“reservation” are returned. 
Experts in the use of programming software might well be able to create more 
efficient search terms, and there are slight variations in regex-codes across 
programmes, so I was careful to test the search term on training files in the software 
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that I used (PowerGREP, 2014). The output shows the highlighted matches, allowing 
easy navigation, and the number of lines of context is easily adjustable. If more 
context is required, clicking on the line number opens the source document at the 
specified point. All of this facilitates an efficient analysis of the output. 
 
The output of this step was thus, for each legislative procedure, a list of files 
containing potential substantive reservations, as well as the actual output of the grep 
procedure, namely the lines containing reservations. The emphasis here is on 
potential substantive reservations because not all returned results are indeed correct 
matches. The regex does not distinguish between substantive reservations that 
member states enter, a flight reservation mentioned in legislation on passenger rights, 
and a resource reserve that member states have to maintain under energy legislation. 
It might be possible to filter these out using a more sophisticated search term, but I 
am not aware of any specification that would not come at the cost of risking missing 
substantive reservations.
6
 Therefore, I deemed it more sensible to cast the net a little 
wider and rely on human coding to discard false matches, than missing a reservation 
in a text because of too restrictive search terms.  
 
The resulting list of reservations was then cross-checked and reservations were hand-
coded. This allowed discarding three types of “false” matches. Firstly, this relates to 
any remaining reservations that are not substantive reservations. This captures 
reservations not entered by member states as a negotiating device (e.g., flight 
reservations), non-substantive reservations (e.g., scrutiny reservations) that were 
                                                 
6 For instance, it would be possible to search for reservations only if they are in a sentence mentioning 
a country or nationality. This would mean that we discard instances in which a reservation is entered, 
but the country is not mentioned. Likewise one could exclude matches in the context of specific words 
(say, “flight”). But this would also exclude substantive reservations in the proximity of the term. Thus, 
refinements would only constitute partial solutions, and carry important risks. 
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returned despite being excluded (e.g. due to spelling mistakes in the document or 
formatting issues), and mentions of reservations that had been withdrawn. Secondly, 
any reservations could be discarded that referred not to the compromise text as such 
but rather to a specific member state proposal. For example, consider a footnote 
reading “FR suggests postponing deadline to 2017; reservation by NL delegation on 
this proposal“. In this case the Netherlands is not excluded from the presidency’s 
coalition, as the proposed change to the deadline was merely floated at the meeting, 
but not embraced by the presidency and included in the text. Thirdly, it allowed 
flagging up a document if there were any non-attributable reservations. In some cases 
the draftspersons use generic language highlighting that “several member states” or 
“two delegations” entered reservations. In this case, we cannot identify who is 
actually behind the reservations. 
 
The key question of which member states entered a substantive reservation proved a 
very straightforward coding exercise based on the handy output of the software.
7
 
This facilitated refining the list of Council documents that included information on 
coalitions, as well as the coalition members as such. However, for many legislative 
procedures there was more than one document including substantive reservations, 
and thus potentially different coalitions to choose from. Deciding on which 
document to use, and thus which coalition, represented the final challenge. 
 
                                                 
7 In line with recommendations by Neuendorf (2002, pp. 158–159) and Krippendorff (2004, pp. 238–
241), an inter-coder reliability test on a stratified sample of 376 files including 208 matches was 





Identifying the correct document and valid coalition 
 
If the coalition evolved over time, as the presidency adapted the content of the 
proposal to include some member states so as to find a majority, while possibly 
excluding others whose requests became too demanding, it is important to identify 
rules for the selection of the document on which the coding is based. Let us recall 
first that we are interested in identifying intra-institutional coalitions based on a 
presidency compromise text. This implies a specific time window demarcated by two 
criteria.  
 
The first criterion delimits the start of the time window. After a proposal has been 
transmitted by the European Commission, working parties in the Council conduct a 
first analysis of the text. At this stage, the delegations go through the proposal article 
by article in an exchange of views. As a consequence, reservations initially refer to 
the Commission proposal rather than a presidency compromise (Nedergaard, 2007, p. 
261). Hence, documents at this stage are not suitable for the present research interest. 
Moreover, many national capitals are still in the process of forming their positions 
through mechanisms of national inter-ministerial coordination (Gärtner, Hörner, & 
Obholzer, 2011; Kassim, Menon, Peters, & Wright, 2001; Kassim, Peters, & Wright, 
2000), on the basis of which they instruct their representatives in the working parties. 
During this first analysis, positions are still in flux and coalition formation cannot be 
discerned. In sum, the first criterion thus excludes early exchanges of views on the 
Commission proposal from the analysis, because positions refer to the Commission 





The second criterion delimits the end of the time window. Once negotiations with the 
EP start and a joint compromise text becomes the basis of the discussions in the 
Council, we are leaving the intra-institutional phase. Usually, the Council Secretariat 
draws up a so-called “four-column document”, in which one column contains the 
original Commission proposal, one the EP’s proposed changes, one the Council’s 
proposed changes, and one a potential compromise. At this point, reservations do not 
any more refer to the intra-institutional coalition formed by the presidency, but the 
compromise between the two chambers. In order to assess coalition formation at the 
final stage, we will look at final-stage voting behaviour. Therefore, we exclude 
documents in which the basis of discussion is a compromise text between the two 
institutions. 
 
The time window for identifying the early-stage, intra-institutional coalition is 
between these two demarcations. If there is more than one document in this time 
window, the latest one represents the presidency’s final coalition-formation effort, 
and thus the mandate with which the presidency can go into trilogue negotiations 
with the EP rapporteur and the Commission. In a nutshell, for any procedure for 
which reservations were identified in minutes of meetings, we need to identify the 
latest possible document at the intra-institutional stage that is within the time 
window. If the documents returned by the search do not meet these criteria, the 
respective legislative procedure is unfit for our analysis. 
 
In order to assess the risk of selection bias that might arise from the exclusion of 
these procedures, we need to better understand which files are affected by these 
criteria. To this end, we can draw on the categorisation of variants of the co-decision 
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2 procedure developed at the start of the section. Accordingly, we will differentiate 
between formal and informal procedural choices, and mandate-based and non-
mandate based variants of the latter. Files adopted under a purely formal procedure 
would fall outside the scope of the analysis if the Council waited until after the 
adoption of the EP’s opinion before starting its work on the file. The basis of Council 
deliberations would then be the EP’s opinion rather than the Commission’s proposal. 
Where explicit reference was made to EP amendments in documents, I excluded the 
document from the analysis because it suggests that the coalition described already 
targets a compromise with the EP rather than a Council-internal position. In other 
words, these procedures would not meet the second criterion. However, as discussed 
at the start of the section, this is a rare phenomenon. The Council usually starts its 
work on files soon after their adoption by the Commission and works towards a 
mandate for the presidency, which can then enter into informal negotiations with the 
rapporteur. This is the standard, and by now default procedural choice. 
 
If Council and Parliament opt for the informal route, we need to distinguish between 
mandate and non-mandate based variants of the procedure. Under a mandate-based 
procedure, the presidency enters into negotiations with the EP rapporteur based on a 
set of amendments agreed by a coalition in the Council and EP committee, 
respectively. Under a non-mandate based procedure, the Council would not have 
adopted a mandate when the negotiations start. The former is the by far most likely 
situation given the hierarchical organisation of the Council. While very technical 
consultations between experts may take place at expert level, political controversy 
that we are interested in here is covered by political trilogues, in which the 
presidency’s permanent representative or their deputy negotiates with the EP 
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rapporteur. At this point, the proposal has travelled up the Council hierarchy and the 
Council presidency has built a coalition around a compromise proposal. In other 
words, when the proposal has progressed far enough for informal trilogue 
negotiations to be on the agenda, the presidency can work on the basis of a 
compromise proposal, serving as mandate for the negotiations, supported by a 
coalition that it formed.  
 
This raises the question of whether presidencies have a strategic incentive to enter 
into non-mandated trilogues. These files would be excluded from the analysis, 
potentially leading to a selection bias in my sample. I argue that there are only very 
limited circumstances under which it would be expedient for the presidency to 
engage in non-mandated trilogues. One reason for this is that presidencies’ success is 
measured in particular by concluding files. It is much easier for presidencies to 
achieve that once sufficient compromise has been established. Negotiating in a 
vacuum with rapporteur does seem to do only little to drive the negotiations forward. 
 
There may be strategic advantages to be gained for the Council or the presidency 
from e.g. adopting a mandate early or particularly late, before the EP adopts the 
mandate for its negotiator. In both cases, the files would run the risk of being 
excluded. However, these considerations do not seem to be a reason for concern with 
regard to potential selection bias. The strongest reason for the Council to adopt its 
mandate early is to signal to the EP that it is united. But these cases would in any 
case fall through the roster because there would not be any split in the Council. 
Recalling that I selected documents based on reservations mentioned in them, I only 
investigate files causing controversy in the Council. As for adopting mandates late, 
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the nature of Council deliberations eliminates plausible strategic considerations. 
Since Council negotiations are not public, the Council has no incentive to delay 
negotiations in order to, e.g. avoid disclosing splits or policy positions. In other 
words, strategic considerations might play a role in the timing and sequence of 
negotiations, but this does not seem to further bias the data beyond the exclusion of 
non-controversial files in the Council. 
 
The two criteria discussed above thus remain the most important delineation o 
suitable documents. They raise important decisions for human coders, and which are 
more difficult than the identification of a reservation discussed above: which of the 
documents, if any, should be the basis for coding the intra-institutional coalition? 
Coding instructions were devised that operationalise the criteria in a straightforward 




Once this document had been identified, all of these steps culminate in a simple 
variable capturing whether each member state upheld a reservation at this point, and 
hence, whether it was part of the presidency’s proto-coalition or not. Thus we 




                                                 
8 A test for inter-coder reliability was conducted on a stratified sample of 82 legislative files, and thus 
in line with Neuendorf’s (2002, pp. 158–159) and Krippendorff’s (2004, pp. 238–241) 
recommendations supports this with Krippendorff’s alpha at .802. This is a satisfactory value 
(Krippendorff, 2004, pp. 241–243), in particular given that slightly different choices in documents do 




European Parliament: identifying coalitions based on amendments  
 
Having been assigned a report, the rapporteur will draw up a draft report after one or 
two exchanges of views on the Commission proposal in the committee (Corbett, 
Jacobs, & Shackleton, 2011, pp. 161–162). This contains a set of amendments that he 
or she deems desirable or, in rare cases, only a resolution to adopt the Commission 
proposal without amendments. The draft report is then discussed in committee and a 
second round of amendments is introduced, this time around by committee members 
as well as the rapporteur. The full set of amendments is then discussed in committee, 
and subsequently voted on. This is a more formal, less iterative procedure than in the 
Council. While the presidency in the chair can propose new changes at any point, the 
rapporteur and competing party groups are more constrained. 
 
Before the vote, however, the rapporteur can seek to build a coalition in negotiation 
with shadow rapporteurs and party group coordinators (Corbett et al., 2011, p. 159). 
The rapporteur can propose compromise and consolidated amendments in this quest. 
These are usually one to three reformulations of amendments confined to one 
paragraph or article each. In rare cases, these amendments are formally proposed, in 
which case they can be treated like ordinary amendments as they will have authors 
attached to them. However, often compromise amendments are proposed shortly 
before the meeting, and are, much like oral amendments in committee, not available 
in written form. This renders it impossible to attribute sponsors. 
 
In this context it is again instructive to draw on the distinction between mandate and 
non-mandate based informal negotiations under the co-decision 2 procedure. This 
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has far ranging consequences for EP committee decision-making and transparency. 
Under classical scenario of a mandate-based informal negotiation, the committee 
adopts its opinion and before tabling the report in plenary, the rapporteur reaches out 
the Council in order to see whether a “formal procedure” beyond the first reading can 
be averted.  In contrast, under a non-mandate based scenario the rapporteur would 
enter into informal negotiations with the Council  before the final committee vote 
rather than between committee vote and plenary vote (Héritier & Reh, 2012; 
Obholzer & Reh, 2012; Reh, 2014). If the rapporteur forges such an agreement, 
usually all previously negotiated amendments fall and are replaced by a full new text 
including all amendments. Under these circumstances it would be impossible to 
identify whose amendments were included and whose were not, unless one was to 
comb through the proposed text.  
 
Excluding files negotiated under the non-mandated variant of the informal route 
under co-decision 2 raises questions as to whether this leads to a selection bias with 
regard to the sample of acts studied here. Therefore, it is important to note that such 
non-mandated informal negotiations are strictly discouraged within the EP. As early 
as 2004, the EP adopted guidelines on negotiations under co-decision, which 
required rapporteurs to negotiate based on a committee mandate. By now, these rules 
have been codified in the EP’s rules of procedure. On the one hand, the need for 
guidelines shows that this has been an issue. MEPs complained that rapporteurs 
would meet with the presidency without control by e.g. shadow rapporteurs. On the 
other hand, it demonstrates that this conduct was from early on strongly discouraged, 




It also helps to think about the strategic reasons that rapporteurs might have to enter 
into non-mandated negotiations with the Council. In principle, the rapporteur could 
pursue this route without a backlash from fellow members of the committee only in 
case of very technical, non-controversial legislation. This legislation is already 
excluded from the sample if it did not cause controversy in the Council. This would 
suggest that the overall impact would be rather small. 
 
If the vote proceeds, committee (substitute) members decide on individual 
amendments, possible compromises or oral agreements (Corbett et al., 2011, pp. 
162–163). Split votes differentiating between different parts of an amendment may 
be requested. The committee secretariat prepares a voting list indicating the voting 
order and interdependencies between amendments. For instance, many amendments 
are mutually exclusive, meaning that if one is adopted the others automatically fall 
and are not put to vote.  
 
The key insight about the process is that proposing amendments does not seem a 
coordinated endeavour, while voting is. Party groups usually have the rapporteur or 
shadow rapporteur following a file on their behalf, so their amendments, as well 
those of coordinators, are of particular importance (Corbett et al., 2011, p. 159; 
Hurka, Kaeding, & Obholzer, 2014; Whitaker, 2001). Nevertheless, the amendment 
process is genuinely open. Members enter amendments as they deem appropriate. 
This contrasts with voting, which is largely based on coordinated lists provided by 
the (shadow) rapporteur in cooperation with party group coordinators on the 
committee, after party-group internal discussions and negotiations between the 




As amendments from a group’s MEP may thus be withdrawn or lapse as part of a 
compromise in the rapporteur’s proto-coalition, and as individual MEPs might 
uphold amendments not supported by the group, the definition of the rapporteur’s 
proto-coalition cannot be fully in line with that in Council, where we looked at those 
who – translated to the EP setting – saw their amendments rejected. Instead we have 
to approach the issue not by who is excluded, but who is included in the coalition. 
 
Hence, we can define as part of the rapporteur’s proto-coalition all groups who had 
an amendment adopted. I exclude compromise/consolidated and oral amendments 
not specifying their sponsors. This is reasonable because we can expect that the 
groups proposing or endorsing these are exactly those who also see other 
amendments adopted. For pragmatic reasons, I also exclude any amendments from 
opinion-giving committees. This would not have been feasible as the entire process 
would have to be executed for each file and each opinion by a committee. While the 
amendments contained on these opinions might well be important, I expect that they 
reflect the same coalition as the main responsible committee. 
 
In sum, we can thus recap this section as follows. After all amendments have been 
proposed, the rapporteur needs to build a proto-coalition supported by other party 
groups. By exchanging support over amendments, the rapporteur can build a 
coalition. As a consequence, amendments proposed by MEPs from groups belonging 
to the proto-coalition will be accepted in committee. Hence, by identifying which 
groups successfully proposed amendments, we can identify who belongs to the 
rapporteur’s proto-coalition. This shows that in order to identify coalitions, we 
44 
 
require all amendments proposed in committee, as well as the minutes of the meeting 
in which they were put to vote. 
 
Data collection: early-stage coalitions in the EP 
 
Amendments were extracted from official EP documents with the help of software. 
While the sheer amount of data was the major challenge when it came to the Council, 
locating documents proved hardest in the context of the EP. This is because 
documents are not systematically filed on the basis of the inter-institutional 
reference. Given this was the major constraint, data collection was limited to those 
162 files for which information had been secured on Council coalitions. This 
limitation made the largely manual process practically feasible. 
 
 
Obtaining the documents, extracting information, and identifying successful 
amendments 
 
The EP’s Legislative Observatory (OEIL) (European Parliament, 2014) was the 
starting point of the data collection, as it provides links to draft reports and 
amendments (for more recent procedures), as well as the date of the vote in 
committee. On this basis the meeting list of the respective committee could be 
accessed, and missing documents (draft reports, amendments, and possible 
compromise amendments) could be downloaded. By sifting through the agendas and 
documents for the following meetings, most minutes could be secured when they 
were put on the agenda for approval by the committee. If the minutes had not been 
approved in committee two years after the initial meeting, the search was aborted. As 
45 
 
the complexity already suggests, attempts at automation of this part of the data 
collection did not succeed. 
 
Once the documents had been secured, the data had to be extracted. Amendment 
numbers and sponsors could be extracted through simple “grepping” of the 
documents, and given the consecutive numbering of amendments any mistakes could 
be easily corrected. These could then be matched with information from the 
meeting’s minutes. The minutes however varied in quality. Some minutes did not 
include amendment-specific data at all, so they had to be excluded. In most cases, the 
minutes list all adopted amendments, with a simple addition that all remaining 
amendments fell or lapsed (because a competing amendment was adopted), were 
rejected by vote, or withdrawn by the authors. For others, it is specified in detail 
which of these different options applied to specific amendments. As per the 
definition of coalitions above, the analysis focused on the common denominator of 
adopted amendments. Excluding 38 acts for which either the minutes could not be 
located or which did not contain amendment-specific information, the result of these 
steps was a list of more than 19,000 amendments proposed on 124 files matched with 
information on whether they were adopted or not. 
 
We could stop at this point if individual MEPs rather than party groups were the 
decisive actors in legislative coalition formation. In order to match MEPs with their 
party group instead, I used data from the EP that was automatically extracted 
(“crawled”) from MEPs’ web profiles detailing their history of parliamentary service, 
including their party group affiliation and possible changes thereof. This is in 





 This allowed matching amendment sponsors with their party 
group affiliation at the time of the vote.  
 
On this basis it could easily be coded whether an amendment sponsored by an MEP 
of a specific group was adopted, and thus whether the party group was part of the 
rapporteur’s proto-coalition or not. Recalling that the formateur forms a coalition 
around him- or herself, it should be noted that the party group of the formateur is part 




Analyses of final stage contestation and voting behaviour are much more common, 
and their coding is more straightforward. We follow procedures that are similar to 
those deployed to identify early-stage coalitions in the two institutions. 
 
Council of the EU 
 
There is an established literature focusing on contestation in the Council at the final 
decision-making stage. These studies have focused on the level of contestation as 
well as dimensions of the policy space and coalitions among member states (Bailer, 
Mattila, & Schneider, 2014; Hagemann & De Clerck-Sachsse, 2007; Hagemann, 
2006; Hayes-Renshaw et al., 2006; Hosli, Mattila, & Uriot, 2011; Mattila & Lane, 
2001; Mattila, 2004, 2009; van Aken, 2012). Since Regulation 1049/2001 on 
transparency and access to documents entered into force, votes are recorded in public 
                                                 
9 I use part of this data on parliamentary service in co-authored work on rapporteurship assignment 
(Hurka et al., 2014) and party group coordinators (Obholzer & Kaeding, 2012). 
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addendums to Council minutes. In addition, monthly summaries of council acts 
provide information on voting decisions and statements. For earlier decisions, it is 
also useful to consider press releases accompanying the decisions. Given the 
consensual nature of Council decision-making, Hagemann (e.g. 2007) argues that 
member states express their dissatisfaction through statements rather than votes if 
they realise that they are in the minority. Member states can enter these into the 
minutes (and they are reproduced in the monthly summaries). Thereby, they can 
maintain good relations with the other member states. 
 
For these reasons I coded as members of the final coalition all member states that did 
not vote against, abstained, or entered a statement voicing their concerns in the 
minutes.
10
 These documents are available through the Commission database PreLex 
and the Council’s Legislative Transparency websites. Under all of these 
circumstances, the member states did not get what they wanted and can hence be 






Similar to the Council, we have a good knowledge of plenary decision making in the 
EP, largely because of roll-call vote analysis (Hix et al., 2007; Hix & Noury, 2009). 
These studies have shed light on the ever-increasing cohesion of party groups, 
coalitions and dimensionality of the policy space. However, the default mode of 
voting in the EP is a simple show of hands and roll-call votes have to be requested 
                                                 
10 I excluded statements by the UK and Spain maintaining that specific pieces of legislation did not 
affect their territorial claims to Gibraltar, as I did not consider this conflict to be related to the policy 
at stake. 
11 I do not differentiate between abstentions under qualified majority voting and unanimity. Under the 
latter procedure, an abstention does not block an agreement. Yet, it clearly shows that the member 
state abstaining does not fully support the agreement forged by the Presidency. 
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separately (Carrubba et al., 2006; Carrubba, Gabel, & Hug, 2008). Therefore, we 
cannot systematically rely on roll-call votes to identify whether the majority of a 




Instead we again draw on amendments and their success, in line with the procedure 
at committee level. The report voted in committee is put to vote in plenary, and the 
committee, party groups and members (at least 38) can propose amendments. If the 
committee report is adopted without any amendments, the early-stage coalition 
equals the final coalition. If the committee report is successfully amended by groups 
that were part of the early-stage coalition, nothing changes. If any amendments by 
one of these groups are voted down, the respective group is not considered part of the 
coalition any more. Successful amendments by groups that were not previously 
included in the coalition are taken to mean that they are now additional members of 
the coalition.  
 
If the committee report is voted down or withdrawn, the starting point is not the 
early-stage coalition that carried it, but instead we start from a clean slate. Those 
groups whose amendments are adopted are considered as part of the coalition. Hence 
we arrive at final-stage coalitions in the EP. 
 
Data: the samples 
 
Through these steps, intra-institutional coalitions could be identified in a total of 124 
legislative procedures in the population of 844 co-decision files initiated between 
                                                 
12 This 2009, the first-reading vote on the legislative resolution takes place by roll call. 
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1999 and 2009. This is not a representative sample, but meaningful selection of 
controversial files. It is not representative because at a minimum it does not include 
non-controversial files on which no member state introduced a reservation. Other 
strategic considerations of actors in the process that might lead to a selection bias in 
the sample have been discussed above. Overall, there is no clear direction in which 
these can be expected to affect the data and results in the following papers. Similar to 
roll-call vote samples in legislatures, the cases studied here are relevant and arguably 
particularly interesting, because they shed light on contested legislation. Most 
importantly, the procedure developed here allows original insights into early-stage 
coalitions and legislative behaviour that can be replicated on more recent legislative 
files.  
 
The three papers draw on different samples of these 844 legislative acts. The first 
paper focuses on early- and final-stage decision-making and hence uses the 124 cases 
for which we have complete information on both Council and EP. The second paper 
is concerned with the dynamics between the formateurs and their principals, and can 
as a consequence draw on almost the full population of 844 acts. The third paper 
focuses on coalition dynamics in the Council and can make use of all 164 cases for 
which information could be identified for that institution. 
 
Summary and outlook 
 
This introduction has provided a concise overview of the research project at the heart 
of the thesis. It has first explained the structure of the thesis in three papers and 
expounded their content. Presenting the main argument and definitions of its building 
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blocks has served a common foundation for the three papers. Against the backdrop of 
the state of the art, this has illustrated the contribution of the thesis to the literature. 
Finally, a technical section has detailed the innovative empirical strategy. 
 
The three papers will introduce the theory of trans-institutional cooperation, the 
formateurs’ impact on efficiency in the market for vote trades and the impact these 





Annex 1: Coding instructions 
Identifying reservations 
Please code whether a grep (search) result tells you about a substantive reservation 
by a member state, where 1=yes and 0=no. Member states are identified by the 
country name, nationality or one of the codes/abbreviations listed in the inter-
institutional style guide (http://publications.europa.eu/code/pdf/370000en.htm ). 
Please note that COM and Cion refer to the European Commission. 
Please code a search result as 1 under the following condition: 
 The result links one or several member states to a substantive reservation. 
Formulations include e.g. “CZ entered a reservation”, “the NL delegation 
reserved their position”, “UK: reserve”.  
Please code a search result as 0 under the following conditions: 
 It refers to reservations or reserves in different contexts than as a negotiating 
device (e.g. flight reservations, currency reserve). 
 It refers to a scrutiny, parliamentary, linguistic, or waiting 
reservation/reserve. 
 It relates to a specific proposal made at a meeting rather than a provision 
included in the draft legal text/ a presidency compromise (e.g., “NL has a 
reservation on the F proposal”, “The Commission proposes to extend the 
deadline. DK has a reservation on this.). 
 It relates to a reservation that has been withdrawn at this point.  
 It relates to a substantive reservation, but does not immediately specify one. 
For instance, consider the sentence “The following reservations remain: IT 
has a reserve on article 1”. The first result would be coded as 0, while the 
second would be coded as 1. In contrast, consider the sentence “The 
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following reservations remain: IT, article1.” This would return one result, 
which would be coded as 1. 
Please code all results of a document as 0 under the following condition: 
 Any result leaves unspecified which member state entered a reservation (e.g., 
“Two delegations entered reservations on this article.”) 
In some cases, reservations will not be in the footnotes but in a summary at the start 
of the document. This requires particular care because relevant information may be 
spread over several lines. If in doubt, please request the full document. 
 
 
Identifying the correct document 
Please consider the following documents by procedure and date. In some cases, more 
than one document might be assigned to a date. In this case please consider all the 
documents en bloc because they relate to a single meeting.  
For each legislative procedure, please study the documents and starting with the most 
recent, identify whether the text: 
1) Relates to the first reading under the co-decision procedure.  
a. YES: proceed with step 2. 
b. NO: code as 0 and proceed to the next most recent document. 
2) Is a compromise text between the Council and EP. 
a. NO: proceed with step 3. 
b. YES: code as 0 and proceed to the next most recent document. 
3) Relates to a working party document and has not been discussed by Coreper 
or the Council before. 
53 
 
a. YES: code as 0. Code all remaining documents relating to the 
procedure as 0. Then proceed to the next legislative procedure. 
b. NO: code as 1. Code all remaining documents relating to the 










‘Formateurs’ in bicameral legislative politics: Explaining 





The paper presents a theory of why and how specific coalitions are formed under 
bicameralism. It suggests that actors can enter into trans-institutional cooperation 
across institutional boundaries, and proposes a causal mechanism of coalition 
formation. Formateurs can propose a logroll across issues within a bill that is carried 
by a majority in the two chambers. They therefore face a strategic decision between 
two decision-making scenarios, in which either the chambers oppose each other as 
unitary actors or coalitions within the institutions are pitted against each other. On 
this basis the paper develops a typology of coalition dynamics. The empirical 
analysis draws on original data on early and final-stage coalitions on 124 legislative 
proposals proposed between 1999 and 2009 under the co-decision procedure in the 
bicameral system of the European Union. It provides evidence of different types of 




In bicameral systems, legislators need to form concurrent majorities in the two 
chambers in order to adopt legislation in the face of intra- and inter-institutional 
conflict. This raises the research question of why and how specific winning majority 
coalitions are built. To this end, this paper investigates the formation of majority 
coalitions through facilitation of specific logrolls across issues within a legislative 
proposal. It pursues two objectives: first, it introduces a distinction between different 
types of legislative coalition dynamics and provides empirical evidence of them in 
the political system of the European Union; second, it suggests that key actors in the 
chambers exert control over exchanges causing these dynamics.  
 
Coalition formation takes place in two stages and in line with one of two scenarios, 
as figure 1 illustrates. After intra-institutional coalitions have been formed in the 
chambers at a first stage, the chambers can take an inter-institutional or trans-
institutional approach to conflict resolution at the second stage: in the first scenario, 
the intra-institutional coalitions enter into inter-institutional negotiations on behalf of 
their unitary chamber; in the second scenario, a trans-institutional coalition between 
individual legislators across institutional boundaries can be formed instead. These 
scenarios result from exchanges towards a logroll carrying the bill that can take place 
at an intra-, inter- and trans-institutional level. The crucial point is that they result in 
distinct types of coalitions that consist of different actors. The paper provides 




Figure 1: Inter- and trans-institutional scenarios 
 
The central argument in this paper is that specific actors enable and influence the 
outcome of bicameral decision-making between the chambers by exerting control 
over the exchanges between actors. In countries such as Belgium or the Netherlands, 
actors tasked with forming a government are referred to as formateurs. Similar to 
these, legislative formateurs use their proposal power to put forward an inter- or 
trans-institutional logroll. In an inter-institutional logroll, the intra-institutional 
coalitions exchange support on different issues by giving in on issues about which 
they care less (low salience), while gaining concessions on issues about which they 
care a lot (high salience). In a trans-institutional logroll, constituent actors of the 
institutions exchange support. I assume a multi-issue and arguably multi-dimensional 
policy space, which creates vast opportunity for such logrolls within bills (Tullock, 
1959, 1981), creating demand for formateurs to enable coalitions.
13
 Out of the vast 
                                                 
13 Logrolls can take three forms, each of which has been argued to be present in the EU: internal 
logrolls within a bill (Aksoy, 2012; McKibben, 2008), external logrolls across bills (‘package deals’) 
(Kardasheva, 2009a), and logrolls over time through diffuse reciprocity (Heisenberg, 2005; Keohane, 
1986). Here, we focus on the most immediate of trades in support, that is internal logrolls, and 
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range of such feasible tradeoffs (hence, potential outcomes) in a zone of agreement, 
formateurs pick one substantive compromise and supporting coalition, and thereby 
decide if a trans- or inter-institutional route should be taken. In other words, 
formateurs determine which of the multiple equilibria is chosen and are, therefore, at 
the core of the micro-mechanism of coalition formation.  
 
Studies of government formation, from which the concept and role of formateurs 
originates, suggest that formateurs and other institutions have a key impact on 
coalition formation and stability (Diermeier, 2008). Extrapolated to legislative 
decision-making, they should also have a crucial impact on the nature of coalitions 
and be able to mould coalitions to further their interests (Finke, 2012).  
 
The paper focuses on the political system of the European Union to investigate the 
influence of formateurs on coalition dynamics. It scrutinises the agenda-setting 
power of the rapporteur in the EP and of the rotating presidency in the Council of the 
European Union in intra- and inter-institutional decision-making, and presents a 
typology of coalition dynamics arising from the strategic decision that formateurs 
face.  
 
The paper draws on a novel dataset on early and final-stage coalitions in the 
European Parliament and Council of the EU. It is based on an original data collection 
and analysis of more than 18,000 Council documents and more than 19,000 EP 
amendments relating to 124 legislative proposals initiated between 1999 and 2009 
under the co-decision procedure. For the first time, this allows systematic insights 
                                                                                                                                          
out of several possible options through provision of focal points (Ringe, 2005) for tradeoffs and 
eventual agenda setting. 
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into early-stage coalition formation in the two chambers. On this basis, it provides 
empirical evidence for the occurrence of four types of bicameral coalitions. 
Comparing coalitions across the two chambers and two stages, it focuses on two 
dependent variables: coalition size and the formateurs’ distance to the status quo. On 
this basis, we find some support for the influence of the formateurs as linchpins of a 
causal mechanism underlying bicameral coalition formation. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. It starts off by providing a theoretical framework that 
suggests a rationale of formateur influence in bicameral legislative politics and 
discusses the role of formateurs and the institutional context in which they operate in 
the European Union. On this basis it presents the strategic decision that the 
formateurs face between two scenarios, and develops a typology and hypotheses. 
These are finally explored and tested using the case of the EU. A discussion of the 
results concludes the paper. 
 
The role of the formateur in bicameral coalition formation 
 
Legislative exchanges of political support over issues within a proposal are the key to 
coalition formation. Such issue-linkage results in logrolls (Tullock, 1959), in which 
legislators support issues about which they care less in exchange for support on 
issues which are salient to them. In parliamentary systems, these exchanges take 
place after elections when a government is formed and portfolios are allocated 
(Laver & Shepsle, 1990). As a result, the executive subsequently controls a 
legislative majority. In presidential systems, the legislature can usually propose 
legislation and has to find mutually agreeable compromises. If bicameral approval is 
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needed (Diermeier, Merlo, & Eraslan, 2007), this changes the composition of 
coalitions and incentivises exchanges across institutional boundaries. This creates a 
bicameral market for exchanges and demand for the institution of a formateur to 
mitigate transaction costs (see paper 2). This is because formateurs can propose 
coalitions supported by a logroll across the two chambers. Accommodating requests 
of actors, they become architects of the coalitions in the chambers. In the following, 
we first discuss the role of the formateur, and then illustrate it by the example of the 
EU. 
 
The formateur: market maker for legislative exchanges  
 
Exchanges of political support come with transaction costs emanating from search, 
negotiation and enforcement (Dixit, 1998; Furubotn & Richter, 1997; North, 1990). 
Parties and committee structures can institutionalise these exchanges at the intra- and 
bicameral level in order to reduce transaction costs of decision-making. First, parties 
may internalise some of the intra- and inter-chamber coordination. In particular, the 
party leadership can exert agenda control and reward as well as punish members in 
order to push through an intra-party compromise (Aldrich, 1995; Cox & McCubbins, 
1993, 2004; Rohde, 1991). Second, committee structures can likewise institutionalise 
exchanges in legislatures. Distributive theory suggests that the committee structure 
formalises exchanges within the chamber, as legislators self-select into committees 
of their choice and can control legislation in the committee’s jurisdiction (Shepsle & 
Weingast, 1987; Weingast & Marshall, 1988). 
 
However, both parties and committees face considerable challenges in bicameral 
systems classified as “strong” by Lijphart (1986) because the two chambers are 
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differently composed and have veto power. This exacerbates bicameral coordination 
(Tsebelis & Money, 1997). Strong parties might facilitate exchanges of support 
between their delegates in the lower and upper houses. König (2001) tested how 
party politics alters bicameral decision-making. As parties present in both chambers 
can coordinate their positions and act concertedly, they provide building blocks for a 
concurrent majority in the two chambers, and eventually for the absorption of the 
veto player that the chamber represents. However, different majorities and different 
incentives of factions in the two houses render this more unlikely. In a similar vein, a 
lack of perfect committee parallelism between the chambers hampers committees’ 
ability to institutionalise exchanges given uncertainty about the enforceability of 
exchanges (Larocca, 2010). The bicameral market for exchanges is hence susceptible 
to market imperfections and, at a maximum, market failure.  
 
Market imperfections are the result of excessive search, negotiation and enforcement 
costs. In addition to standard information costs relating to the substantive issues at 
stake (Gilligan & Krehbiel, 1990; Krehbiel, 1991), the sheer size of the market and 
number of actors increases actors’ search costs when identifying possible trading 
partners, agreeing on a “price” for mutual support and enforcing this in a sequential 
legislative procedure (Stigler, 1961).  
 
Formateurs can reduce these costs by providing “focal points” for negotiations. As 
Ringe explains, “focal points influence policy makers’ perceptions of the relevance 
and salience of the dominant ideology dimensions. Hence, their introduction 
structures the political context by affecting the dimensional location of political 




While focal points alleviate search costs and negotiation costs, they do not address 
enforcement issues. The institution of the formateur represents a solution to this issue 
because they can take on the role of a “market maker” in the market for votes. This 
means that they enable trades by considering how to set off demands against each 
other. Out of the multitude of offers and demands, they choose which trades to 
realise, and hence which coalitions will be formed. Eventually, they construct a 
logroll of these trades, so that any reneging actor invalidates the entire deal. 
 
Thereby formateurs can also mitigate the threat of market failure in absence of a 
stable majority (Riker, 1962). When granted agenda-setting power, formateurs can 
propose specific logrolls and supporting coalitions, whereby they choose one of 
multiple equilibria. By sanctioning some exchanges, while blocking others, the 
formateur decides who is included and who is excluded from the coalition. This 
institution can facilitate a stable outcome by creating a ‘structure-induced 
equilibrium’ (Shepsle, 1979) with a stable coalition that might never materialise 
without the institution of a formateur (Tallberg, 2006).  
 
Formateurs, then, at a minimum, limit market imperfection through the reduction of 
search costs, and at a maximum prevent market failure by providing a focal point 
(Ringe, 2005) in intra- and bicameral negotiations. We can define formateurs as 





Bicameral legislatures have an incentive to create the institution of the formateur. In 
most legislatures actors with ties to the majority party or coalition execute this role. 
As argued in paper 2, majority parties can engage in internal logrolling. In many 
systems, actors with ties to the majority party or coalition accordingly hold 
comparable positions. Yoshinaka, McElroy, and Bowler (2010) distinguish between 
continental Europe and Anglo-American systems. They argue that in the Anglo-
American world, “bills are usually managed by a minister, sponsor, or private 
member; committee chairs may also play a critical role in the management of 
legislation” (p.460). In continental Europe, which they deem in general less 
“majoritarian” in the sense that legislatures are not characterised by equally strong 
divides between parties, the institution of the rapporteur (i.e. the person reporting) is 
commonplace in order to form a winning majority or consensus between multiple 
parties.  
 
In Congress, representatives sponsoring legislation have to form a majority in their 
chamber while ensuring that there is a concurrent majority in the Senate. Before 
placing a bill on the floor agenda, committee chairs will likewise want to ascertain 
that a piece of legislation has sufficient support. Who acts as formateur might here 
depend on partisan dynamics and seniority in specific committees. In European 
parliaments such as those in Italy, Spain, France, or Germany, rapporteurs are 
employed to manage legislation (Yoshinaka et al., 2010). While there is variation in 
the degree to which they can actively shape legislation to their own benefit, we thus 
find that formateurs come in different shapes and forms, but that there is general 
demand for actors who set the agenda by proposing compromise texts and building 




Formateurs in the European Union: appointment and constraints 
 
The political system of the European Union (EU) shares characteristics of 
parliamentary and (semi-) presidential systems (Hix & Hoyland, 2011), making it 
susceptible to the pitfalls of bicameralism developed above. In its bicameral 
legislature consisting of the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (EP), 
there is no government that would fall if not supported, and hence no stable 
government majority and opposition minority that consistently vote en bloc. In 
addition, partisan links between the chambers are weak. Whilst in legislatures with 
strong parties, these might take on inter-chamber coordination, the prospect of this is 
unlikely in the EU (Lindberg, Rasmussen, & Warntjen, 2008). As one chamber is 
directly elected, while in the other member state governments are represented, 
congruence of the chambers is unlikely (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). As a consequence, 
the formation of majority coalitions between the EP and the Council of the EU has to 
take place on an issue-by-issue basis. The market for vote trades is in principle prone 
to imperfections and failure. 
 
However, in the bicameral legislature of the EU, formateurs work within the 
committee structure of the two chambers to overcome these challenges (Corbett et 
al., 2011; Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006). For the EP, the rapporteur is the 
formateur; for the Council, the presidency assumes this role. In contrast, I do not 
consider the Commission as a formateur because it has a low-profile role in the 
negotiations. The fact that the EP and Council amend legislation demonstrates that 
the Commission does not successfully target the proposal at a specific winning 
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majority in the two chambers. In order to build these coalitions, and to pass 
legislation, the rapporteur and the presidency are essential.  
 
Rapporteurs are appointed to lead negotiations on a specific file. Most research on 
rapporteurs investigates the aggregate distribution of rapporteurships by drawing on 
organisational theories developed in the context of the US Congress (Kaeding, 2004; 
Mamadouh & Raunio, 2003; Yoshinaka et al., 2010). Here, we will in contrast 
discuss why a specific file is assigned to an MEP.  
 
The corresponding question of which Presidencies take up which legislative files has 
been relatively neglected. Since the presidency rotates every six months, a 
presidency is not assigned to a specific file that it would see through to the final 
adoption. However, it has been argued that prospective presidencies lobby the 
Commission to push forward work on files salient to them (Warntjen, 2007).  
Discussing the allocation of files to formateurs, we can also address the question of 
whether formateurs are chosen independent of coalitions that they form later on in 
the process, or whether it is coalitions that hand-pick specific formateurs. 
 
This section then focuses on the appointment of formateurs, the ‘matchmaking’ 
between a specific legislative proposal and a formateur, the constraints in which they 
work, and the solution they represent to overcome risks of market imperfection and 
market failure. In analysing this, we will discuss the opportunities and constraints 





European Parliament: the rapporteur as formateur 
 
Legislative work in the EP takes place in its committees. The EP leadership assigns 
proposals to committees, and these select a rapporteur whose task it is to form a 
majority. Drawing on principal-agent theory, we can see that there are two principals, 
the committee and the party, who choose their agent, the formateur, in two steps. 
This shows that the institution of the rapporteur is a suitable response to the threats of 
imperfections and failure in the market for legislative exchanges.  
 
The committee is the primary principal of the formateur. Party group coordinators 
are the agents of the party leadership in each committee, and spokespersons on the 
subject matter (Obholzer & Kaeding, 2012; Whitaker, 2001). Rapporteurships are 
distributed through a bidding process among coordinators, who receive points 
according to their party’s strength. Larger party groups thus have a relative 
advantage on more important, and hence more expensive, co-decision reports (e.g. 
Yordanova, 2013, p. 64). However, the bidding process allows savvy coordinators 
from smaller parties to save points in order to bid for reports that are salient to them. 
In principle, collusion in this process is possible. But since rapporteurships are 
allocated immediately after the transmission by the Commission and thus before the 
committee has examined the proposal in detail, any coalition of groups acting 
concertedly would have to be based on clearly identifiable alignments on the subject 
of the file. More generally, mainstream parties might try to prevent fringe or extreme 
groups from winning rapporteurships on important co-decision files. The more likely 
scenario is that if there are specific MEPs who are considered experts on a particular 
topic, for instance due to work experience or drafting of related legislation, 
agreement among coordinators may be consensual rather than competitive. However, 
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the more salient a report, the more relevant the competitive bidding process becomes. 
As a consequence, the evidence seems to suggest that party groups as opposed to set 
coalitions bid for and win reports rather than the other way around. It is thus safe to 
argue that the rapporteur will be the formateur of the coalition in the chamber. The 
committee thereby chooses an agent representing the committee as a whole, but 
tightly controlled by shadow rapporteurs from competing groups.  
 
Rapporteurships are coveted prizes for party groups, who are the secondary 
principals. Once a coordinator has secured a report, they can delegate the 
rapporteurship to one of the committee members of their group (Obholzer & 
Kaeding, 2012). While they are usually free in their choice, functional imperatives 
suggest that workload ought to be evenly divided, which is a challenge for smaller 
groups in particular. Likewise, there are arguably pressures on the coordinator to 
consider the different national delegations. In addition, despite the perks of 
rapporteurships, MEPs might be active on different committees, in the party 
leadership or other roles that limit their availability and the pool from which 
coordinators can choose (Corbett et al., 2011; Neuhold, 2001). Notwithstanding these 
constraints, coordinators have room for manoeuvre in formulating specific demands 
and picking distinct MEPs. Choosing an MEP close to the party line minimises the 
risk that the formateur deviates from it. Coordinators can thus strategically deploy 
rapporteurs by taking their likely positions into account. 
 
Despite the importance of the committee and party, there are good reasons for 
considering the rapporteur are than these principals as formateurs. Rapporteurs are 
the “primary legislator on the committee” (Yordanova, 2011a, p. 100). In different 
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political systems, other actors might be more suitable as formateurs. EP committees 
are politically divided and while committee chairs are powerful, in the EP they are 
not involved in the details of each file negotiated by the committee. Parties likewise 
do not act as formateurs themselves. As the existence of shadow rapporteurs 
demonstrates, intra-party delegation is essential to closely follow files and explore 
compromises. In the EP, the rapporteur executes this role for the chamber as a whole.  
 
Nevertheless, the rapporteur is constrained by the two principals, the party group and 
the committee. This requires them to reconcile competing demands to advance the 
interests of the committee and their party group. Horizontal and vertical control 
mechanisms are supposed to keep the rapporteur in check. Horizontally, shadow 
rapporteurs follow the legislative file on behalf of the remaining groups. By taking 
part in inter-institutional meetings, they gain access to privileged information that the 
rapporteur might otherwise use to exceed his or her mandate. Party coordinators 
constitute a vertical check on the rapporteur’s enforcement of the party line. 
Coordinators can bring the rapporteur in line as they eventually pass the voting 
recommendations of the rapporteur on to the group, and can thus interfere if 
necessary (Whitaker, 2001). In sum, the rapporteur is therefore an extension both of 
the committee and the party structure of the EP. In order to further reduce transaction 
costs, both committees and parties thus have an incentive to delegate. 
 
Once an MEP has been assigned a rapporteurship, they will draw up a draft report 
after one or two exchanges of views on the Commission proposal in the committee. 
This contains a set of amendments that are deemed desirable or, in rare cases, only a 
resolution to adopt the Commission proposal without amendments. When presenting 
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the proposal and draft report in committee, the formateur can provide focal points for 
the negotiation by setting specific provisions in context or proposing particular trade-
offs (Benedetto, 2005; Ringe, 2005, 2010). The draft report is then discussed in 
committee and a second round of amendments is introduced, this time by committee 
members as well as the rapporteur. For some proposals this is a manageable amount, 
for others these comprise hundreds of pages and thousands of amendments. 
Committees and party groups thus rely on the formateur to carve out possible trade-
offs and to suggest an overall logroll, when the full set of amendments is discussed in 
committee, and subsequently voted on. Before the vote the rapporteur therefore seeks 
to build a coalition in negotiation with shadow rapporteurs and party group 
coordinators. The rapporteur can propose compromise and consolidated amendments 
in this pursuit in order to trade off actors’ support over different issues so as to 
achieve a logroll across different issues in the proposal. This demonstrates that the 
rapporteur really is the formateur in the EP. In line with our definition of formateurs, 
the rapporteur is thus the agenda-setter with regard to specific compromise texts that 
are supported by a coalition that he or she formed. 
 
The crucial role of the rapporteur also becomes evident in negotiations with the 
Commission and Council, as well as at the final decision-making stage. In these 
informal meetings - referred to as “trilogues” - the rapporteur acts as a “relais actor” 
linking the two chambers (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977; Farrell & Héritier, 2004). 
Again the institution of the rapporteur facilitates more efficient decision-making, 
reducing information, negotiation and enforcement costs. As lead negotiator the 
rapporteur can subsequently construct a majority in the plenary by again proposing 
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trades of votes over different issues resulting in a logroll supported by the required 
majority.  
 
Empirical evidence underscores the influence of the rapporteur over outcomes. 
Costello and Thomson (2010) show that EP opinions tend to be biased towards the 
rapporteur’s national interest (Finke, 2012; Hurka, 2013). Likewise, they provide 
evidence of the impact of the rapporteur on the final decision outcome (Costello & 
Thomson, 2011). The choice of the rapporteur can thus bear on the winning majority 
and, consequently, the content of legislation, as they are the architects of the 
coalition supporting an agreement.  
 
Council of the EU: Council presidency as formateur 
 
While the rapporteur is appointed on a continuous basis until the adoption of the 
legislation, the Council presidency rotates every six months among member states 
according to a schedule that is fixed many years in advance (Hayes-Renshaw & 
Wallace, 2006). The delegation to the presidency creates a formateur who is granted 
authority to chair all meetings and lead negotiations on legislative proposals 
throughout the different sectoral working parties, the ambassador-level Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the ministerial-level Council. This 
presents the chambers’ solution to the threats of market imperfection and failure in 
the bicameral system. 
 
Presidencies have some influence on the legislative files that they negotiate during 
their presidency (Warntjen, 2007). The agenda is partly pre-determined through 
advanced files at second reading or conciliation that require agreement within short 
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timeframes in line with treaty rules or through functional necessities that require 
urgent action. Nevertheless, there is a menu of pending proposals at first reading that 
presidencies can choose from. This suggests that presidencies can choose files and 
thus coalitions on them instead of coalitions choosing specific presidencies. If there 
were pre-existing proto-coalitions, these could not select a formateur as their 
sequence cannot be influenced in the short-run. However, after the adoption of the 
EP opinion at first reading, the Council does not need to pick up a proposal. There 
are strong strategic imperatives as to which files a presidency should select. Kleine 
(2012) argues that presidencies, acting in line with the Council norm to 
accommodate governments under strong domestic pressure, privilege files that they 
wish to adopt largely unchanged. This is because other governments cannot trust the 
presidency’s claim that the accommodation of outliers and their inclusion in a broad 
coalition serves the common rather than their narrow interests. The principal thus 
controls the agent by withdrawing support if they suspect excessive agency drift. 
Within this constraint, which would arguably result in the inability of the formateur 
to propose a coalition, the presidency has important agenda-shaping powers that 
Tallberg (2003) highlights in providing evidence of agenda-setting, agenda-
structuring and agenda exclusion. 
 
In line with our definition of formateurs, the presidency is thus the agenda-setter with 
regard to specific compromise texts that are supported by a coalition it formed. The 
presidency chairs meetings and thus can provide focal points in the negotiations on 
legislative proposals (Tallberg, 2004, 2006). In addition, they can individually or in 
working party meetings gather member states requests for changes, in particular any 
serious substantive reservations that they have, and link issues by trading member 
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states’ support over different issues in order to arrive at a logroll. On a rolling basis, 
they can rewrite the legislative text discussed in the Council and suggest presidency 
compromises that are acceptable to specific states (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 
2006, p. 150). Thereby the institution of the presidency in the Council, just as that of 
the rapporteur in the EP, addresses the imperfections and risk of failure in the market 
for legislative exchanges.  
 
In a similar vein, this holds in inter-cameral negations when the two formateurs of 
the Council and the EP meet. The presidency can then negotiate on behalf of the 
Council, and has privileged information about the preferences of the different actors. 
Through this coordinating role as a “relais actor” (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977), there 
is a reduction in information, negotiation and enforcement costs. As a result, the 
presidency and can propose a logroll supported in the two chambers. 
 
Tallberg (2004) suggests that their role leaves presidencies with influence over which 
agreement to choose out of several options in a “contract zone”. In line with these 
arguments, empirical evidence suggests that outcomes are usually biased towards the 
position of the presidency (Aksoy, 2010; Schalk, Torenvlied, Weesie, & Stokman, 
2007; Thomson, 2008; Warntjen, 2008). 
 
In summary, this section has highlighted that the political system of the EU serves as 
an example for bicameral systems in which transaction costs might hamper efficient 
decision-making. The two chambers have delegated authority to formateurs in order 
to mitigate these risks, but how exactly they have devised this institution differs. 
Whereas the EP appoints a formateur for one piece of legislation for the full 
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decision-making procedure, the Council’s formateur is selected for all ongoing 
procedures but for a limited time only. The two institutions thus seek to attain 
representativeness by different means, limitations in scope or time. One important 
criticism of the argument made thus far is that the choice of formateurs may be 
endogenous to the coalition. Rather than reducing transaction costs by choosing a 
proto-coalition, a pre-existent proto-coalition may choose a formateur. This is a 
plausible line of argumentation which suggests that the formateurs are not central to 
the causal process but might only execute the will of the coalition that chose them as 
their agents. While possible, I have highlighted evidence which points in a different 
direction. In fact, there are strong theoretical and empirical cases to be made for 
formateur influence in coalition formation, but the mechanism of how they can exert 
influence and which limitations apply is unclear. The next sections seek to shed light 
on this. 
 
Coalition dynamics: the formateurs’ strategic decision in a two-level 
game 
 
Formateurs build coalitions in two stages. First, they build an intra-institutional 
coalition, and, second, they enter into bicameral negotiations on this basis. We can 
take as a starting point a simple spatial model. Standard spatial models assume 
Euclidean preferences and, in essence, “sincere voting”, as actors’ decisions are 
based on an evaluation of a policy outcome against the status quo. This implies a 
closed amendment rule. The agenda-setter thus makes a take it or leave it offer, 
which leads the actors to evaluate the offer against the status quo rather than 
alternative policy options. In most legislative settings, however, the agenda-setter 
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makes a proposal that can be amended. This has important implications that I will 
illustrate below. 
 
In general, such “sincere voting” is not a given. Tsebelis (1990) provides ample 
evidence of nested games, in which actors make apparently suboptimal choices, 
which prove strategic rather than based on miscalculations. Dewan and Spirling 
(2011) show that strategic opposition, that is voting against a policy change even 
though it moves the outcome towards one’s own ideal point, can indeed result in 
outcomes closer to the opposition’s preferences (even without taking longer term 
issues such as signalling to voters into account). Considering strategic voting rather 
than sincere voting then means that it makes sense for actors to vote for outcomes 
that at face value, i.e. when evaluated against the status quo, make them worse off. In 
other words, if there are different options from which actors can to choose, being 
worse off can mean preventing being worst off. 
 
 
Figure 2: Spatial model with status quo 
 
Consider the example in figure 2, which presents a simple spatial model with seve 
actors, four of which are required to pass legislation. With the formateur/ agenda-
setter located to the right of the status quo, the standard spatial model suggests, in 
broad terms, that the agenda-setter will propose an outcome right of the status quo, 
and that all actors on the left of the status quo would vote against it, all actors right of 
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the agenda-setter would vote in favour, and the agenda setter then has to make the 
pivotal actor  (located between the  status quo and the agenda setter) better off 
compared to the status quo. Therefore, the agenda-setter proposes a policy at its ideal 
point, which is supported by actors 4, 5, 6, and 7. But that need not be the case.  
 
“Strategic opposition” teaches us that not all actors on the right of the agenda-setter 
will necessarily support the agenda-setter, even though the outcome would improve 
on the status quo. Actor 7 may not be willing to support policy at actor 4’s ideal 
point if it is “sensitive” to its ideal point. In many parliaments and international 
organisations, actors take a stand against policies that they consider weak 
compromise and thus no real solution to an issue. Strategic voting also suggests that 
actors located between the agenda-setter and the status quo (and even left of the 
status quo) might vote in favour of outcomes that make them worse off when 
compared to the status quo. If actor 7 is willing to support the agenda-setter at a 
policy located at, say, actor 5’s ideal point, actor 3 is better off supporting the 
agenda-setter with its original offer, even though a policy located at 4 makes it worse 
off when compared to the status quo. However, it makes it better off when compared 
to the alternative of an outcome at five. Taking these dynamics seriously means that 
the status quo loses relevance, as its influence is highly contingent on the actor and 
preference alignment. 
 
In order to formalise these expectations, we can assume an open amendment rule, 
under which the agenda-setter has to accommodate the requests of those that join the 
coalition. The agenda-setter would thus look to those actors that are located closest to 
him or her. Naturally, these are actors three and four. With an open amendment rule, 
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the coalition can coordinate on the amendments that it will jointly carry. Actor three 
would be expected to support a deal because the alternative is the agenda-setter 
expanding the coalition away from actor 3’s ideal point so as to include actor six. In 
order to form a wining majority though, a fourth coalition member is required. The 
agenda-setter’s calculation will depend on whose accommodation results in an 
outcome closest to its ideal point, in this case actor 6.  
 
All of this means that it helps to understand legislative politics as a distributive 
process, in which coalition formation is a process of allocating goods 
(accommodation of requests for changes, amendments). This means that we can draw 
inspiration from coalition theory, which focuses on the allocation of portfolios to 
specific parties while considering voting power and/or policy distances rather than 
status quo locations as alternatives. This can be likened to deals under log-rolling, in 
which benefits (amendments) regarding specific issues are allocated to members of 
the coalition as their requests are accommodated. 
 
In line with this, then, we assume actors to be policy-seekers. They are interested in 
obtaining their preferred legislative outcome and thus place a premium on entering 
coalitions with like-minded (i.e. connected) actors. Therefore, Robert Axelrod (1970) 
argued that in a one-dimensional political space, politicians who are interested in 
implementing certain policies form so-called “minimum-connected” winning 
coalitions.  
 
In order to explain how formateurs go about forming a coalition, we draw on 
Axelrod’s concept of proto-coalitions (Axelrod, 1970, 1972; Diermeier et al., 2008). 
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In contrast to Axelrod, we assume that formateurs are the linchpins of coalition 
formation that build coalitions around themselves. They can achieve this by either 
successively expanding a coalition around them, or by starting with a surplus 
majority and then minimising it. At the heart of the coalition is a logroll that the 
formateur proposes.
14
 By accommodating requests of actors, the formateur can 
expand the coalition. This only works as long as the coalition members unanimously 
agree to the new logroll. If agreement fails, the proto-coalition breaks down and the 
formateur selects another coalition excluding those who opposed the agreement. By 
adapting the logroll on which the coalition is based to accommodate or refuse 
requests of actors, the formateur can thus dynamically develop the coalition by 
including and excluding actors. Proto-coalitions are thus “working coalitions” around 
the formateur that can be shifted.  
 
We can derive two propositions from this framework which combines policy-seeking 
and veto players in the proto-coalition (Tsebelis & Ha, 2013). These propositions are 
based on the gains the formateur expects to reap. If the range of a coalition is 
smaller, preferences of its members are more compact, leading to an outcome closer 
to their preferences. 
Proposition 1: The formateur seeks to minimise the range of the proto-
coalition. 
Given preference heterogeneity in the coalition, we expect that those members 
closest to the mean will be closest to the outcome.  
Proposition 2: The formateur seeks to minimise their distance from the mean 
of the proto-coalition. 
                                                 
14 This means that I only focus on coalitions available to the formateur, thus excluding attempts by 
coalition outsiders to form a blocking minority. 
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In government formation, there is evidence in support of these propositions (Martin 
& Stevenson, 2001; Warwick, 1998), suggesting that they should equally hold in 
legislative decision-making. 
 
It should be noted that the two propositions are observationally equivalent under two 
possible scenarios: first, when deciding on one issue (i.e. in one dimension); second, 
when deciding on several issues along the same dimension with all actors ascribing 
equal salience to all issues. Then the only reduction of a coalition will take place at 
its margins. For instance, the most left-leaning or most right-leaning members might 
be excluded. In all other scenarios, the propositions are potentially distinct.  
 
Consider two examples. The first focuses on a one-dimensional policy space with 
decisions on several issues. If actors attach varying levels of salience to individual 
issues, it is well conceivable that e.g. a left-wing member of a proto-coalition can 
agree to a centrist outcome of a coalition, while an only moderately left-wing 
member of the proto-coalition cannot, if the latter attaches a relatively higher 
salience to the issue at stake. As a consequence, the moderately left leaning member 
might be excluded, resulting in a change in the formateur’s distance to the mean, but 
not in a change in the range of the coalition.  
 
The second example concerns a two-dimensional policy space, in which the 
exclusion of the most left-wing member on a left-right dimension would affect the 
range of the left-right dimension and the coalition policy on a second dimension, 
such as integration. Since the actor would be placed elsewhere on the integration 
dimension it would affect formateurs’ distance from the mean, but not the range on 
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that dimension. In other words, Proposition 2 is sensitive to changes in the coalition 
because of considerations on different issues or along other dimensions which 
nevertheless have repercussions. In sum, assuming varying levels of salience or 
multiple dimensions means that the two propositions are different.  
 
I make this assumption by arguing that actors engage in log-rolling, which is based 
on exchanges across different issues (dimensions) based on varying levels of 
salience. In legislative decision-making, these assumptions are arguably met. 
Negotiations revolve around various articles of a piece of legislation, and actors are 
likely to feel more strongly about some issues than about others. While I thus focus 
on one dimension at a time, the propositions capture the multidimensionality of the 
policy space, and the fact that coalition members may be accommodated on more 
than one dimension.  
 
While this has presented the key considerations in any one chamber, the propositions 
also hold in the formation of a bicameral coalition. However, we can nuance our 
expectations when focusing again on the role of the status quo and the amendment 
rule. 
 
As we will see in more detail below, the formateur can act as a veto player on behalf 
of the coalition at the bicameral level. If the coalition remains united, or if the 
formateur can block amendments, this equals a conditional closed amendment rule. 
This leads to dynamics that are different from those at the intra-institutional level. 
Proximity to the status quo becomes a bargaining advantage. The formateur of the 
coalition located closer to the status quo will be less likely to shift the coalition. In 
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contrast, the formateur located farther away from the status quo can be expected to 
shift the coalition in order to still ascertain policy change. In other words, here it can 
credibly be claimed that the choice is between the status quo and the policy offer 
rather than an alternative policy obtained by further amendments. The location of the 
status quo thus influences coalition dynamics at the bicameral stage, since it indicates 
who will budge. 
 
 
In sum, reliance on proto-coalitions suggests a micro-mechanism for coalition 
formation, according to which the formateurs construct a logroll tying together a 
coalition in their chamber and possibly beyond. This creates different options for the 
formateurs to strategically select coalitions, as the following expounds. 
 
Inter- and trans-institutional dynamics in bicameral coalition formation: a typology 
 
We differentiate between two scenarios at the bicameral stage. In an inter-
institutional scenario the chambers are pitted against each other as unitary actors. The 
formateurs stick to their proto-coalition, and then engage in inter-cameral bargaining 
to come to an agreement. This is the standard story of bicameral negotiations in the 
literature, and in line with unicameral theories of legislative organisation. In a trans-
institutional scenario actors in coalitions across institutional boundaries are pitted 
against each other. The formateurs abandon their intra-institutional coalition and seek 
a new logroll across institutional boundaries. Thus they shift the coalitions. In a 
nutshell, the formateurs’ strategic decision after the formation of a proto-coalition at 
the intra-cameral stage is to decide whether to take an inter-institutional or trans-




Each of these two scenarios can be subdivided into two types of coalitions, resulting 
in a total of four types of coalition dynamics. These are summarised in figure 3. 
Below we illustrate the four types and discuss the formateurs’ strategic 
considerations. 
 
Figure 3: An overview of coalition dynamics 
 
In order to focus on the key dynamics and to present them concisely, we assume that 
actors are uncertain about the preferences of their counterparts in the other chamber. 
These preferences are only revealed during the negotiations. When discussing the 
results, we will come back to this assumption, relax it and analyse its consequences 
for coalition dynamics. 
 
First, let us consider the inter-institutional scenario as the default scenario. 
Formateurs stick to the intra-institutional coalition, which pits the chambers against 
each other. Under these circumstances, the formateur can take on the role of a veto 
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hands. In line with this, Diermeier and Meyerson (Diermeier & Myerson, 1999) have 
highlighted that internal veto players can improve the chambers’ bargaining situation 
in bicameralism. This however entails a strategic choice on the part of the formateur 
to act as veto player and to not abandon the coalition.  
 
We can illustrate the coalition dynamics in one-dimensional depictions of the two 
chambers with five actors each, of which a coalition of three is required to pass 
legislation. Figure 4 illustrates the first type of coalition dynamics we can encounter. 
Uppercase letters A-E refer to the actors in the upper house, lowercase letters a-e 
refer to those in the lower house. Formateurs in the two houses of the legislature, 
here actors C and d, form intra-institutional coalitions. Sticking to these coalitions 
results in the pure case of inter-institutional interaction, as the intra-institutional and 
final coalitions are the same in the two chambers. This is the first type of coalition 
dynamic (perfect continuity). 
 
 






Figure 5: Inter-institutional scenario: inclusion of coalition members 
 
Alternatively, even if formateurs stick to their intra-institutional coalitions, the 
resulting compromise can be appealing enough for other actors to join the coalition. 
Starting from the same intra-institutional coalitions (B+C+D, c+d+e), other actors’ 
demands may be met. This leaves the intra-institutional coalitions intact. Figure 5 
shows that actors E in the upper house as well as actors a and b in the lower house 
join the original coalitions B+C+D and c+d+e, as their preferences are covered by 
the two intra-institutional coalitions. This represents the second type of coalition 
dynamics (inclusionary dynamics). 
 
Now we consider the implications of trans-institutional coalition formation, where 
the formateur does not act as veto player on behalf of the initial majority coalition in 
their chamber. Formateurs have an incentive to strategically seek coalition partners 
in the other chamber in order to ascertain a concurrent majority by aligning the 
chambers. In line with the propositions developed above, we expect that formateurs 
abandon their proto-coalition only if this allows them to reduce the range of the 
bicameral coalition and/or if they reduce their distance to the bicameral coalition 




H1: If formateurs abandon their proto-coalition, they choose coalitions that are 
overall smaller in range. 
H2: If formateurs abandon their proto-coalition, they choose coalitions that 
reduce their distance to the mean. 
 
Thus, they will pursue a “minimisation” of the coalition across institutional 
boundaries by maximising the overlap of the preferences of the coalition members. 
The more compact the coalitions are in terms of preferences, the fewer concessions 
the formateurs need to make. The closer they are to the coalition mean, the more 
likely they are to get what they want. 
 
We can again illustrate the resulting trans-institutional coalition dynamics. Figure 6 
shows that in order to reduce the range of the coalition, formateurs may shift the 
coalitions in the two houses. Based on the same initial intra-institutional coalitions 
(B+C+D, c+d+e), formateur C in the upper house may exclude actor B, and include 
actor E instead. Likewise, formateur d in the lower house may exclude actor e and 
include actor b instead. These shifts have in common that the formateurs abandon the 
intra-institutional coalition as they exclude a member. This results in a more compact 






Figure 6: Trans-institutional scenario: inclusion and exclusion of coalition members 
 
This also holds for the purest trans-institutional scenario. Figure seven illustrates this 
case, in which an initial oversized majority of actors b+c+d+e is reduced in size as 
actor e is excluded at the final stage. No new members are added. This is the final 
coalition type (exclusionary dynamics). 
 
 
Figure 7: Trans-institutional scenario: exclusion of coalition members 
 
 
In sum, this shows that formateurs have various options at hand to obtain an outcome 
as close as possible to their preference. On the one hand, they can achieve this by 
minimising the range of the coalition. On the other, they can position themselves at 
the centre of the coalition. The following section explains the research design 




Data and research design  
 
These coalition dynamics and hypotheses are investigated based on a comprehensive 
dataset including information on early and final-stage coalitions on co-decision acts 
proposed between 1999 and 2009. The co-decision procedure, now labelled the 
“ordinary legislative procedure”, includes the EP and Council as co-equal chambers 
in a bicameral procedure. As intra-institutional negotiations take place before the 
chambers enter into inter-institutional negotiations, we can compare the consistency 
of initial intra-institutional coalitions and those supporting the final outcome. To this 
end, novel means of identifying early-stage coalitions were devised (these are set out 
in detail in the introduction). Information on early-stage coalition membership is 
drawn from an analysis of more than 18,000 Council documents and 19,000 
amendments proposed in the EP, which provide insights into which actors were 
accommodated by the formateurs and which were not. Likewise, final coalitions are 
based on legislative behaviour in terms of amendments, votes and statements (for the 
Council only) at the time of adoption.  
 
In sum, this provides us with two points of measurement for the two chambers: the 
early intra-institutional coalitions and final coalitions in each chamber. This allows a 
comparison of whether, and if so how, the coalitions changed between intra-
institutional and final agreements. The sample consists of all 124 out of 844 
legislative proposals on which early-stage coalitions could be identified in both the 
Council and the EP. The Council is the major constraint, because often reservations 




This sample allows us for the first time to gain systematic insights into early-stage 
coalitions and the dynamics of bicameral coalition formation. While committee level 
activity in the Council has been studied (Cross, 2012, 2013a; F. M. Häge, 2007), 
coalitions have not been identified. In addition, arguably the best datasets on EU 
decision-making focus on member state preferences and outcomes rather than 
coalitions (Thomson et al., 2012, 2006). In the EP, we likewise have very limited 
knowledge of coalitions at committee-level (Whitaker, 2011; Yordanova, 2013). The 





Early-stage coalitions in the Council were identified from Council documents. 
Member states can enter reservations (Nedergaard, 2007, pp. 162–3; Westlake & 
Galloway, 2004, p. 226) in order to request changes to a draft text. Those who are 
part of the presidency’s proto-coalition will have been accommodated and hence do 
not need to enter reservations. Based on an analysis of more than 18,000 Council 
documents relating to 844 legislative acts initiated between 1999 and 2009, it was 
possible to determine early-stage coalitions in the Council for 162 legislative acts. 
 
Coalitions in the EP were likewise identified based on requests for changes in the 
162 legislative acts on which information was available in the Council. For 124 of 
these information was available, so that more than 19,000 amendments proposed at 
the committee stage could be analysed. These were cross-referenced with vote results 
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in minutes of committee meetings. Those party groups that saw amendments adopted 




Information on final-stage legislative behaviour is more easily accessible. For the 
Council, I used votes and statements voicing dissatisfaction to demarcate who was 
not included in the final coalition (Hagemann, 2007, 2008). Member states voting 
against, abstaining, or entering statements into the minutes of the Council were 
considered as excluded from the coalition. 
 
In the EP, I coded coalition membership on the basis of the text and amendments 
proposed by party groups and interpreted these as changes to the initial proto-
coalition. By default, the rapporteur’s report (or joint text in case of third-reading 
agreements) is put to vote, and if accepted this was considered a continuation of the 
proto-coalition. However, if groups submit amendments at plenary stage that are 
rejected, this means that they are not (or not any more) members of the coalition. 





Actor preferences are taken from the consecutive waves (1999, 2002, 2006, 2010) of 
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2012; Hooghe et al., 2010), because it 
focuses on the EU in particular. The dataset includes expert opinions on national 
party positions on two key dimensions of the EU policy space. I draw on national 
88 
 
parties’ general left-right ideological position (on a 0-10 scale) and their position on 
integration (1-7 scale). In the two institutions, these are the two dimensions that have 
over time been shown to structure the policy space in the two chambers (Hagemann 
& Høyland, 2010; Hix et al., 2007; Hix & Noury, 2009; Hosli et al., 2011; Mattila & 
Lane, 2001; Mattila, 2009).  
 
Using national party positions as a proxy for MEPs’ positions is instructive because 
national parties select MEPs and have a strong influence on their behaviour in 
parliament (Hix, 2002). I calculated the position of party groups in the EP and 
coalition governments in the Council by weighting the positions of their constituent 





Intra-cameral and bicameral coalition dynamics: overview 
 
The data on early and final-stage coalitions provides intriguing insights into the 
dynamics of bicameral decision-making. We can first look at the two chambers 
individually, before shifting to the bicameral level. This allows us to identify which 
of the four types of coalition dynamics materialise in EU decision-making. Do 
formateurs stick to their coalition, or do they abandon it? Do exclusionary or 
inclusionary dynamics prevail? In order to assess these questions, we focus on the 
party groups supporting a coalition in the EP, and member states doing so in the 
Council.  
                                                 
15 The data is interpolated between different waves. Missing values for rapporteurs were replaced by 
the party group’s average position; missing values for presidencies were replaced by the rescaled 




Considering the size of coalitions in terms of the number of actors, figure 7 reveals 
that in 69 per cent of cases, the formateur’s coalition remained unchanged between 
the intra-institutional and final bicameral stage in the EP. In a further 15 per cent, 
additional party groups were added to the early-stage coalition, resulting in an overall 
larger coalition in the EP. In contrast, in a total of 16 per cent of cases, at least one 
group that had supported the intra-institutional coalition was subsequently excluded. 
While in six per cent of cases the coalition shifted, meaning that groups were 
replaced as some were added and some excluded, in 10 per cent of cases the coalition 
became smaller as members were excluded.  
 
Figure 8: Coalition dynamics in the EP. 
 
In the Council there is much more fluctuation given the higher number of actors and 
hence larger pool of potential coalition members. Nevertheless, the broad patterns are 
similar. In 69 per cent of cases, the intra-institutional coalition remains intact. 
However, there is perfect continuity in only four per cent of cases, while 65 per cent 
cover cases in which additional member states supported the coalition in the end. In 
















excluded, while in a further 27 per cent of cases a shift occurred as members were 
excluded and included at the same time. 
 
Figure 9: Coalition dynamics in the Council of the EU 
 
Shifting the focus to the bicameral level, we can compare the combined intra-
institutional coalitions to the final coalitions in the two chambers. Continuity 
between intra- and final-stage coalitions in the two chambers only occurs in two per 
cent of cases. In 70 per cent, in at least one of the chambers, members are added if a 
compromise is struck between the institutions. However, in ten per cent of cases the 
bicameral coalition is reduced in size, while in seventeen per cent of cases it shifts as 
one chamber increases its coalition size, while the other reduces in size. 
 
The dynamics of changes in coalition size show the scope of manoeuvre between the 
intra- and bicameral coalition stages. In more than one quarter of cases, trans-
institutional dynamics prevail. This means that in at least one chamber, actors were 
excluded from the coalition. In sum, this provides evidence of the empirical 
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dynamics. The next section sheds light on the extent to which this variation in 
coalition dynamics can be explained by the formateur’s preference.  
 
 
Figure 10: Bicameral coalition dynamics in the EU 
 
 
Exploring the causal mechanism 
 
The first hypothesis suggested that formateurs choose coalitions that are more 
compact in range. In order to test this, we can compare the mean total range of early-
stage coalitions in the Council and EP, and compare that to the mean total range of 
the final coalitions in the institutions. We focus on the two dominant dimensions in 
the EU policy space. First, the left-right ideological dimension; and second the pro-
anti integration dimension. We conduct a Wilcoxon signed rank test to investigate 
these hypotheses. We find that the ranges of the coalitions are indeed different on the 
on the integration dimension at the final stage. Early-stage coalitions are larger at a 
10 per cent level of significance. In contrast, this does not hold for the left-right 


















 Early stage Final stage Z score 
Range: Left-right 
dimension 
Mean: 6.84 Mean: 6.88 -0.831 
Range: Integration 
dimension 
Mean: 5.55 Mean: 5.44 1.713* 
Note: *p ≤ 0.1 
Table 1: Changes in the range of the coalition 
 
The second hypothesis posited that rapporteurs change coalitions so as to move 
towards the centre of the coalition. This suggests that they are more likely to obtain 
what they want. Again we use Wilcoxon signed rank tests to establish whether 
rapporteur and presidency change coalitions so as to move closer to the mean of the 
coalition on the two central dimensions of interest. We find that the rapporteur and 
the formateur choose coalitions that on average place them closer to the mean on the 
integration dimension. However, the difference between early and final-stage 
coalitions is only significantly different for the rapporteur. On the left-right 
dimension, there is no significant difference between the distances between the 
formateurs and the respective mean at the early and final stages for the rapporteur. 
 
 Early stage Final stage Z score 
Presidency: distance to 
mean on left-right 
dimension 
1.641421 1.648453 -0.412 
Presidency: distance to 
mean on integration 
dimension 
1.821562 1.666467 1.306 
Rapporteur: distance to 
mean on left-right 
dimension 
1.562463 1.539225 -0.306 
Rapporteur: distance to 
mean on integration 
dimension 
1.818432 1.77067 1.678* 
Note: *p ≤ 0.1 




In sum, these results suggest that formateurs in bicameral systems can use the powers 
vested in them to shape the final coalition to their benefit. Support for the first 
hypothesis suggests that the rapporteur can strategically exclude preference outliers 
on the integration dimension, thus reducing the overall range. A smaller range of the 
coalition denotes that formateurs opt for a trans-institutional scenario, and 
accordingly exclude members in order to achieve more compact coalitions. The 
members of the coalition benefit from this as it means that they are more likely to 
obtain an outcome in line with their preferences. This effect is particularly interesting 
when considering the frequency of different coalition types. Above we have seen that 
inclusion is the prevalent coalition dynamic, and that exclusionary dynamics only 
account for a quarter of coalitions. Those actors that are included thus do not seem to 
have a strong effect on coalition ranges, or else we would find that coalition ranges 
are larger at the final stage. Instead this suggests that actors who are included are not 
specifically accommodated but rather support the proposal as a consequence of the 
agreement between the two chambers, or that they are I fact accommodated on 
different dimensions or on specific issues. On balance, formateurs only seem to 
include actors if this does not increase the range of the coalition on these two key 
dimensions. 
 
The fact that the change can be ascribed to the EP suggests that coalitions are overall 
more stable in the Council, and that the reduction in range is due to actors in the EP 
being excluded. One plausible explanation for why it is on balance the EP rather than 
the Council that budges when it matters suggests that the Council might benefit from 
its location closer to status quo in the bicameral negotiations (Costello & Thomson, 
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2013; Thomson et al., 2006). Thereby, the presidency has the stronger hand in 
negotiations with the rapporteurs, who by default seem to construct coalitions that 
are more inclusive on the integration dimension.  
 
Taken together, this lends support to the pivotal role of the formateur in the causal 




This paper has proposed a micro-mechanism of bicameral coalition formation, which 
puts formateurs in a crucial role. On this basis it has investigated the presence of 
trans-institutional cooperation in bicameral decision-making. An inter-institutional 
scenario suggests that the same actors will be part of the coalition throughout the 
legislative process. The coalition in the chamber will thus be cohesive, even though 
they might need to jointly compromise. A trans-institutional scenario in contrast 
suggests that formation of a concurrent majority is crucial for legislative success. 
This is achieved through a logroll across institutional boundaries. The analysis gives 
credence to the argument that formateurs build trans-institutional coalitions based on 
exchanges of support over issues.  
 
Two pieces of empirical evidence support the argument. First, empirical evidence 
from early- and final-stage coalitions on 124 legislative acts adopted by the EP and 
Council of the EU reveals a distinction between four coalition dynamics. Perfect 
continuity in line with the inter-institutional scenario is very rare. Most often, 
members are added to the existing coalitions. This is result is due to the Council, in 
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which final coalitions are usually very large. Accordingly, this strengthens inclusive 
dynamics in the bicameral arena. In contrast, formateurs choose trans-institutional 
coalitions and abandon the previous intra-institutional coalition in 27 per cent of 
cases. This underscores the importance of differentiating between coalition 
dynamics. 
 
Even though in the vast majority of cases members are added to the coalitions, we 
find that the range of the final coalition is on average smaller on the pro-anti-
integration dimension. While this does not hold for the left-right dimension, it lends 
some support to the first hypothesis, suggesting that formateurs choose more 
compact coalitions. The bigger the range, the broader is the ideological spectrum of 
the members of the coalitions who have to be accommodated. A smaller range thus 
suggests that the formateur also benefits. 
 
Second, we find evidence for the central role of the formateurs in this process. 
Indeed, the rapporteur is able to move closer to the coalition’s mean at the final stage 
when considering the pro-anti-integration dimension. Formateurs manage already at 
committee stage to choose coalitions in which they are in a relatively central position 
on a left-right dimension, as the relatively small distances to the mean suggest.  
 
At this point we can return to the assumption introduced above that actors at the 
intra-institutional stage face uncertainty about the preferences of actors in the second 
chamber. Relaxing this assumption means that formateurs can already strategically 
choose the intra-institutional coalition. This would create a bias against my 
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argument, and would suggest that trans-institutional cooperation might be more 
pervasive. Accordingly, the results might underestimate its effect.  
 
The empirical reality of the sequential co-decision procedure in the EU means that 
the EP as first mover faces more uncertainty than the Council, which in principle can 
wait until the adoption of the EP opinion before adopting its position. This would go 
some way to explaining why the presidency does not seem to be able to shift the 
coalition so that it is closer to the mean. In fact, the presidency might thus already 
strategically choose the intra-institutional coalition. 
 
Ironically, this suggests that the Council might be more of a unitary actor than the 
EP, which contradicts the standard assumption in procedural models of EU decision-
making. These assume the EP to be a represented by the median voter based on a 
simple majority rule in the chamber. In contrast, the paper suggests that the 
preference distribution in the EP matters. The shift in coalitions in the EP could 
likewise explain why empirical studies often find the Council to have the upper hand. 
While the EP shifts it position, and thus might be seen to lose, we now know that the 
rapporteur might well be able to exploit this situation, casting doubt on the 
usefulness of comparing the relative power of the institutions rather than actors 
within them.  
 
At a theoretical level, the micro-mechanism of coalition formation presented here 
builds on and develops the literature on legislative politics in four respects. First, it 
conceptualises decision-making as a cooperative endeavour, in which trades among 
actors are enforceable, albeit at a cost. This creates a demand for the logroll proposed 
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by the formateur through which exchanges across issues lead to the formation of a 
winning coalition. For the EU, researchers have sought to explain decision outcomes 
drawing on procedural models which are based on the formal rules of the procedure 
or bargaining models disregarding these rules (Thomson et al., 2006; Tsebelis & 
Garrett, 2000). I provide a theoretical foundation and specific causal mechanism of 
how agreement is reached. At the core of the path towards agreement are exchanges 
across several issues rather than single issue-specific deals in a legislative market.  
 
Second, the boundaries of the market in which exchanges take place are not confined 
to a single chamber, but extend to the two houses. Theories of legislative choice 
usually focus on a single chamber only. For instance, distributive theory suggests 
that exchanges are institutionalised in the committee system of a chamber (Weingast 
& Marshall, 1988). Likewise, many empirical studies confine their research to single 
chambers only. McKibben (2008, 2013) and Aksoy (2012) focus on exchanges 
between member states in the Council of the EU. However, in a bicameral setting, 
the enforceability of exchanges in a chamber is highly uncertain as they are subject 
to the agreement of the second chamber. Exchanges that do not take the second 
chamber into account thus face the risk of imminent failure. Therefore, I argue that 
the boundaries of the market in which legislators exchange support on issues 
encompasses the two chambers so as to facilitate stable exchanges.  
 
Third, exchanges might predominantly be conducted within an individual bill rather 
than across bills. This is due to a lack of credible commitment if agreements are not 
implemented simultaneously. Consequently, within-bill trades enjoy a higher 
enforceability. The literature focusing on exchanges across chambers often focuses 
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on trades across bills (e.g. Kardasheva, 2009a). These “package deals”, even when 
agreed simultaneously rather than building on diffuse reciprocity (i.e. promises of 
future cooperation), are however hard to enforce (McKibben & Western, 2014). 
Given a lack of credibility of commitments and hence uncertainty regarding 
enforceability, I argue that the scope of exchanges is mostly limited to a single 
legislative act. 
 
Fourth, the main actors in the bicameral market are not the chambers as unitary 
actors, but instead their constituent actors. Specific privileged actors hold a crucial, 
market-making role. Distributive theory implies that a chamber is organised as a firm 
rather than a market (Weingast & Marshall, 1988), which implies that it can be 
considered a unitary actor in bicameral decision-making. Informational theory 
(Krehbiel, 1991) considers individual legislators and partisan theory parties as the 
most important actors (Cox & McCubbins, 1993, 2004), without however specifying 
the path towards an agreement. Thus, exchanges in bicameral decision-making are 
often presented as interactions between the chambers in an inter-institutional process. 
This also holds for empirical studies. For instance, Kardasheva (2009a) draws on 
distributive theory and organisation theory to analyze package deals between EP and 
Council. In contrast, I consider the constituent actors of the chambers as participants 
in the market, and take the privileged position of specific powerful actors into 
account (see also Finke, 2012). 
 
In sum, the paper has put forward the theoretical argument that formateurs build a 
trans-institutional coalition by proposing a logroll across issues within a legislative 
proposal. This sheds new light on decision-making dynamics in bicameral systems. It 
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has been shown that formateurs can make a strategic decision for one of four types of 
coalitions in line with the inter- and trans-institutional scenarios. These decisions 
change winning coalitions’ size, composition, and compactness, affecting bicameral 
decision outcomes. In particular, the paper provides evidence that formateurs can 
exploit the powers that they are delegated to achieve coalitions that are more 
compact and in which they are more central on an integration dimension.  
 
This has normative implications in that it highlights two co-existing dynamics. First, 
formateurs seem to pursue inclusionary strategies, accommodating actors where this 
is not costly (i.e., does not increase the range of the coalition). Second, they manage 
to reduce the range of the coalitions, pointing to more polarised decision-making. 
Inclusionary dynamics arguably increase the legitimacy of policy output, and 
balancing the two dynamics is an important responsibility of the formateur. Given 
that they reap benefits in this process as they can shift the coalition so as to be 
located closer to the mean underscores that control of these agents is essential. Future 
research will have to investigate the extent of agency gains that formateurs reap, and 








Transaction Costs and Trans-Institutional Cooperation in 







Parties and committees mitigate transaction costs of legislative decision-making by 
institutionalizing exchanges. However, in bicameral systems with weak parties 
and/or diverging majorities in the two houses, uncertainty regarding the 
enforceability of exchanges in any one chamber exists. Therefore, the chambers have 
an incentive to endow specific actors with agenda-setting power. This paper focuses 
on the institution of the chambers’ key negotiators, who jointly act as ‘formateurs’ of 
a coalition. Drawing on homophily (the tendency to bond based on commonalities), 
it argues that similarities between these actors reduce the transaction costs of 
exchanges, and hence facilitate legislative cooperation. Therefore, decision-making 
speed can be modelled as a function of the characteristics of the proposer, 
negotiators, and their principals in the two houses. The resulting hypotheses are 
tested on a dataset comprising more than 750 pieces of legislation initiated during a 
ten-year period (1999-2009) in the political system of the European Union. Event-
history analysis provides evidence that formateurs have a strong impact on decision-
making efficiency. Similarity along the left-right dimension fosters cooperation, 
while matching nationalities slow down decision-making. This sheds light on the 
important role of institutions’ agents in bicameral politics, and has important 






Transaction costs are a key factor in legislative decision-making. Legislatures have 
institutions in place to mitigate costs of collective decision-making. First, parties can 
implement division of labour arrangements and agenda control (Aldrich, 1995; Cox 
& McCubbins, 1993, 2004; Rohde, 1991). Second, a committee system can help 
achieve stable outcomes by institutionalizing exchanges between legislators in a 
chamber (Shepsle & Weingast, 1987; Weingast & Marshall, 1988). Yet in “strong” 
bicameral political systems (Lijphart, 1986), chambers are differently composed and 
have veto power which triggers uncertainty regarding the enforceability of intra-
institutional agreements in bicameral negotiations. This creates demand for inter-
cameral coordination in order to form coalitions across the divide of the chambers. 
To this end, chambers can endow formateurs with agenda-setting powers to facilitate 
trans-institutional cooperation through vote trading across issues within a bill 
(logrolling).  
 
This paper sheds light on the importance of the institution of the formateur in the two 
chambers, and adopts a transaction cost framework in order to analyse its impact. It 
argues that the political similarity of the formateurs influences the transaction costs 
of exchanges and hence the likelihood and extent of cooperation. Consequently, it 
investigates the dependent variable of legislative cooperation between the two 
formateurs. Based on sociological and organisation studies of networks, homophily 
(the phenomenon that more similar actors are more likely to bond) implies lower 
transaction costs of exchanges between similar actors, which allow more 
comprehensive and swifter exchanges. Formateurs and their similarity thus make 
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decision-making more efficient. Therefore, the dependent variable is operationalised 
as decision-making duration. I model decision-making speed as a function of the 
characteristics of the intra-institutional formateurs in two chambers of a bicameral 
legislature. In so doing, the paper takes issue with the limited conception of the 
legislative market in distributive (Shepsle & Weingast, 1987; Weingast & Marshall, 
1988) and partisan theory (Aldrich, 1995; Rohde, 1991), which focus on single 
chambers only and thus neglect the demand for cooperation across institutional 
boundaries. In contrast, I argue that delegation beyond a committee system and party 
leadership is necessary to mitigate transaction costs and to overcome uncertainty 
regarding the enforcement of exchanges. Explaining legislative politics and 
organisation thus requires conceiving the legislative market for exchanges beyond a 
single chamber. This suggests an extension to standard theories of legislative 
organisation.  
 
The paper tests these claims using the case of European Union decision-making 
under the ordinary legislative procedure (“co-decision”), under which both chambers 
have veto power. This combines the two standard bicameral conflict resolution 
methods, a “navette procedure” during which the proposal shuttles back and forth 
between the chambers, and a conciliation committee comprising members of the two 
chambers (Tsebelis & Money, 1997). In the European Parliament (EP) (the lower 
house), the formateur is the “rapporteur” who seeks to gain support for their report 
and can choose a coalition carrying the proposal in committee and, eventually, the 
plenary. In the Council of the EU (the upper house), the rotating presidency can 




The dimensions of the EU policy space and the impact of actor alignment on 
outcomes have been subject of a significant body of scholarship (e.g. Hix et al., 
2007; Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002; Kaeding & Selck, 2005; Marks & 
Steenbergen, 2002; Thomson, Boerefijn, & Stokman, 2004; Thomson, 2009). Here I 
test the effect of similarity in nationality and positions on a left-right and integration 
dimension based on expert surveys (Bakker et al., 2012; Hooghe et al., 2010). I draw 
on a comprehensive dataset on more than 800 acts proposed during the 1999-2004 
(EP5) and 2004-2009 (EP6) legislative terms in order to investigate these questions. 
 
I apply event-history analysis (‘survival analysis’) to investigate the effect of the 
actor constellation on efficiency. Event-history analysis has been applied to the 
agenda-setting, decision-making and implementation stages of EU legislation 
(Rasmussen & Toshkov, 2013; Steunenbeg & Kaeding, 2009; Thomson, 2007). 
Previous studies on decision-making were largely interested in institutional questions 
of gridlock in the Council, enlargement and the impact on integration (Golub, 2008b; 
Hertz & Leuffen, 2011; Schulz & König, 2000). More recently, Klüver and 
Sagarzazu (2013) have found that the ideological congruency of the institutions 
speeds up the legislative process. The more the Commission (the proposer), Council, 
and EP differ in their ideological preferences, the longer the duration of decision-
making. In contrast, I pursue a micro-level analysis explaining decision-making 
speed based on the characteristics of the key negotiators in the process, while 
controlling for the preferences of the proposer and the negotiators’ principals.  
 
The findings give credence to an impact of the key negotiators on cooperation among 
the institutions. We find very strong and significant effects for the link between the 
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Council presidency and the rapporteur of the EP. The analysis shows that the larger 
the ideological distance between these actors, the longer it takes to form a coalition 
across the two chambers, while controlling for intra-institutional and inter-branch 
preference dynamics, the nature of the legislative act and the institutional 
environment. In contrast, matching nationality slows down decision-making. In sum, 
the findings provide support to the importance ascribed to formateurs and the 
transaction costs of their exchanges, and hence support the underlying theoretical 
argument for trans-institutional cooperation. From this follows an extension of 
standard distributive and partisan theories of legislative organisation. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section discusses the relevance of 
transaction costs in legislatures. It identifies the reasons for the delegation to 
formateurs in bicameral systems, and explains the higher likelihood of homophilic 
exchanges because they incur lower transaction costs. On this basis, the main 
hypotheses are formulated. The second section presents the EU political system, and 
expounds the role of key negotiators in EU bicameral decision-making. The third 
section outlines the research design and the fourth presents the results.  
 
Transaction costs and cooperation in legislatures  
 
Exchanges and their transaction costs are crucial for explaining decision-making. In 
order to pass legislation, legislators exchange support over salient issues within 
legislative proposals in order to build a stable majority. Hence, legislatures can be 
likened to a political market in which vote trades take place. These come with 
transaction costs arising from difficulties in “the specification, monitoring, or 
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enforcement” of an exchange (Dixit, 1998). They entail “search and information 
costs”, “bargaining and decision costs” as well as “supervision and enforcement 
costs” (Furubotn & Richter, 1997, pp. 44–5) and differ depending on the institutional 
framework and actor constellation involved. What exchanges take place hence 
depends on the participants in the market and the transaction costs of the exchanges. 
Eventually, the exchanges effectuated between the actors in the legislative market 
determine coalition formation dynamics (see paper 1) and outcomes (see paper 3).  
 
Intra-institutional solutions to mitigate transaction costs do not suffice 
 
Different institutions help mitigate transaction costs of collective decision-making 
(North, 1990). In particular, this holds for parties and committee systems. Parties and 
committee systems can reduce transaction costs by pre-structuring the exchanges 
necessary to pass legislation (Aldrich, 1995; Cox & McCubbins, 1993, 2004; Shepsle 
& Weingast, 1987; Weingast & Marshall, 1988). They grant agenda-setting powers 
to specific individuals, thus facilitating collective decision-making. However, if 
parties/committees are weak, or if a second chamber represents a veto player 
(Tsebelis & Money, 1997; Tsebelis, 2002) the enforcement of trades is not credible, 
and coalition formation has to take place on an issue by issue basis.  
 
First, distributive theory of legislative organisation posits that legislative chambers 
internalise exchanges, and may hence be organised like firms (Weingast & Marshall, 
1988). Legislative institutions (a committee system) are created that enforce 
exchanges within a chamber, thus reducing transaction costs. But when two 
chambers have veto power, the internal organisation cannot guarantee enforcement 
of the exchanges which depend on the second chamber (Larocca, 2010). This holds 
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in particular for strong bicameral systems which are based on differential 
representation resulting in different preference alignments (Lijphart, 1986). Under 
these circumstances, intra-institutional exchanges potentially become insufficient as 
the size of the political market in which votes are traded has to be expanded beyond 
any one single chamber. 
 
Second, parties may form in legislatures to reduce the transaction costs of collective 
decision-making, and may bridge the two chambers. They internalise exchanges, and 
can vote cohesively, based on specialisation gains and agenda-setting power of the 
leadership (Aldrich, 1995; Cox & McCubbins, 1993, 2004; Rohde, 1991). In 
bicameral systems, parties can act together across institutional boundaries (König, 
2001), if issues at stake do not divide the party. Yet, not all political systems benefit 
from strong parties within legislatures, and not always are majorities in the two 
chambers aligned. If no party or coalition enjoys a stable majority in the two 
chambers, coalitions have to be formed on an issue-by-issue basis.  
 
In order to coordinate exchanges across the two chambers, the floor can then endow 
formateurs with agenda-setting power. They can facilitate exchanges across issues 
within a legislative proposal in a market for votes now comprising two chambers, 
and give credibility to trades that are negotiated. Distributive and partisan theories in 
contrast imply that an institutionalisation of exchanges within parties or committee 
systems suffices, which renders exchanges across institutional boundaries costly, and 
possibly prohibitively so. Formateurs in contrast enable trans-institutional 
cooperation between actors in the two chambers, because they can propose a trans-
institutional logroll linking issues and thus trading support in the two chambers. 
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Delegating to formateurs, chambers can hence reduce search, information, 
negotiation, and enforcement costs of trans-institutional exchanges, making 
bicameral decision-making more efficient.  
 
Homophily: Transaction costs of exchanges depend on actor constellation 
 
Organisation studies suggest that these formateurs amount to “relais actors” linking 
the two chambers (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977; Farrell & Héritier, 2003). As a 
corollary, the constellation of the formateurs determines transaction costs by 
affecting information, negotiation and enforcement costs of exchanges. In general, 
transaction costs approaches analyse the transaction costs associated with different 
governance structures (Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999). Likewise, in our case of 
political exchanges in a bicameral legislature, we ask how legislators’ constellations 
affect transaction costs when confronted with uncertain enforceability in the inter-
institutional arena. When legislators have to decide on how to weigh up mutual 
support for different issues, the characteristics of the actors involved will impact on 
the effort required to come to an agreement. Therefore, similar to the institutional 
environment, we expect the actor constellation to influence the level of transaction 
costs arising from exchanges. 
 
Based on studies of social networks that have identified homophily as a strong 
organizing principle of social relations (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001), 
we argue that similar actors incur lower transaction costs when entering into 
cooperation by exchanging support over issues. Podolny (1990, p. 359) argues “that 
ideological dissimilarity impedes formation of exchange relations because it creates a 
lack of trust and a fear of harmful externalities”. In a similar vein Kanter (1977) 
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shows that homophily breeds trust. More generally, this strand of the literature 
suggests that homophily facilitates exchanges of different types (McPherson et al., 
2001). Explicitly linking homophily and transaction costs of cooperation, Gerber, 
Henry and Lubell conclude that “political similarity affects the political calculus of 
collaboration, in particular by decreasing the search costs of discovering and 
bargaining over the distribution of costs and benefits from joint initiatives” (2013, p. 
600). In Podolny’s (1990) words, the risk of unintended consequences from 
exchanges with similar actors is lower, which makes it rational for actors to factor 
similarity into their strategic decisions. Hence, similarity makes counterparts 
mutually more predictable, affecting exchanges through minimising transaction 
costs. Homophily thus structures exchanges, raising the question of which 
dimensions of similarity matter. 
 
The ideological left-right dimension is commonly regarded the central organizing 
principle in politics. It encapsulates positions on many different socio-economic 
issues collapsed into a single dimension. Lipset & Rokkan (1967) suggest that the 
left-right division is based on class, religion and centre vs. periphery as societal 
cleavages. More recently, Kitschelt (1994) argues the distinction between left and 
right captures an interventionism - free market continuum as well as a liberal - 
authoritarian continuum. Its significance is due to the fact that “Political actors have 
an incentive to interpret new issues in light of existing cleavages such as the 
Left/Right ideological dimension” (Marks & Steenbergen, 2002, p. 881). In line with 
this, there is strong evidence that the left-right dimension is meaningful in the EU 
policy space. It is the dominant dimension in the EP (Hix et al., 2007; Hix & Noury, 
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2009), and there is consistent evidence that it affects Council decision-making (Hosli 
et al., 2011; Mattila, 2004, 2009). 
 
Therefore, we expect perceived left-right positions of actors to influence the degree 
of cooperation they will engage in. Actors with similar preferences incur lower 
transaction costs when exchanging support over issues and thus facilitate 
cooperation, leading us to expect earlier conclusion of the legislative process.  
 
H1: An increase in ideological distance on the left-right dimension between the 
formateurs diminishes legislative cooperation and slows down the legislative 
process. 
 
The integration dimension is commonly regarded as a second key dimension of the 
EU policy space (Tsebelis & Garrett, 2000). Traditionally, conflict is understood to 
centre on the extent to which competencies should be transferred to the European 
level. This a conflict dimension that is prevalent in many federal systems that need to 
decide on the allocation of authority across different levels. In the EU we can 
however link this to international relations theories (Marks & Steenbergen, 2002, p. 
883). There is strong evidence of the integration dimension structuring coalition 
formation in the EP (Hix et al., 2007; Hix & Noury, 2009), as well as in the Council 
(Hosli et al., 2011; Mattila, 2004, 2009). As a consequence, we expect that perceived 





H2: An increase in ideological distance on the integration dimension between the 
formateurs diminishes legislative cooperation and slows down the legislative 
process. 
 
A final important factor in a multinational organisation such as the European Union 
is that of origin. Matching nationality can be considered a factor driving cooperation. 
Shared origin and representation of the same (or overlapping) constituencies can 
explain shared preferences. Accordingly, we expect that formateurs from the same 
member state will be more likely to cooperate. 
 
H3: A match in nationality between the formateurs increases legislative cooperation 
and accelerates the legislative process. 
 
The next section presents the institutional framework in which these exchanges take 
place and the key actors involved.  
 
The political system of the European Union 
 
The political system of the European Union  shares characteristics of parliamentary 
and (semi-) presidential systems (Hix & Hoyland, 2011). As in parliamentary 
systems, the executive in the form of the European Commission proposes legislation. 
Yet in contrast to parliamentary and in line with presidential, separated-powers 
systems, the executive does not command a majority in the bicameral legislature 
consisting of the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (EP). The 
Commission does not fall if its proposals are not supported, and hence there is no 
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stable government majority and opposition minority that consistently votes en bloc. 
In addition, partisan links between the chambers are weak (Lindberg et al., 2008). 
Whilst in legislatures with strong parties, these might take on inter-chamber 
coordination, the prospect of this is unlikely in the EU. As a consequence, the 
formation of majority coalitions between the EP and the Council of the EU has to 
take place on an issue-by-issue basis unless the chambers are perfectly congruent. 
This is unlikely in strong bicameral systems in which the chambers represent 
different constituencies, and makes the EU an ideal laboratory to investigate the 
dynamics between formateurs. 
 
The ordinary legislative procedure includes up to three readings. The proposal first 
shuttles back and forth between the EP and the Council. From the first reading, the 
proposal can be adopted at any time if one chamber acquiesces to the other’s 
proposal. The third reading is prepared by a conciliation committee comprising 
representatives of the two chambers (Franchino & Mariotto, 2012; Rasmussen, 
2008). Previous research provides valuable insight into the cooperation of legislators 
across institutional boundaries and its impact on outcomes and the legislative 
process. Rasmussen (2011) and Reh et al. (2013) have investigated the reasons for 
“early agreement”, i.e. adoption of a legislative act at the first or early second 
reading, analyzing the interplay of intra- and inter-institutional factors. But Toshkov 
and Rasmussen (2012) have highlighted that early agreement must not be confused 
with fast agreement. They demonstrate that ‘early’ agreements take longer to 




Formateurs work within the committee structure of the two chambers (Corbett et al., 
2011; Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006). Empirical evidence underscores the 
influence of the formateurs. Costello and Thomson (2010) show that EP opinions 
tend to be biased towards the rapporteur’s national interest. Likewise, they provide 
evidence of the impact of the rapporteur on the final decision outcome (Costello & 
Thomson, 2011). The choice of the rapporteur can thus bear on the winning majority 
and, consequently, the content of legislation, as they are the architects of the 
coalition supporting an agreement (Finke, 2012; Hurka, 2013)(cf. paper 1). Likewise, 
in the Council, outcomes are usually biased towards the position of the presidency 
(Aksoy, 2010; Schalk et al., 2007; Thomson, 2008; Warntjen, 2008). In the 
following, we will discuss each chamber in turn. 
 
European Parliament: the rapporteur as formateur 
 
Legislative work in the EP takes place in its committees (Neuhold, 2001; Yordanova, 
2013). The EP leadership assigns proposals to committees, and these select a 
rapporteur who acts as formateur, i.e. as proposer of a coalition. The committee is the 
primary principal. Rapporteurships are distributed through a bidding process among 
the party groups in each committee, based on points that are allocated in line with 
group size (Kaeding, 2004). The committee thereby chooses an agent representing 
the committee as a whole. Rapporteurships are however coveted prizes for party 
groups, who are the secondary principal of the formateur (Corbett et al., 2011; 
Obholzer & Kaeding, 2012). Once a party group has secured a report, they can 
delegate the rapporteurship to one of the committee members of their group. The 
rapporteur is thus constrained by two principals, the party group and committee. This 
requires them to reconcile competing demands to advance the interests of the 
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committee and their party group. ‘Shadow rapporteurs’ follow the legislative file on 
behalf of the remaining groups and seek to keep the rapporteur in check (Ringe, 
2010, p. 22). Taking part in inter-institutional meetings and thus having access to 
privileged information, they can sound alarm when they feel the rapporteur has 
exceeded their mandate. Likewise, party group coordinators fulfil a comparable role 
for party groups (Obholzer & Kaeding, 2012). These control mechanisms ascertain 
that the rapporteur will not drift too far off the committee or party line.  
 
Council of the EU: Council presidency as formateur 
 
While the rapporteur is appointed on a continuous basis until the adoption of the act, 
the Council presidency rotates every six months among member states according to a 
schedule that is fixed many years in advance (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006). 
The presidency is the agent of the Council both in intra-institutional negotiations in 
the sectoral working groups and committees, as well as in inter-institutional 
negotiations.  
 
Presidencies have some influence on the legislative files that they negotiate during 
their presidency (Warntjen, 2007). The agenda is partly pre-determined through 
advanced files at second reading or conciliation that require agreement within short 
timeframes in line with treaty rules. Nevertheless, there is a menu of pending 
proposals at first reading that presidencies can choose from. Kleine (2012) argues 
that presidencies privilege files that they wish to adopt largely unchanged. This is 
because other governments cannot trust the presidency’s claim that its own domestic 
interests are strong enough to require accommodation. Nevertheless, Tallberg (2004) 
suggests that their role still leaves presidencies with influence over which agreement 
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to choose out of several options in a “contract zone”, for instance when proposing a 
“presidency compromise” (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006, p. 150). As a 
consequence, they will choose files that matter to them.   
 
Research Design: data, operationalisation and methodology  
 
In this section I will explain the research design for testing the hypotheses developed 
above. Legislative cooperation is the dependent variable and operationalised as 
decision-making duration. This study focuses on legislation introduced during the 
1999-2004 and 2004-2009 legislative terms, and analyses co-decision files only. Co-
decision has by now become the most important legislative procedure in the EU and 
is particularly interesting, given that EP and Council are co-equal legislators.  
 
The data covers the period from mid-June 1999 to mid-October 2012, and is split 
into 172 episodes, which accounts for the rotating presidency of the Council and the 
variation in the composition of the institutions due to national and European 
elections as well as EU enlargements. In other words, splitting the period into 
different episodes captures the varying preference alignment in the institutions. The 
longest episode covers half a year (the term of the presidency), the shortest only a 
day. The statistical method chosen allows us to draw lessons from right-censored 
cases, i.e. legislative acts which were not yet adopted in 2012.  
 
The starting point in the construction of the dataset used for this paper is Reh et al. 
(2013) data on co-decision. This was adapted so as to comprise all binding co-
decision acts initiated during the Prodi and Barroso I commissions (1999-2009). This 
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results in 844 acts, of which we have to exclude 37 due to missing data. The 
excluded acts were classed as secondary to the research objective, as they are non-
binding recommendations or have been subject to a change of legal basis resulting in 
a different legislative procedure. The data was further supplemented from the 
Legislative Observatory and PreLex databases of the EU institutions and data on 
national party and party group affiliation of MEPs based on their histories of 
parliamentary service. I added the identities of the rapporteur in the EP and the 
Council presidency in charge. This dataset provides the basis for the analysis.  
 
In a second step, I collected information on the national party affiliation of the key 
actors and the composition of the three institutions. Döring and Manow (Döring & 
Manow, 2012; Döring, 2012) detail the national party delegations represented in the 
EP, allowing insight into its composition of party groups. Likewise, they provide 
information on national governments, from which the presidency and the 
composition of the Council could be coded. Döring (2007) provides information on 
the composition of the European Commission and the party affiliation of the 
commissioners. 
 
The dataset that was thus created links individual legislative acts with information on 
the actors involved regarding their individual party affiliation and preferences, as 
well as putting this into comparative perspective by coding the distance on the 
dimension scrutinised here. Splitting the 807 acts into the different episodes leads to 
a large dataset of 17,416 observations reflecting a time series of the preference 






The dependent variable captures the legislative cooperation between the actors. We 
posit that similarity on the left-right dimension among the legislative actors will 
speed up the decision-making process by reducing transaction costs, while 
divergence will lead to delay. Hence we operationalise legislative cooperation as 
duration in days between the adoption the Commission proposal and the final 
adoption of the act (signature).  
 
There are two reasons why legislative cooperation leads to shorter decision-making 
duration. Firstly, diverging opinions denote higher transaction costs for decision-
making which prolongs its duration. Hammering out the details of a compromise 
acceptable to the respective required majorities within the institutions is thus costly 
in terms of resources. Secondly, delay can be used as an explicit signalling device 
and power instrument by the institutions (see Kardasheva, 2009b, p. 388). The EP 
has been argued to benefit from a longer time horizon than the Council, where the 
rotating presidency determines the pulse. Thus, delay is the observable implication of 
a lack of cooperation. 
 
Nevertheless, there are conceivable objections to the use of the duration as proxy for 
cooperation. Firstly, slow decision-making may occur with very salient acts that 
require special consideration. Secondly, duration may be a result of complexity of an 
issue rather than conflict. Long durations could thus be explained by the sheer length 
of an act and legislative actors taking their responsibilities seriously by taking time to 
comb through the text. I therefore constructed control variables capturing these 
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concerns. Whilst decision-making duration is a proxy and not a direct measurement, 
it promises to be a valuable, valid indicator. 
 
Finally, we should note that there is not an effective limit to the duration of the 
negotiations as time limits apply only at later stages. Both under article 251 of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Communities (TEC) at the time analysed in this 
paper and under article 294 of the Treaty Establishing the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) since 2009, the temporal provisions regarding co-decision/ 
the ordinary legislative procedure have remained the same. The first reading is not 
subject to time limits. Only after the Council has adopted its ‘Common Position’ at 
first reading time limits start to kick in. This shows that despite the limits to duration 




Distance on a left-right and integration dimension was assessed by the location of the 
actor’s national party as a proxy for their own preferences. We can expect the actors’ 
preferences to be in line with the national party position both if they are policy-
seeking and office seeking (as they depend on the national party’s support for re-
nomination). This implies an expectation that the positioning of a national party of a 
legislative actor is representative of their personal preferences, and in particular that 
formateurs read their counterpart’s national party affiliation as a label based on 
which they adapt their behaviour. 
 
I draw on Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data regarding the position of national 
political parties (Bakker et al., 2012; Hooghe et al., 2010), because this specifically 
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focuses on EU issues. It is based on surveys asking experts to locate parties on a 
number of dimensions, of which I use the general left-right (scale 0-10) and 
integration position dimension (scale 1-7). Interpolating the positions established in 
four waves of the survey (1999, 2002, 2006, 2010), the party positions underlying 
formateurs’ preferences and institutions’ positions dynamically reflect the evolution 
of national party preferences over time. However, parties from small countries such 
as Luxembourg, Malta, and Cyprus are missing in this data set, so where necessary I 
took recourse to Döring & Manow’s composite index averaging different sources 




I draw on a number of control variables, which can be broadly divided into three 
camps. The first relates to the relation between the institution’s agent and the 
principal as well as the two principals. The second relates to the institutional 
environment, and the third to legislation-specific characteristics.  
 
Firstly, I control for the distance between the formateurs and the weighted mean of 
their institution. I use this as a proxy intended to capture the degree of likely intra-
institutional conflict and scrutiny that the agent will be faced with. As the distance 
increases, we would expect more scrutiny, leading to longer decision-making 
duration. Further, a control for the distance between the principals ascertains that any 
effect is not due to the macro-dynamics of broader inter-cameral alignment (Klüver 
& Sagarzazu, 2013). In addition, I include a dummy variable indicating whether the 
Commission was “absorbed” by Council and EP (Tsebelis, 2002), i.e. whether the 
Commission mean was located between the EP and Council. When this is the case, 
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we expect swifter decision-making. Each of these controls is included for both the 
left-right and integration dimension. It can be argued that this does not hold if the 
Commission is farther away from the status quo than the two chambers in a one-
dimensional setting. This is because any agreement by the chambers moves the 
outcome towards the Commission’s ideal point and thus constitutes an improvement 
on the status quo. As the argument goes, the Commission would then gladly accept 
the move, as any agreement left it better off. In contrast, if it was located outside the 
range of the chambers and closer to the status quo, it would indeed endeavour to 
block any moves that make it worse off (i.e. if the distance between the new outcome 
and its ideal point is larger than the distance between its ideal point and the status 
quo).  
 
There is a theoretical and empirical justification for focusing on absorption rather 
than the relative locations vis-à-vis the status quo. At a theoretical level, I consider 
the Commission sensitive to deviations from its ideal point. As a consequence, I do 
not expect it to accept without a fight any outcome that represents an improvement 
on the status quo, but that is not located at its ideal point. Accordingly, I expect the 
Commission to engage in strategic opposition to achieve an outcome that is closer to 
its ideal point. At an empirical level, this means that the Commission would refrain 
from including amendments by the EP and Council in its proposal. Commission gate-
keeping power (Rasmussen, 2003) means that at a minimum higher thresholds are 
required in the Council (unanimity instead of QMV), and at a maximum additional 
readings are required. Therefore, Commission absorption is a theoretically and 





In so doing I use the mean rather than the median of the Commission, even though 
the College of Commissioners formally decides by simple majority. Given the norm 
of consensual decision-making in the College of Commissioners, the mean is an 
appropriate measure (Caplin & Nalebuff, 1991; Grofman, Koetzle, Merrill, & 
Brunell, 2001) that is an accepted indicator of Commission preferences (Warntjen, 
Hix, & Crombez, 2008). 
 
Secondly, I control for the complexity and salience of the file under negotiation. I 
draw on the number of recitals of an act as an indicator of their complexity, as 
practiced in the implementation literature (Kaeding, 2006). Very salient acts might 
require more attention and hence a longer negotiation phase. I draw on Reh et al.’s 
(2013, p. 18) measure of salience based on media mention in major outlets across 
several EU countries. The more complex and salient an act, the longer we expect 
decision-making to take.  
 
Thirdly, the institutional environment matters. The time span covered includes two 
enlargement rounds that I account for. In 2004, ten new member states joined the 
Union, and in 2007 two further followed. It had long been anticipated that this “big-
bang” enlargement would slow down decision-making. Yet, previous studies of 
decision-making duration provide mixed evidence (Hertz & Leuffen, 2011). I control 
for the negotiations in the enlarged EU through a dummy variable (equalling 1 in 
EU25/27). In addition, legislators may wish to see legislative acts adopted before the 
end of term of the EP/Commission. Therefore, I control for the days left in the EP 
term at the time the proposal is launched (Klüver & Sagarzazu, 2013; Kovats, 2009). 
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Finally, the Amsterdam treaty revised the rules for co-decision by allowing early 
adoption of legislative acts after the first reading. This has been increasingly used by 





In order to analyse the effect of the independent variables on the questions of when 
and whether an act was adopted, we draw on event history analysis (Box-
Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). As there are no particular theoretical expectations 
regarding the baseline hazard of adoption of the legislative act, I use a semi-
parametric Cox regression (pp.21-68) (Golub, 2008a). The Cox model makes a 
proportional hazard assumption, which was tested for each variable in the models 
(Grambsch & Therneau, 1994). Where non-proportional hazard could not be 
excluded, I transformed the variables into time-varying covariates by using the 
interaction with the natural log of the duration (Golub, 2008a). Another critical issue 
is ties (i.e. events with the same duration). These were handled by the Breslow 
method, which alleviates the problem (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, pp.55-59). 
In sum, while a Cox model in medical research would e.g. examine the effect of 
environmental factors on survival of a patient (hence survival analysis), we will here 
estimate the impact of a covariate on the hazard rate (the ‘risk’) of the adoption of an 
act (the event). This results in the hazard ratio which is the change in the hazard rate 







Overall, we find evidence that the alignment of key negotiators indeed influences 
legislative cooperation. Models testing only hypotheses 1 and 2 separately are shown 
in annex 1. We discuss a model based on a slightly smaller sample (787 acts, 16338 
observations) in order to include salience. A full model without salience confirms 
these results (see annex 2). In the following, we will go through the model step by 
step. 
 
We find that an increase in the distance between the institutions’ agents strongly 
affects decision-making speed. This lends support to the importance ascribed to the 
role of the formateurs in building a concurrent majority. The effect of an increase of 
ideological similarity between the rapporteur and presidency, i.e. the legislature’s 
formateurs, is strong and in the anticipated direction. The more dissimilar the two 
actors are, the longer it takes to agree on a compromise. The odds of an adoption of a 
legislative act are 6.5 per cent lower for any one point of distance on the ten-point 
left-right dimension. This corroborates the first hypothesis developed above. In 
contrast, distance on an integration dimension does not influence the odds of 
adoption of a legislative act. In contrast to our expectations, matching nationality has 
an adverse effect on efficiency. First, we need to qualify this by pointing to the 
relative scarcity of such matches. Nevertheless, the finding raises interesting 
questions. It might suggest that principals actively prevent matching pairs from 
negotiation to avoid national collusion between actors with possibly similar national 
preferences. The difference between the effects of ideological similarity and 
nationality suggests that national collusion is deemed more harmful to other actors’ 
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preferences than apparently acceptable ideology-based cooperation. This might be 
because the latter type of cooperation is familiar from domestic politics, whereas 
member states holding the rotating presidency might have to pass on files negotiated 
by MEPs from their country to avoid the impression of bias (Kleine, 2012).  
 
These results control for a series of factors at the level of preference dynamics, 
legislative acts, and the institutional environment. Focusing on preference dynamics 
between the principals and the agents at the intra-cameral level, we find that only the 
relation between the presidency and the Council mean has a significant bearing on 
decision-making duration. If the rotating presidency is an outlier, this markedly 
slows down decision-making. A one unit increase in distance on the left-right 
dimension reduces the odds of adoption by some 12 per cent, while a one unit 
increase on the integration dimension has even a slightly stronger effect at 14.5 per 
cent. This suggests an effective control by the principal in the Council. However, it 
does not suggest that the EP cannot control their agents. It is more plausible to expect 
the EP selects the rapporteur, who will usually be responsible from start to finish for 
the proposal, with considerations of agency drift in mind. The pre-set rotation in the 
Council does not allow a similar type of control through selection of the agent.  
 
Turning to inter-cameral dynamics, we find a very strong and significant effect for 
the distance between the means of the institutions on a left-right dimension. This is in 
line with the findings of Klüver and Sagarzazu (2013). The further the institutions’ 




  Hazard ratio 
 Variables (Std. deviation) 
   
Main IVs   
 Formateurs: left-right 0.935** 
  (0.0255) 
 Formateurs: integration 0.982 
  (0.0437) 
 Formateurs: nationality match 0.686** 
  (0.129) 
Controls   
Intra-cameral Council - presidency: left-right 0.877** 
  (0.0577) 
 EP mean - rapporteur: left-right 0.960 
  (0.0495) 
 Council - presidency: integration 0.855** 
  (0.0524) 
 EP mean - rapporteur: integration 1.036 
  (0.0649) 
Inter-cameral Council - EP means: left-right 0.263*** 
  (0.0540) 
 Council - EP means: integration 7.497*** 
  (1.637) 
Inter-branch Commission absorbed: left-right 1.095 
  (0.219) 
 Commission absorbed: integration 0.330*** 
  (0.109) 
Proposal Recitals  0.749*** 
  (0.03369) 
 Recitals *ln(t) 1.043*** 
  (0.00724) 
 Salience 1.000 
  (0.00219) 
Context Days left in term 1.000*** 
  (8.12e-05) 
 EU25/27 0.147*** 
  (0.0526) 
 Amsterdam 1.001*** 
  (0.000111) 
   
 Observations 16,338 
 Subjects 788 
 Failures 768 
 Log likelihood -4173.043 
 Note: Table displays hazard ratios. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3: Cox regression 
 
 
The effect of distance between means on an integration dimension is large and not in 
the expected direction. This is puzzling, but a simple explanation is that the small 
range of similarity of the distance in means over time inflates the effect. It should 
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also be noted that the variable only barely passes the Grambsch and Therneau test, 
suggesting that we should interpret the estimate with great caution. 
 
At the inter-branch level, we focus on the effect of the location of the executive vis-
à-vis the legislature. The reasoning was that if the Commission as a veto player who 
might withdraw the proposal is absorbed, i.e. located between the EP and Council 
means, this would accelerate the legislative process. We find a strong, significant 
effect opposite the theorised direction. In other words, if the Commission is a 
preference outlier, EP and Council come to an agreement more swiftly. This suggests 
that the Commission’s threat to withdraw its proposal at the legislative stage is not 
viable as it commonly prefers any agreement to the status quo. Actors in the two 
chambers might instead cooperate to avoid the emergence of strong domestic 
opposition against the law under discussion (Kleine, 2013). 
 
In addition to these preference dynamics, we further controlled for the nature of the 
legislative act under discussion by including measures of their salience and 
complexity. The weak and not significant finding for salience might be due to the 
two directions in which salience might affect speed: on the one hand, it might lead to 
focussing resources on such acts, on the other hand these issues might exacerbate 
polarisation. In sum, there is no systematic effect. This also holds for the complexity 
of legislative acts as measured by the number of recitals, for which the effect varies 
over time. 
 
Moreover the institutional environment has not been stable over the 13 years covered 
by the analysis, which warrants control for three factors. First, we control for the 
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point in time in the legislative term. The variable is significant and suggests that 
towards the end of term, it takes longer to come to agreement (note that the effect is 
strong considering that the variable is measured in days). This may be because most 
legislation is adopted within one term. Second and third, we controlled for the effect 
of enlargement, finding that is has slowed down decision-making, and the time since 




Figure 11: Cumulative hazard – ideological preferences 
 
The insights can be illustrated by an example. In the second half of 2005, the United 
Kingdom held the rotating Council presidency. At the time, Labour was in 
government. The Labour party was considered to be moderately left by country 
experts in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, who on average placed Labour at 4 on an 
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presidency at the time. The Council presidency was in negotiations with the EP on a 
number of pieces of legislation. Suppose the rapporteurs for two comparable pieces 
of legislation were a Labour MEP and a Conservative MEP.
16
 Under these 
circumstances, and controlling for intervening factors captured by the control 
variables, we can compare the cumulative hazard ratios for these two scenarios. 
 
The solid line in figure 11 illustrates the case of any presidency and rapporteur at the 
same position on a left-right spectrum. Here, this represents the case of a Labour 
government and Labour rapporteur. In contrast, the Conservatives were deemed to be 
located at the centre-right (7.13) by country experts. If the formateurs were separated 
by a distance of 3.13 points, such as here in the example of a Labour government and 
Conservative rapporteur, the cumulative hazard rate is markedly lower at any point in 
the negotiations. This scenario is represented by the dashed line in the graph above. 
The graph shows within one legislative term (approx. 1800 days), the ideological 
difference would imply that the same party combination would have adopted approx. 
2.5 acts, while the dissimilar combination would have come to agreement on two 
acts. This example shows that the odds of coming to an agreement are higher in the 
case of ideologically similar as opposed to dissimilar formateurs. This reflects the 
importance of the formateurs’ ideological similarity for the transaction costs of 
bicameral decision-making. 
 
Likewise, we can illustrate the opposite effect for nationality. Holding the other 
variables in the model constant, we can compare a scenario in which presidency and 
rapporteur have the same nationality to one in which they do not. Figure 12 displays 
                                                 
16 We disregard nationality in the example. 
128 
 
the cumulative hazard for the two cases. The distance between the lines reflects that 
in one legislative term, formateurs with matching nationalities would only adopt 1.5 









This paper has modelled the duration of decision-making as a proxy for legislative 
cooperation resulting from preference alignments of key negotiators in a bicameral 
system. It has argued that the negotiation process and intra-institutional dynamics 
privilege the formateurs in bicameral decision-making, here the Council presidency 
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suggests that cooperation is more likely for similar actors given lower transaction 
costs of exchanges. The output of the 1999-2009 legislative terms was then used to 
test whether these actors substantially influence cooperation.  
 
The empirical findings support the impact of the key negotiators on inter-cameral 
bargaining and the efficiency of the legislative process. We find a very strong and 
significant effect for the impact of ideological similarity between the Council 
presidency and the rapporteur of the EP on legislative cooperation, and consequently 
the legislative process. The larger the political distance between these actors, the 
longer it takes to form a coalition across the two chambers when controlling for the 
overall institutional environment, preference alignment in and across the chambers, 
and the nature of the legislative act. Two actors thus single-handedly transform the 
legislative process. 
 
The paper suggests that the formateurs’ similarity affects their calculus of legislative 
cooperation by affecting the transaction costs of exchanges between them and by 
extension, the two chambers. Studies of homophily show that more comprehensive 
exchanges are feasible between more similar actors. This is because search, 
negotiation and enforcement costs are lower as similarity increases. Here we have 
focused on one implication of the lowered transaction costs, namely decision-making 
speed. Future research will have to investigate whether there is also a qualitative 
difference between the agreements facilitated by the formateurs. Nevertheless, the 
findings lend support to the importance ascribed to formateurs and the underlying 
theoretical argument putting them at the core of a causal mechanism explaining 




This has important implications for the study of legislative organisation and 
bicameral decision-making. Distributive and partisan theories are unicameral, and 
they do not necessarily hold in bicameral systems (Gailmard & Hammond, 2011; 
Tsebelis & Money, 1997). In bicameral political systems in which the two chambers 
are differently composed, actors are faced with uncertainty as to the preferences of 
the other chamber when seeking to implement intra-institutional solutions to mitigate 
transaction costs of decision-making. This hampers the institutionalisation of intra-
cameral exchanges in parties or in the form of committee systems. While distributive 
theory suggests that the committee system reduces transaction costs by 
institutionalizing an exchange, this does not yet guarantee that committee members 
can implement their preferences, and that transaction costs are minimised. Likewise, 
division of labour within parties has only limited impact on transaction costs unless 
these control majorities and exert authority in the two chambers. In a nutshell, this is 
because in a bicameral system the market for legislative exchanges extends beyond 
any one chamber. Recognising this, the chambers can create a rotating post for an 
agent who wields proposal power in the formation of a winning majority across the 
chambers. The institution of the formateur addresses these shortcomings and hence 
invites extension of these standard theories to include delegation to a formateur.  
 
Research on EU legislative politics has long applied theories of legislative 
organisation developed in the context of the US Congress to the institution of the EP 
rapporteur. These studies show how the theories go a long way towards explaining 
rapporteurship assignment, but have left largely under-theorised the role of the 
rapporteur in intra- and inter-cameral decision-making (Yordanova, 2011b). In sum, 
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this paper contributes to linking the different pieces in this puzzle by proposing to 
extend theories of legislative organisation to include the institution of the formateur 
who reduces transaction costs of legislative cooperation and hence makes decision-




Annex 1: Single dimensions 
  (1) (2) 
 Variables Left-Right Integration 
Main IVs    
 Formateurs: left-right 0.942**  
  (0.0257)  
 Formateurs: integration  0.930* 
   (0.0371) 
 Formateurs: nationality match 0.686** 0.630** 
  (0.125) (0.117) 
Controls    
Intra-cameral Council mean - presidency: left-right 0.943  
  (0.0544)  
 EP mean - rapporteur: left-right 0.950  
  (0.0451)  
 Council mean - presidency: integration  0.979 
   (0.0512) 
 EP mean - rapporteur: integration  1.052 
   (0.0647) 
Inter-cameral Council - EP means: left-right 1.162  
  (0.136)  
 Council - EP means: integration  2.436*** 
   (0.329) 
Inter-branch Commission absorbed: left-right 0.413***  
  (0.0682)  
 Commission absorbed: integration  0.317*** 
   (0.100) 
Proposal Salience 1.000 1.000 
  (0.00223) (0.00220) 
 Recitals 0.751*** 0.748*** 
  (0.033058) (.0334) 
 Recitals *ln(t) 1.043*** 1.043*** 
  (0.00708) (0.00717) 
Context EU25/27 0.0923*** 0.363*** 
  (0.0270) (0.118) 
 Amsterdam 1.001*** 1.001*** 
  (9.28e-05) (7.88e-05) 
 Days left in term 1.000* 1.002** 
  (7.76e-05) (0.000814) 
 Days left in term *ln(t)  1.000 
   (0.000129) 
    
 Observations  17,354 16,338 
 Subjects 788 788 
 Failures 782 768 
 Log likelihood -4329.6305 -4208.229 
    
Note: Table displays hazard ratios. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4: Cox regression – single dimensions  
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Annex 2: Full model without salience 
  (1) 
 Variables Without salience 
   
Main IVs   
 Formateurs: left-right 0.944** 
  (0.0259) 
 Formateurs: integration 0.998 
  (0.0442) 
 Formateurs: nationality match 0.665** 
  (0.124) 
Controls    
Intra-cameral Council - presidency: left-right 0.886* 
  (0.0579) 
 EP mean - rapporteur: left-right 0.983 
  (0.0507) 
 Council - presidency: integration 0.855** 
  (0.0527) 
 EP mean - rapporteur: integration 1.020 
  (0.0634) 
Inter-cameral Council - EP means: left-right 0.236*** 
  (0.0485) 
 Council - EP means: integration 9.707*** 
  (2.079) 
Inter-branch Commission absorbed: left-right 0.948 
  (0.189) 
 Commission absorbed: integration 0.258*** 
  (0.0839) 
Proposal Recitals 0.743*** 
  (0.033682) 
 Recitals *ln(t) 1.044*** 
  (0.00731) 
Context  Days left in term 1.000* 
  (8.21e-05) 
 EU25/27 0.187*** 
  (0.0663) 
 Amsterdam 1.001*** 
  (0.000108) 
   
 Observations 17,416 
 Subjects 807 
 Failures 770 
 Log likelihood -4233.9102 
   
Note: Table displays hazard ratios. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 








Coalition dynamics in bicameral systems: Explaining 





This paper analyses the success of legislators seeking to become part of the winning 
majority in a bicameral system, where the fate of amendments is not determined in 
one chamber alone. After intra-cameral coalition formation, formateurs in the two 
chambers face a strategic decision. They can either stick to the original coalition, or 
shift the coalition by including new members, and excluding others. As a 
consequence, inter-cameral coordination and the formation of a concurrent majority 
can produce winners and losers. This paper argues that actors’ inclusion and 
exclusion at the bicameral stage depend on their proximity to the formateur and the 
distance of the formateur and mean member of the second chamber. It draws on 
original data on early- and final-stage coalitions in the Council of the European 
Union under the co-decision procedure between 1999 and 2009. The findings include 
changing patterns of exclusion and inclusion, in which the formateur represents the 
crucial link between intra- and inter-cameral decision-making. This sheds light on 
the impact of bicameral coordination on final outcomes, and gives credence to the 
theoretical argument for trans-institutional cooperation as well as a broader literature 






A rich theoretical literature has discussed the relative power of the Commission, 
Council and European Parliament (EP) in the European Union (Crombez, 2000; 
Scully, 1997; Steunenberg, 1997; Tsebelis & Garrett, 2000), and an empirical 
literature has sought to test these theories drawing on expert interviews (König, 
Lindberg, Lechner, & Pohlmeier, 2007; Thomson, 2011; Thomson et al., 2012, 
2006), amendment analysis (Kasack, 2004; Kreppel, 1999, 2002; Tsebelis, Jensen, 
Kalandrakis, & Kreppel, 2001; Tsebelis & Kalandrakis, 1999), or text analysis 
(Cross & Hermansson, 2013; Franchino & Mariotto, 2012). In this paper, I shift the 
focus away from the power of the institutions and the premise that EU decision-
making pits the Council against the EP. Instead I argue that coalitions inside the two 
chambers of the legislature take on each other.  
 
The paper argues that bicameral decision-making proceeds in two stages and in line 
with one of two scenarios. At a first stage, intra-institutional proto-coalitions 
(Axelrod, 1970, 1972) are formed by formateurs in the two chambers of the 
bicameral system; at a second one, in order to come to a concurrent majority, two 
modes of bicameral coalition formation can be pursued. Formateurs face a strategic 
decision between engaging in trans-institutional coalition-formation, leading to a 
more compact coalition, and inter-institutional bargaining pitting the chambers 
against each other as (quasi-) unitary actors. The argument is intuitive in matching 
the institutional infrastructure of the European Union, where a rapporteur in the EP 
and the presidency in the Council carve out proposals in the form of reports or 
presidency compromises. They can tailor these to a specific proto-coalition, and may 
subsequently shift the coalition in order to form a concurrent majority in the two 
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chambers. As a corollary, some actors can be excluded from the original proto-
coalition, while others may be included. The dependent variable contrasts three 
possible outcomes when moving from early intra-institutional to final bicameral 
coalitions: who becomes included in the coalition, who becomes excluded from it, 
and who remains unaffected?  
 
I investigate this question using the case of the Council of the European Union. The 
empirical analysis focuses on all 162 of 844 co-decision acts proposed between 1999 
and 2009 for which information on early-stage coalitions was available. It identifies 
coalitions by tracing who is excluded from coalitions carrying the proposals at the 
early intra-institutional and final bicameral stages based on requests for changes by 
delegations and “revealed preferences” in voting and statements. From this starting 
point, we can analyse if and to what effect the bicameral stage changes coalition 
outcomes. This allows original insights into the dynamics of Council and EU 
bicameral decision-making. For the first time, we gain systematic insight into early-
stage coalitions in the Council, bringing our knowledge on par with that on the EP 
(Finke, 2012).   
 
The paper finds variation in the coalition membership of actors at the intra-
institutional and bicameral levels. Most importantly, it finds variation in the extent to 
which actors are affected by bicameral coordination. Interestingly, inclusion and 
exclusion when moving from early to final stage coalitions are not driven in parallel 
by the same determinants. They are conditional on the relation to the formateur at the 
intra-cameral level, and the formateur’s position vis-à-vis the other chamber. The 
specific dynamics implied in these results support a literature linking intra-cameral 
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organisation to inter-cameral outcomes (Diermeier & Myerson, 1999; Gailmard & 
Hammond, 2011) and have important implications for the legitimacy of EU decision-
making (Golub, 2012b; Kleine, 2013).  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we develop the theoretical argument and a 
series of hypotheses on inclusion and exclusion. Second, the paper presents the 
empirical strategy, including a procedure to identify early-stage coalitions. Third, we 
discuss early stage as well as final stage contestation in the Council, and derive the 
dependent variable of legislative success and failure. The subsequent section 
estimates a statistical model explaining success and failure, the results of which are 
scrutinised in the concluding discussion. 
 
Legislative success in bicameral systems  
 
Winners and losers in legislative decision-making as well as their strategies have 
attracted a fair amount of attention in the literature. Legislative success, legislative 
effectiveness and efficiency are often used interchangeably to describe actors’ 
capacity to achieve policy outcomes in line with their preferences. Not surprisingly, 
the variation in political systems and the different focuses of studies lead to a 
somewhat blurry picture.  
 
A first strand focuses on inter-branch conflict and the success of the executive across 
different political systems (Cheibub, Przeworski, & Saiegh, 2004; Diermeier & 
Vlaicu, 2011). Others zoom in on the United States, where the power of the President 
over Congress has been the subject of debates on effectiveness and gridlock (Binder, 
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1999; Mayhew, 2005; Saiegh, 2009). We have a good understanding of comparable 
dynamics in the EU, as the power of the institutions has been vividly debated 
(Costello & Thomson, 2013; Thomson & Hosli, 2006; see introduction to thesis).  
 
A second strand however centres on the legislature. Studies usually focus on success 
of amendments, seeing a bill out of committee, or final adoption (Anderson, Box-
Steffensmeier, & Sinclair-Chapman, 2003; Frantzich, 1979; Wilson & Young, 1997). 
Our knowledge of the success of different constituent actors in the legislature of the 
EU in contrast is sparse. As a result, we have only little insight into who comes out 
on top in the negotiations, and who reaps the spoils of legislation. 
 
The literature: are there winners and losers? 
 
We know comparatively little about winners and losers in EU decision-making. The 
most plausible explanation for this is that most work suggests that there are none. For 
instance, there is no clear government and opposition. Instead, EU decision-making 
is presented as Pareto-improving (Majone, 1993, 1994), consensual (Heisenberg, 
2005; Lewis, 1998), or subject to diffuse reciprocity, suggesting that actors “win 
some, and lose some”, but that these gains and losses balance out in the long-run 
(Arregui & Thomson, 2009; Thomson, 2011). A further reason is the difficulty in 
obtaining measures of success. Here we will focus on success by member state 
delegations in the Council, the questions of whether there are winners and losers, and 




Two approaches provide insight into the question of who wins and who loses in EU 
decision-making in the Council.
17
 The first focuses on “revealed preferences” in 
legislative behaviour, and analyses Council votes and statements. Variation in how 
often member states voice dissatisfaction through votes against a proposal, 
abstentions or formal statements in the minutes of meetings might provide an 
objective measure of how often states lose, because it shows that they are isolated 
and signal distance from the winning majority (Hayes-Renshaw et al., 2006). Van 
Aken (2012, p. 43) presents such an overview focusing on votes in the 1995-2010 
period. Hagemann (e.g. 2007) goes beyond mere votes by including formal 
statements into the analysis. These statements allow member states “to express 
public dissatisfaction with a measure but also maintain good relations with the 
presidency and the Commission” (Hagemann & De Clerck-Sachsse, 2007). For up-
to-date information, VoteWatch (2014) provides a tool to follow these statistics 
processed from Council documents.  
 
Unfortunately, studies seeking to explain voting behaviour are usually based on 
aggregate data on the Council only, neglecting the process of coalition formation, 
differences across procedures, as well as bicameral dynamics (for an exception, see 
Hagemann & Høyland, 2010). The common lesson from these studies is that there is 
substantial variation in how often member states contest decisions, prima facie 
suggesting that there might be winners and losers, because some are excluded more 
often than others (Hayes-Renshaw et al., 2006).  
                                                 
17
 A third approach mentioned in the introduction draws on quantitative text analysis, essentially 
comparing draft legislative texts to the final text adopted (Cross & Hermansson, 2013; Franchino & 
Mariotto, 2012). This is a promising way forward for studies focusing on the success of institutions, or 
groups in the European Parliament, where amendments are routinely proposed and voted on. For our 
purpose however, this is not apposite as we do not have full draft acts that correspond to member 




However, these figures also show that the majority of decisions are adopted 
unanimously – or with but one to three dissenters. This gives credence to approaches 
highlighting the consensual nature of Council decision-making. Heisenberg (2005) 
ascribes this to a “culture of consensus”, rooted in a “history of negotiations among 
the same partners and the acculturation of new members to those norms”. In contrast 
to this constructivist account, Kleine (2012, 2013) argues that important concerns are 
accommodated by member states in order to maintain the deep level of integration of 
the EU in the face of excessive domestic opposition against it. This points to the 
normative implications of winners and losers: if some consistently benefit more than 
others, this might undermine the legitimacy of EU policy and European integration. 
The overall high levels of consensus thus reinforce the importance of the question as 
to why some states still deem it necessary to contest decisions. 
 
However, the view that we can consider those voting in favour of a proposal as part 
of a winning majority, and those voting against as part of a losing minority can be 
challenged as well. This argument suggests that in the EU outvoted countries might 
drop their objections without obtaining concessions.  This suggests that there may 
not only be few winners and losers, but that that we cannot apply the category of 
‘winners’ at all.  
 
A second approach draws on the Decision-Making in the European Union (DEU) 
datasets (based on expert interviews) giving a quantitative assessment of actor 
positions (Thomson et al., 2012, 2006). These studies measure success as the 
distance between a country’s position and the final outcome. The results from these 
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studies are mixed. Some find no meaningful differences between states, whilst others 
do. Arregui & Thomson (2009) as well as Thomson (2011, Chapter 9) find that there 
are no overall winners and losers (Thomson et al., 2004; Thomson, 2009). 
Comparing distances between states’ positions and final outcomes, Thomson (2011) 
concludes that before enlargement, there was only a significant difference between 
France and Sweden (the latter being more successful), but that even this has 
disappeared after enlargement (pp.242-4). The other member states success rates 
were indistinguishable. 
 
In contrast, a number of studies drawing on DEUI data (i.e. pre-enlargement only) 
indeed identify relative winners and losers. Selck and Kaeding (2004) and Selck & 
Kuipers (2005) focus on a subset of countries only and find that the UK is more 
successful than Germany, France, and Italy, while Sweden and Finland outperform 
Denmark. Golub (2012b) weighs the losses states incur by the salience they attach to 
them. He concludes that “states differ far more significantly in their respective levels 
of bargaining success than previously recognised, [and] some of the smaller states 
are the ones that do especially well” (p.1294). This is supported by Cross (2013), 
who likewise uses salience-weighed measures of success and finds significant 
differences across member states, again with big states doing worse than small states 
such as Cyprus.  
 
In sum, the literature provides a mixed picture, highlighting on the one hand the 
inclusive nature of coalition formation, while nevertheless identifying winners and 
losers. This paper contributes to the literature by focusing on inclusion and exclusion 
at the intersection of intra- and inter-cameral decision-making, when the two 
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chambers have to form a concurrent majority. This could be interpreted as winning 
and losing, but there are doubts as to what extent these labels might indeed be valid 
in the context of the EU. We will return to this issue in the discussion of the results.  
 
The argument: inclusion and exclusion in bicameral decision-making 
 
The paper suggests that bicameral decision-making proceeds in two stages in line 
with a micro-mechanism which puts formateurs in the two chambers at its core (see 
paper 1). In order to form a concurrent majority, legislators have to exchange support 
over issues in the proposal. By gaining support on issues about which they care 
more, while giving in on issues about which they care less, a stable majority can 
emerge. Formateurs are delegated agenda-setting powers in order to facilitate such a 
logroll. Thereby, the chamber can mitigate risks of market imperfection and market 
failure in the bicameral market for vote trades (see paper 2), thus leading to 
efficiency gains. In order to explain how formateurs construct a coalition, we draw 
on Axelrod’s concept of proto-coalitions. Proto-coalitions are “working coalitions” 
which the formateurs form around themselves by proposing a logroll. 
Accommodating the requests of actors, formateurs can expand the coalition; adapting 
the logroll, they can exclude members.  
 
At a first stage, formateurs form intra-institutional coalitions. At a second stage, they 
face a strategic decision between engaging in trans-institutional coalition-formation, 
leading to a more compact coalition, and inter-institutional bargaining pitting the 
chambers against each other as (quasi-) unitary actors. Changes to the proto-
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coalitions then result in winners and losers in the coalition formation process at the 
bicameral level. 
 
Figure 13 depicts a hypothetical case illustrating this process. The chambers 
comprise of actors labelled by uppercase letters A-E in the Upper House, and by 
lowercase letters a-e in the Lower House. In order to pass legislation, a simple 
majority is required in the two chambers. At the first stage, the formateurs – here 
actors C and d – build proto-coalitions B+C+D and c+d+e around themselves. At a 
second stage, the formateurs can follow an inter-institutional scenario and stick to 
their coalitions, or they can engage in trans-institutional cooperation shifting the 
coalitions. This can reduce the range of the overall coalition. Accordingly, they can 
accommodate actor E, thus including them in the coalition, while excluding actor B.  
 
As a consequence, the formateurs’ decisions at the intersection between intra- and 
inter-cameral decision-making result in winners and losers.  
 
 
Figure 13: An illustration of coalitions in two chambers of a bicameral system 
 
The resulting dependent variable of the analysis differentiates between changes or 
continuity in the status of a member state as a member of the early-stage proto-
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coalition or the opposition. More precisely, we are interested in those who are 
included in and excluded from the coalition when comparing intra-institutional and 
final coalitions. Figure 14 illustrates this. At both stages we can differentiate between 
the members of the coalition (i.e., those included) and the opposition to that coalition 
(i.e., those excluded).  
 
 
Figure 14: The dependent variable – continuity, inclusion, and exclusion 
 
Moving from the early intra-cameral stage to the final inter-cameral stage, different 
coalition dynamics are conceivable. Both members of the coalition and members of 
the opposition can remain part of their respective group. This is reflected in the two 
arrows labelled “continuity”. In contrast, if the formateur decides to shift the 
coalition, additional members can be included in the coalition (“inclusion”) and/or 
previous members can be excluded from the final coalition (“exclusion”).  
 
Inclusion implies that a country wins as its concerns are accommodated allowing it to 
support the compromise. Hence it leaves the opposition and joins the ranks of the 
coalition. In contrast, exclusion means that the coalition does no longer reflect the 
preferences of a country, which therefore opposes the piece of legislation. Hence it 
leaves the coalition and defects to the opposition. In a nutshell, the dependent 
145 
 
variable thus reflects whether inter-cameral coordination and the decision taken by 
the presidency leave the member state unaffected (continuity), and if not, whether 
this is to its benefit (inclusion) or detriment (exclusion). Therefore, we will seek to 
explain the likelihood of inclusion and exclusion with reference to continuity as a 
baseline scenario. 
 
Hypotheses on inclusion and exclusion 
 
The formateur is the linchpin of bicameral coalition formation. Not surprisingly, 
studies have found that Presidencies are more likely to be included in coalitions 
(Hosli et al., 2011; Mattila, 2004), and are winners of the process (Golub, 2012b). In 
order to explain legislative coalition formation and legislative success at the 
intersection of intra- and final-stage decision-making in the Council, we therefore 
focus on member states’ relation to the formateur and the formateur’s relation to the 
second chamber (Cross, 2013a) along different preference dimensions that have been 
found to influence legislative success and voting behaviour in the EU political 




Preferences along the left-right ideological spectrum and a pro-anti integration 
dimension have been found to shape Council decision-making at different times. The 
policy space of the Council is thus different from that of the EP with a consistent 
left-right dimension and weaker pro-anti integration dimension both before and after 
enlargement (Hix et al., 2007; Hix & Noury, 2009). For the pre-enlargement phase, 
Mattila (2004) draws on data for the 1995-2000 period, while Hagemann zooms in 
                                                 
18 It should be noted that the findings discussed below result from the application of different 




on 1999-2004. Both find that ideological positions of governments influence their 
voting behaviour, with left-wing governments less likely to be excluded and hence 
voting against the majority (Mattila, 2004). Whilst early studies after enlargement 
only pointed out geographical clusters (Hagemann, 2008), later studies showed that 
these correlate with governments’ ideological positions (Hosli et al., 2011; Mattila, 
2009). The balance of the Council majority had changed, and right wing 
governments were on the side of the majority more often than left governments 
(Hosli et al., 2011). This suggests that ideological proximity might explain whether 
member states are included or excluded when the bicameral coalition is formed. 
 
From this follow the first two hypotheses: 
H1a: The larger the distance between the formateur and a member state’s 
government along a left-right dimension, the greater the odds of exclusion from the 
coalition. 
H1b: The larger the distance between the formateur and a member state’s 
government along a left-right dimension, the lower the odds of inclusion in the 
coalition. 
H2a: The larger the distance between the formateur and the EP mean along a left-
right dimension, the greater the odds of exclusion from the coalition.  
H2b: The larger the distance between the formateur and the EP mean along a left-
right dimension, the lower the odds of inclusion in the coalition.  
 
Evidence on impact of positions on European integration is more limited and 
sometimes conditional. Mattila (2004, 2009) found an interaction between left-right 
preferences and the position on integration before and after enlargement. This is 
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confirmed by Hosli et al. (2011), who also found that overall less integrationist 
governments were excluded more often. From this follow the third and fourth 
hypotheses: 
 
H3a: The larger the distance between the formateur and a member state’s 
government along a pro-anti integration dimension, the greater the odds of exclusion 
from the coalition. 
H3b: The larger the distance between the formateur and a member state’s 
government along a pro-anti integration dimension, the lower the odds of inclusion 
in the coalition. 
H4a: The larger the distance between the formateur and the EP mean along a pro-
anti integration dimension, the greater the odds of exclusion from the coalition.  
H4b: The larger the distance between the formateur and the EP mean along a pro-
anti integration dimension, the lower the odds of inclusion in the coalition.  
 
Taken together, these hypotheses capture the role of the formateur in the micro-
mechanism of coalition formation outlined above.  
 
Many of the studies discussed so far also find geographical clusters of Northern, 
Southern, and Eastern member states, or old and new member states. A North-South 
divide (Mattila & Lane, 2001) is usually considered to have been supplemented by 
an Eastern cluster (Kaeding & Selck, 2005; Mattila, 2009). However, the mere 
geographical position is hardly relevant as such, but rather conceals underlying 
dimensions. Accordingly, many of the results above are in fact inferred from what 
prima facie appeared to be geographical dimensions (Zimmer, Schneider, & 
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Dobbins, 2005). Therefore, we do not include these patterns as such. However, the 
accession status of member states might influence their inclusion. This is particularly 
relevant given the surprising finding that some variables have opposite effects on old 
and new member states, and  that new member states are less often outvoted than old 
member states (Hosli et al., 2011). Hence follows hypothesis five: 
 
H5a: The odds of exclusion from the final coalition are lower for new member states 
than for old member states. 
H5b: The odds of inclusion in the final coalition are greater for new member states 
than for old member states. 
 
Further factors of relevance are power-related characteristics, such as member states’ 
status as net payer or recipient from the EU budget. While Mattila (2004) does not 
find support of these in the late 1990s, studies drawing on DEU data (Zimmer et al., 
2005) and voting data in redistributive policy areas do (Bailer et al., 2014). They 
even suggest that rich member states buy off smaller states, even though this vote 
selling argument is refuted by Golub (Golub, 2012a). In general, interpretations of 
why this dimension might matter differ, pointing to different regulatory preferences 
as well as power differentials relating to the transfers of funds. Their implication is 
that net recipients from the budget are outvoted less often than net contributors 
(Bailer et al., 2014). Based on this we formulate the sixth hypothesis: 
 
H6a: The odds of exclusion from the final coalition are lower for net recipients from 
the EU budget than for net contributors. 
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H6b: The odds of inclusion in the final coalition are greater for net recipients from 
the EU budget than for net contributors. 
 
In addition to these factors, member states’ size has been argued to affect their 
success. Large states were more likely to be excluded from wining majorities 
between 1995 and 2000 (Mattila, 2004). Likewise, Golub (2012b) and Cross (2013) 
found that small member states were more successful. In contrast, Hosli et al. (2011) 
demonstrated size not to affect inclusion and exclusion after enlargement. The 
operationalisation of the variable varies across studies. Some focus on GDP, others 
on population or the number of votes in the Council, leading to different 
interpretations. Using different indicators, we formulate a final sixth hypothesis. 
 
H7a: The larger the population/ GDP per capita of a member state, the greater the 
odds of exclusion from the final coalition. 
H7b: The larger the population/ GDP per capita of a member state, the smaller the 
odds of inclusion in the final coalition. 
 





This section first explains the strategy devised to identify coalitions in the Council 
and thus the dependent variable, and then briefly discusses the data collection effort 
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to this end. Subsequently, it provides an overview of independent and control 
variables as well as their operationalisation. 
 
Dependent variable: Identifying coalitions in the Council 
 
The paper draws on novel data on early-stage coalitions in the Council. In 
combination with information on final votes and statements, this allows identifying 
who was included and who was excluded in the process of bicameral coalition 
formation. While information on final votes and statements is easily available from 
the Council’s monthly summary of Council acts, addendums to minutes of Council 
meetings, and, for earlier cases, press releases referenced in the Commission’s 
PreLex database, the coding of early-stage coalitions requires some explanation. 
 
Members of legislatures usually formally propose amendments, but bargaining in the 
Council centres on successive drafts of a piece of legislation. The rotating presidency 
can decide whether to accommodate member states’ requests for changes. Usually 
these concerns are included as footnotes in the draft legislation. Cross (Cross, 2012) 
has studied interventions in the Council on a subset of legislative files. He shows that 
there is strong variation in the extent to which member states intervene in the 
Council, and that they do so the more they are unsatisfied with the draft text. This is 
also because in fact the rules of procedure foresee interventions in these cases only 
(ibid.).  
 
Nevertheless, member state delegations reacting to a proposal have different options 
at hand, which so far have not been differentiated. First, they can provide general 
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suggestions for improvements to the text, be they objective or proposals in line with 
their preferences. Second, on more important issues, member states can enter 
substantive reservations (‘reserves’) (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006; Nedergaard, 
2007, pp. 162–3; Westlake & Galloway, 2004, p. 226). In addition, there are scrutiny 
reservations entered if inter-ministerial coordination on the negotiating position has 
not been concluded, parliamentary reservations if a national parliament has to be 
consulted on a member state’s position, and linguistic reservations in case of legal-
linguistic issues with a translation. These are ‘soft’ reservations in the sense that they 
are usually procedural. ‘Hard’ substantive reservations in contrast are issue-specific 
objections to the draft text through which member states express requests for 
accommodation (Westlake & Galloway, 2004, p. 226). In the give-and-take of 
Council negotiations, member states have an incentive to only use a reservation if 
salient issues are at stake. Hence, we can conceptualise a reservation as an interaction 
of salience and preference. 
 
By contrast, states which enter reservations are, at that point, not accommodated by 
the presidency and not part of its proto-coalition. Thus, I define member states 
upholding a reservation as excluded from the early-stage coalition. If a member 
states’ concerns are taken on board by the presidency, or indeed if they have none 
that are salient to them, they do not need to enter a reservation, and are considered 
part of the proto-coalition. 
 
In order to obtain information on reservations in Council documents, I analysed 
18,000 accessible documents in the Council Public Register that relate to 844 co-
decision acts proposed between 1999 and 2009. Drawing on a computer programme 
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(a so-called grep-tool) that searches and extracts search terms from text files, I 
successfully identified early intra-institutional coalitions in 162 instances in the 
Council, always before negotiations with the EP started.  
 
It should be noted that the sample is not representative of the total co-decision output 
for two reasons. Firstly, it excludes uncontroversial proposals that are rubberstamped 
by the Council and EP. Classic examples would be updates to legislation or the 
codification of a series of acts. Accordingly, whenever no member state deemed it 
necessary to enter a reservation, the procedure was excluded from the analysis. 
Secondly, Council transparency and the quality of documentation varies depending 
on the note taker and sensitivity of legislation (Cross, 2013b), so that some 
documents are not accessible, while some procedures may have been missed because 
conflict was not reflected in the minutes of meetings. Nevertheless, the resulting 
sample is meaningful because it comprises acts on which member states disagreed, 
and thus exactly those proposals that are relevant for an analysis of winners and 
losers in bargaining. In that sense, it is similar to a sample of roll-call votes which is 
not necessarily representative of the total population of votes (Carrubba et al., 2006), 
but carries the promise of important insights nonetheless. 
 
As the identification of coalitions is based on preferences revealed in legislative 
behaviour, it can be criticised by the same token as any study analysing voting 
behaviour, but this criticism is particularly pertinent in the case of the EU. We have 
to assume that actors’ legislative behaviour is in fact meaningful, so that voting in 
favour means that an actor has been accommodated, while voting against means that 




In my dependent variable this represents a particular problem for the inclusion 
category.  For instance, Novak (2013) argues that votes in the Council might 
underestimate the controversy of decisions. She suggests that unanimity is often the 
result of blame avoidance, as member states refrain from voicing opposition to avoid 
seeming weak and isolated at home. No matter what, governments in the Council 
would thus drop their reservations at the final voting stage, resulting in them being 
seen as part of the winning majority. Whilst this implies that increased transparency 
would come with less revealed contestation, Cross (2013b) argues that transparency 
in Council negotiations invites “grandstanding” and might accordingly inflate 
observable contestation. If grandstanding is restricted to the early stages of the 
negotiations, it would mean that relatively more actors are excluded at the early 
intra-institutional stage than at the final stage, which would further bias the 
interpretation of the “inclusion” category of the dependent variable.   
 
While both mechanisms might be at work in extreme cases, the bulk of negative 
votes and reservations will represent true dissatisfaction and the aspiration to attain 
different policy. Moreover, a key distinction is important. In contrast to votes, 
requests for changes (expressed as reservations) are the basis of any change to an act. 
Member states cannot expect to be accommodated if they do not signal a request for 
this. Accordingly, I conceive of any objections to the winning majorities as a 
combination of high salience and preference. By default, if salience of preferences is 




In parallel, at the final stage, those voting against, abstaining, or entering a statement 
into the minutes voicing their dissatisfaction are deemed excluded from the final 
coalition (Hagemann, 2007; Hayes-Renshaw et al., 2006). In these cases, the member 
state did not obtain what it wanted. Again however, I expect that that states will only 




The operationalisation of the independent and control variables is straightforward. 
Döring and Manow (2012) provide information on national parties in governments in 
the Council as well as the size of national party delegations in the EP based on 
European elections. Ideological and European integration preferences of 
governments are based on Chapel Hill Expert Survey Data (Bakker et al., 2012) that 
was interpolated between the different waves of the survey (1999, 2002, 2006, 2010). 
The national party scores of coalition governments were weighed by the number of 
seats they held in the national parliament, and the mean position of the EP was 
obtained by weighing national party delegations by their number of seats.  The left-
right dimension is measured on a scale from 0-10, while the integration dimension is 
measured on a scale from 1-7.  
 
Net contributors and beneficiaries were calculated based on the Financial reports of 
the European Commission (European Commission, 2014). I use a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if a member state was a net recipient in the respective year of 
the decision (Net recipient). In addition, size is operationalised both by population 
(Eurostat, 2014b) and GDP per capita (Eurostat, 2014a). Population is in millions, 
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while GDP per capita is in thousands. The dummy variable New MS and 
Enlargement are coded 1 for new member states and decisions after the 2004 
enlargement respectively. 
 
In addition, I also use a control variable to capture the salience of legislative acts 
based on a count of the media mentions of a legislative act in a series of newspapers 
(Reh et al., 2013). This is because we might expect that decision-making dynamics 
might differ for salient and non-salient acts. 
 
Analysis: mapping and explaining inclusion and exclusion 
 
This section first presents descriptive data on legislative success and failure, defined 
as inclusion and exclusion in the legislative coalition when moving from intra- to 
inter-cameral decision-making. It proceeds in the sequence of the legislative process 
and presents early- and final-stage coalitions. Second, it moves on to analyse the 
determinants of success and failure. We split the analysis into a pre- and post-
enlargement phase, which coincides with end of the 1999-2004 term of the EP. Ten 
member states joined the Council, and European elections took place which changed 
to composition of the EP. The differentiation allows a more nuanced analysis of 
success and failure.  
 
Descriptive overview: inclusion and exclusion 
 
The new data for the first time allows a systematic insight into member states’ 
coalitions at the sub-ministerial level of the Council. Figure 15 shows the proportion 
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of legislative proposals in which member states were excluded from the early-stage 
coalition, i.e. usually draft texts prepared by the presidency of the Council on which 
they entered a reservation. It shows that there is strong variation across countries, in 
particular a deep divide between old and new member states, as well as important 
differences between pre- and post-enlargement decision-making.  
 
When comparing the proportion of exclusions before and after enlargement, we note 
that overall decision-making has become less contentious at the intra-institutional 
stage. This might be because member states exert restraint in the face of more 
countries that need to be accommodated, or simply because the underlying policy has 
changed. In particular, Germany and France are now included more often. But this is 
not limited to large states, as the cases of Luxembourg and Austria show. In contrast, 
the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden fare worse after enlargement. 
 
Focusing on variation across countries, eleven member states, including eight 
accession countries, are excluded from fewer than ten per cent of early-stage 
coalitions in the post-enlargement phase. In contrast, Germany is the country left 
unsatisfied most often, both before (50 per cent) and after enlargement (38 per cent). 
This does not seem to be a mere artefact of the country’s size. Smaller countries, 
such as Malta, Sweden, and Denmark share a similar profile. Cross (2012) had 
already singled out Malta as a small country that had to intervene often in 
negotiations given its dissatisfaction with draft legislation. The results here 





Figure 15: Exclusion from intra-institutional coalitions 
Notes: Chart shows percentages; N=95 (before enlargement); N=67 (after enlargement), 20 of which 
for full EU27. 
 
In a similar vein, we can analyse the data on opposition at the final voting stage 
(Figure 16). Again it is evident that decision-making dynamics have changed with 
enlargement, and that there is strong variation across countries. While contestation at 
the intra-institutional stage has decreased, contestation at the final voting stage has 
increased, suggesting that member states are more rarely accommodated. 
Nonetheless, comparing total percentages shows that overall levels of exclusion from 
coalitions are considerably lower at the final voting stage. This reflects that countries 
are usually ultimately included in coalitions. Whilst countries are on average 
excluded from 13 per cent (before enlargement: 25 per cent) of coalitions at the intra-
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institutional stage, this drops to 7 per cent at the final stage (6 per cent before 
enlargement). Again, the frequency of this varies across countries. Germany opposes 
18 per cent of legislation, while ten member states do so in less than 5 per cent of 
cases, and a further nine countries in less than 10 per cent of cases. Here, old and 
new member states are far more mixed. 
 
 
Figure 16: Exclusion from bicameral coalitions. 
Notes: Chart shows percentages; N=95 (before enlargement); N=67 (after enlargement), 20 of which 
for full EU27. 
 
So far we have looked at the members of the coalition and contrasted them with 
those that are outvoted. We now know who contested legislation most often, as their 
requests for changes were not taken on board, and who was part of the winning 
majority how frequently. With reference to figures 15 and 16, this has demonstrated 
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the frequency at which member states have been left isolated with reservations at the 
early intra-institutional and at the final bicameral stage. It does not yet show the 
dynamic of inclusion and exclusion when moving from early to final stage coalitions. 
 
The dependent variable captures this change in the shift from early to final, 
bicameral winning majorities. Figure 17 presents an overview. The negative 
percentages indicate how often a member state was eventually excluded even though 
they were initially part of the coalition (exclusion) while the positive percentages 
show how often member states were ultimately included in the coalition (inclusion). 
The sum of the absolute percentages is an indicator for how often the bicameral stage 
made a difference for a country. For Lithuania and Estonia this holds true in less than 
5 per cent of the cases considered, while Germany becomes in- or excluded in 30 per 
cent of cases after enlargement. Hence, the difference between this absolute sum and 
100 reflects the reference category in the analysis (continuity). In these cases, inter-
cameral negotiations did not make a difference for a country’s coalition status. 
Hence, it is important to note that the figure shows the change in coalition status due 
to bicameral trans- or inter-institutional decision-making. 
 
Following from the discussion above, there is important variation across countries as 
well as between EU decision-making before and after enlargement. First, some 
countries are included more often than others, while exclusion remains 
comparatively scarce. This supports the literature highlighting that member states 




Figure 17: Losing and winning in bicameral decision-making 
Notes: Chart shows percentages; N=95 (before enlargement); N=67 (after enlargement), 20 of which 
for full EU27.  
 
Second, it is evident that before enlargement most member states were included more 
frequently, and were excluded less frequently when moving from intra- to final-stage 
coalitions. This holds in particular for Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. 
Before enlargement, the former two countries with their large contingents of MEPs 
were ultimately included in the final-stage coalition in 32 and 38 per cent of cases 
respectively after they had been excluded from the coalition at the early intra-
institutional stage. Germany remains the most frequently included member state in 
the negotiations, while the UK and France inclusion rate has decreased. That of some 
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smaller countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden is 
remarkably high. In general, there is more fluctuation in coalition membership of old 
member states and they also seem to be included more often when compared with 
new member states.  
 
This descriptive overview of contestation at the early and final decision-making 
stages, as well as the derivation of the dependent variable, has focused on member 
state delegations in the Council of the EU. In principle, it would be fascinating to 
provide a similar overview broken down by different national governments, which 
are the unit of analysis in several of my hypotheses. I refrain from this here because 
given the varying terms of office the number of issues different government decide 
on varies, which makes comparison difficult, if not misleading. The results are 
discussed in the next section, which explores the underlying causal mechanisms: 
How can we explain this variation? Why do some states/ governments included, 
while others are excluded? The next section estimates a model to answer these 
questions.  
 
The model: explaining inclusion and exclusion 
 
Given the categorical nature of the dependent variable distinguishing between 
exclusion, inclusion and no change in coalition status, a multinomial model is 
appropriate. We thus investigate the likelihood of exclusion and inclusion with 
respect to the base category of no change in coalition status. As we will see below, 
this makes more sense than an ordinal understanding of the variable, as indeed 




The data is clustered by member state and legislative proposal. Hence, drawing on a 
multilevel model is appropriate. The clusters are not nested, so that crossed random 
effects would be required. Since to my knowledge it is not possible to fit such a 
multinomial model with crossed random effects in the GLLAMM package in 
STATA (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, & Pickles, 2005), I chose the simpler, two-level 
model with a random intercept reflecting the clustering by legislative act. The results 
are very robust when including country level fixed effects (see annex 1, table 7). 
Since I have to drop country level variables that are of interest in this model 
specification, I report the models without fixed effects below and highlight any 
differences in the discussion. We estimate five models relating to the different 
Council constellations. These are presented in table 6. 
 
A cursory overview of the results shows that power-related member state 
characteristics seem to be most helpful to explain winning, while preferences provide 
insight into losing. The table reports exponentiated coefficients to ease interpretation.  
 
The results suggest that we are better at explaining failure, i.e. exclusion from the 
coalition, than inclusion. This is arguably because member states still drop their 
objections for different reasons – be it because they seek to adhere to the culture of 
consensus (Heisenberg, 2005), because of true accommodation of their requests 
(Kleine, 2013), or mere blame avoidance at home (Novak, 2013), i.e. no 
accommodation. Two of the three preference-based indicators that are significant in 
the part of the models that explains inclusion are not robust to inclusion of country-




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Full EU15 EU25/7 Old MS New MS 
       
Fixed part       
       
Exclusion LR: Pres. – EP 1.513* 1.613 1.879 1.290 7.548* 
  (0.365) (0.491) (0.870) (0.673) (8.285) 
 Integration:  0.346*** 0.324* 0.353* 0.490 0.0764* 
 Pres. – EP (0.137) (0.188) (0.214) (0.343) (0.110) 
 LR: MS – Pres. 1.103 0.837 1.289* 1.916*** 0.617 
  (0.119) (0.149) (0.190) (0.381) (0.183) 
 Integration:  1.546** 1.878* 1.294 0.929 2.582* 
 MS – Pres. (0.274) (0.642) (0.288) (0.283) (1.253) 
 Population 0.997 0.978* 1.005 1.001 1.011 
  (0.00618) (0.0111) (0.00772) (0.00852) (0.0284) 
 Net recipient 1.015 0.413* 1.584 1.438  
  (0.347) (0.219) (0.727) (0.697)  
 GDP per capita 1.000 0.998 0.989 1.002 0.774* 
  (0.0239) (0.0392) (0.0319) (0.0361) (0.118) 
 Salience 0.935 0.984 0.891 0.761* 0.974 
  (0.0450) (0.0625) (0.0657) (0.111) (0.0801) 
 Enlargement 1.733     
  (0.587)     
 New MS 0.425  0.318*   
  (0.235)  (0.207)   
 Constant 0.0203*** 0.0546* 0.0222*** 0.0171*** 0.0391* 
  (0.0192) (0.0823) (0.0285) (0.0259) (0.0706) 
Inclusion LR: Pres. – EP  0.912 0.962 0.908 1.017 0.519 
  (0.121) (0.152) (0.256) (0.329) (0.320) 
 Integration:  0.783 1.036 0.525* 0.539 0.665 
 Pres. –EP (0.171) (0.296) (0.194) (0.231) (0.553) 
 LR: MS – Pres. 1.100* 1.057 1.134 1.119 1.522* 
  (0.0581) (0.0732) (0.0978) (0.113) (0.354) 
 Integration:  1.049 0.956 1.150 0.937 1.301 
 MS – Pres. (0.102) (0.136) (0.158) (0.161) (0.347) 
 Population 1.008*** 1.008** 1.008* 1.006 1.055*** 
  (0.00272) (0.00370) (0.00420) (0.00432) (0.0204) 
 Net recipient 0.787 0.715 0.846 0.825  
  (0.129) (0.162) (0.214) (0.212)  
 GDP per capita 1.012 1.006 1.028 1.021 1.045 
  (0.0125) (0.0163) (0.0204) (0.0213) (0.0831) 
 Salience 1.021 1.042 1.002 0.993 1.044 
  (0.0222) (0.0348) (0.0277) (0.0340) (0.0503) 
 Enlargement 0.600**     
  (0.126)     
 New MS 0.503**  0.636   
  (0.167)  (0.284)   
 Constant 0.169*** 0.160*** 0.0877*** 0.112** 0.0122*** 
  (0.0856) (0.111) (0.0707) (0.0971) (0.0158) 
Random 
part 
Variance (act) 0.714 0.927 0.428 0.589 0.984 
  (0.144) (0.233) (0.169) (0.234) (0.740) 
       
 Level 1 units 2,488 1,246 1,242 798 444 
 Level 2 units 146 89 57 57 53 
 Log likelihood -1291.4559 -710.56885 -568.84562 -427.62466 -120.06432 
Exponentiated coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6: Multi-level model 
164 
 
coalition can be conceptualised as legislative success, as either everyone seems to be 
accommodated or simply to join the coalition. In both cases equating inclusion and 
winning seems meaningless. In this context the control for salience is of interest, as it 
suggests that more salient legislation coincides with a higher likelihood of inclusion, 
and lower likelihood of exclusion, even though this is only significant for old 
member states that are losing after enlargement. 
 
The most interesting findings relate to why member states are excluded from 
coalitions. First, let us recall that the models include both the left-right and 
integration dimensions. On the one hand, we included the distance between a 
government and the presidency (H1a, H3a); on the other hand, the distance between 
the presidency and the EP mean (H2a, H4a). Overall the findings suggest that the 
more divergent the integration preferences of a member state and the presidency, the 
more likely it is that this state will be excluded from the coalition. This ties in with 
the findings of paper 1, which showed that the overall range of coalitions is reduced 
on this dimension at the final stage. 
 
However, it is interesting to note that after enlargement and the start of the next 
legislative term, driven by the old member states, the intra-cameral effect of a 
member state’s proximity to the presidency holds for the left-right dimension rather 
than the integration dimension.
19
 This suggests that dynamics between old member 
states have become more party political, while those between new member states are 
rather based on integration preferences. The irrelevance of left-right dynamics with 
regard to new member states might provide a partial answer to the counterintuitive 
                                                 
19 In the robustness check including fixed effects, the variable on the left-right dimension is significant 
and points in the other direction in the EU15 model. 
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finding that an increase in distance on a left-right dimension between a member state 
and the presidency increases the likelihood of being included in the coalition.  
 
The presidency’s distance from the EP mean on the left right dimension is in the 
expected direction, but not significant across all models (even though in the fixed 
effects model in the annex it is additionally significant in the EU15 model). The 
larger the distance between presidency and EP, the higher are the odds of exclusion. 
The effect of the presidency’s distance from the EP mean on the integration 
dimension is not the expected direction. This might suggest that presidencies seek to 
form larger coalitions in order to strengthen their bargaining position with the EP if 
they have different preferences. This is in line with the literature linking intra-
institutional organisation and inter-cameral bargaining under bicameralism 
(Diermeier & Myerson, 1999; Gailmard & Hammond, 2011). By forming a 
particularly large coalition, and taking offers by the rapporteur to its members, it 
increases the threshold for agreement (Diermeier & Myerson, 1999). Thereby, the 
presidency can shift the final outcome towards its preferences (see paper 1). This 
lends support to the counter-intuitive finding by Gailmard and Hammond (2011), 
who suggest that a chamber may have an incentive to be represented by preference 
outliers in inter-cameral bargaining. The results show that under these conditions, an 
overall more inclusive coalition is formed in the Council. 
 
The results from different model specifications (see annex 1, table 7) lend support to 
the importance of the presidency in the Council and its ‘relais actor’ function as 
formateur in inter-institutional coordination (Farrell & Héritier, 2004). In fact, 
individual governments’ distance to the Council and EP mean proves not a 
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significant determinant of success or failure. The presidency constitutes the crucial 
link. In sum, these results provide support for the causal mechanism in which the 
formateur is the linchpin of coalition formation. 
 
On this basis, we can move on to the analysis of further factors influencing 
legislative inclusion and exclusion. Model one confirms that enlargement has made 
inclusion less likely. Bicameral decision-making in the Council has thus become 
more competitive. However, the new member states remain somewhat unaffected by 
this. With regard to hypothesis 5 on new member states we find that they are both 
less likely to be included or excluded at the bicameral stage (albeit in different 
models). This suggests that the new member states are somewhat passive onlookers. 
 
Recalling that objections can be argued to represent an interaction of preference and 
salience, there are two possible explanations. Firstly, the governments may have 
“centrist” positions, leaving them unaffected by the controversy between other states. 
Secondly, their preferences may be akin to those of old states, but the salience they 
attach to them might be lower, and ultimately too low to engage in actively opposing 
legislation. The latter option would be in line with behaviour of MEPs from new 
member states, who are structurally underrepresented in the post of rapporteur in the 
EP, possibly because of low salience of the policy impact that they could achieve 
(Hurka et al., 2014; Hurka & Kaeding, 2012). 
 
Indicators of power, expressed here as status as a net contributor to or recipient from 
the EU budget (H6) population (which also reflects voting power) and GDP per 
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capita (H7), are more relevant for explaining inclusion than exclusion. Overall 
however, their effect is rather weak. 
 
In sum, these findings lead to a differentiated assessment of the stated hypotheses. 
We find confined support for the hypotheses. This is arguably good news for 
European integration, because even if those included are not necessarily winners, the 
fact that they change over time might contribute to the legitimacy of integration. In 
this sense at least, the Council does not seem to differ from other legislative 
chambers: changes in its composition -- while staggered by the pace of national 
elections -- shift the balance over time. The results underscore the inclusive nature of 
much of EU decision-making, while also highlighting the reasons for why member 




This paper set out to identify the impact of inter-cameral coordination on legislative 
success in a bicameral legislature based on a theory of bicameral coalition formation. 
A series of hypotheses on inclusion and exclusion dynamics in bicameral coalition 
formation were developed by linking existing research on Council and EU decision-
making and theoretical expectations arising from the causal mechanism. These were 
tested on a new dataset on early- and final-stage coalitions in the Council collected 
through an extensive analysis of Council documents. 
 
Patterns of inclusion and exclusion may well undermine the legitimacy of EU policy 
and European integration, as recent research has suggested based on varying levels of 
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success across member states (Golub, 2012b). However, the sheer complexity and 
variation over time of the patterns caution against snapshot analyses which may too 
easily incite sweeping conclusions. Even if exclusion can be described as losing in 
bicameral decision-making, the losers in Council decision-making change over time, 
which suggests that overall dynamics do not differ from those in other democratic 
legislative chambers with changing compositions at national elections. Only if some 
actors are structurally disadvantaged in the long run, this will become a normative 
issue.  
 
Differences in legislative success have important implications from an integration as 
well as comparative politics angle. First, systematic winners and losers point to the 
emergence of government-opposition dynamics, where a series of actors consistently 
works together and excludes others from the benefits of legislation. Second, if some 
actors systematically lose, this can affect the legitimacy of European integration and 
its outputs. We find losers in bicameral decision-making, but the predictors 
explaining defeat are dynamic rather than structural. Ideological and integration 
preferences influence a member state’s likelihood of exclusion from a coalition, but 
their variable nature suggests that no-one remains necessarily excluded in the long-
run.  
 
Nevertheless, the status of the new member states deserves further analysis in the 
future. Their low activity might be due to genuinely lower salience, but might also 
have other reasons (Golub, 2012a). Likewise, future research will have to shed light 
on the question of when and why member states are actually accommodated, or 
simply refrain from casting negative votes. These observationally equivalent, but 
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substantively very different phenomena would add to a deeper understanding of 
Council decision-making dynamics. To date we only have limited knowledge of how 
salience and differences in positions and outcomes affect the decision to abstain, vote 
against or contest the act’s content in a statement (Hoyland & Hansen, 2013). 
 
In sum, the findings lend support to the importance of formateurs in bicameral 
decision-making. They show that the presidency can make the strategic decision to 
build a more inclusive coalition when its position differs starkly from that of the EP, 
thus binding its hands in negotiations with the rapporteur, and shifting the outcome 





Annex 1: Robustness test 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Full EU15 EU25/7 Old MS New MS 
       
Fixed part       
       
Exclusion LR: Pres. –  1.548* 2.058** 2.005 1.356 7.183* 
 EP (0.375) (0.707) (0.936) (0.747) (7.898) 
 Integration:  0.334*** 0.277** 0.327* 0.451 0.0612* 
 Pres. – EP (0.135) (0.162) (0.207) (0.329) (0.096) 
 LR: MS –  1.085 0.603** 1.423** 2.136*** 0.823 
 Pres. (0.123) (0.139) (0.240) (0.489) (0.325) 
 Integration:  1.550** 2.047* 1.272 0.907 2.927** 
 MS – Pres. (0.296) (0.773) (0.311) (0.319) (1.585) 
 Salience 0.935 0.984 0.890 0.751* 0.975 
  (0.045) (0.063) (0.066) (0.112) (0.080) 
 Enlargement 1.433     
  (0.484)     
 MS fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
 Constant 0.0123*** 0.0068*** 0.0066*** 0.0161*** 0.0006*** 
  (0.00791) (0.00701) (0.00554) (0.0152) (0.00122) 
Inclusion LR: Pres. – EP  0.920 0.955 0.898 1.025 0.568 
  (0.124) (0.152) (0.255) (0.340) (0.352) 
 Integration:  0.739 1.018 0.551 0.534 0.697 
 Pres. –EP (0.164) (0.296) (0.205) (0.234) (0.586) 
 LR: MS – 
Pres. 
1.060 1.057 1.082 1.075 1.518* 
  (0.060) (0.078) (0.010) (0.120) (0.351) 
 Integration:  1.133 0.956 1.086 0.971 1.303 
 MS – Pres. (0.119) (0.156) (0.152) (0.179) (0.359) 
 Salience 1.020 1.042 1.004 0.992 1.040 
  (0.022) (0.035) (0.028) (0.035) (0.050) 
 Enlargement 0.560***                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
  (0.116)     
 MS fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Constant 0.144*** 0.348** 0.139*** 0.242*** 0.0241*** 
  (0.0514) (0.148) (0.0599) (0.121) (0.0242) 
Random  Variance (act)  .7407 .9469 .4320 .6265 .9669 
part  (.1484) (.2367) (.1698) (.2458) (.7317) 
       
 Level 1 units 2,488 1,246 1,242 798 444 
 Level 2 units 146 89 57 57 53 
 Log likelihood -1276.7669 -701.3507 -561.1248 -416.6736 -118.7132 
Exponentiated coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 




Annex 2: Alternative model specification 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Full model EU15 EU25/7 Old MS New MS 
       
Fixed part       
       
Exclusion LR: MS –  0.959 0.848 1.029 1.009 1.199 
 rapporteur (0.106) (0.139) (0.165) (0.199) (0.415) 
 Integration:  1.170 1.284 1.721** 1.836** 2.028 
 MS – rapp. (0.161) (0.316) (0.378) (0.501) (1.169) 
 LR: Pres. – EP 1.349 1.476 1.755 1.581 12.51 
  (0.349) (0.546) (0.951) (1.011) (19.90) 
 Integration:  0.348** 0.152** 0.709 1.132 0.0417 
 Pres. –  EP (0.152) (0.112) (0.498) (0.957) (0.0872) 
 LR: MS – Pres. 0.994 0.767 1.225 1.797** 0.430** 
  (0.126) (0.162) (0.212) (0.409) (0.180) 
 Integration:  1.555** 2.452** 1.024 0.713 3.318 
 MS – Pres. (0.314) (0.967) (0.260) (0.254) (2.553) 
 Population 0.994 0.973** 1.001 1.002 0.964 
  (0.00746) (0.0130) (0.00975) (0.0105) (0.0476) 
 Net recipient 1.399 0.464 3.197** 3.283**  
  (0.536) (0.269) (1.763) (1.900)  
 GDP per capita 1.010 1.003 1.004 1.024 0.587** 
  (0.0262) (0.0423) (0.0358) (0.0415) (0.157) 
 Salience 0.904 1.006 0.561* 0.611* 0.170 
  (0.0654) (0.0685) (0.168) (0.177) (0.204) 
 Enlargement 1.602     
  (0.617)     
 New MS 0.402  0.265*   
  (0.252)  (0.195)   
 Constant 0.0180*** 0.0874 0.00543*** 0.00138*** 0.247 
  (0.0195) (0.146) (0.00891) (0.00280) (0.572) 
Inclusion LR: MS –  0.945 0.881* 1.039 1.076 0.858 
 rapporteur (0.0505) (0.0611) (0.0917) (0.108) (0.207) 
 Integration:  0.948 0.902 0.783 0.708* 1.016 
 MS – rapp. (0.0760) (0.0979) (0.127) (0.137) (0.409) 
 LR: Pres. – EP 0.906 0.995 0.749 0.877 0.336 
  (0.130) (0.176) (0.242) (0.311) (0.260) 
 Integration:  0.798 1.134 0.415** 0.430* 1.052 
 Pres. - EP (0.194) (0.366) (0.183) (0.207) (1.238) 
 LR: MS – Pres. 1.100 1.065 1.117 1.107 1.477 
  (0.0646) (0.0812) (0.110) (0.129) (0.397) 
 Integration:  1.125 0.950 1.449** 1.162 1.407 
 MS – Pres. (0.121) (0.151) (0.251) (0.242) (0.597) 
 Population 1.008*** 1.006 1.011** 1.009* 1.063*** 
  (0.00304) (0.00405) (0.00486) (0.00498) (0.0250) 
 Net recipient 0.763 0.646* 0.799 0.752  
  (0.140) (0.160) (0.235) (0.225)  
 GDP per capita 1.026* 1.016 1.049** 1.035 1.120 
  (0.0144) (0.0185) (0.0249) (0.0259) (0.103) 
 Salience 1.073** 1.074* 1.108* 1.156** 0.960 
  (0.0303) (0.0407) (0.0636) (0.0742) (0.175) 
 Enlargement 0.579**     
  (0.133)     
 New MS 0.719  1.144   
  (0.271)  (0.612)   
 Constant 0.117*** 0.149** 0.0553*** 0.0813** 0.00546*** 
  (0.0693) (0.117) (0.0551) (0.0866) (0.0110) 
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Exponentiated coefficents reported. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Variance  0.697 0.907 0.490 0.545 2.644 
  (0. 157) (0.254) (0.215) (0.262) (1.889) 
       
 Level 1 units 2,055 1,078 977 630 347 
 Level 2 units 122 77 45 45 41 





Dynamics of legislative cooperation and their implications 
 
 
This thesis set out to investigate why and how specific coalitions are formed in 
bicameral systems. Against the backdrop of two debates putting the search for a 
micro-mechanism of coalition formation and the link between legislative 
organisation and bicameral decision-making on the research agenda, the thesis argues 
that actors enter into trans-institutional cooperation across the boundaries of their 
chambers. This conclusion draws together the empirical, theoretical and normative 
contributions and implications of the papers and maps a research agenda that 




The thesis draws on a distinction between early stage and final-stage coalitions and 
for the first time provides a systematic analysis of the former based on a major data 
collection effort resulting in a unique dataset. This provides leverage for our 
understanding of EU decision-making. 
 
At a general level, the thesis demonstrates that bicameral decision-making is more 
than the sum of two intra-institutional processes. A great deal of research focuses on 
individual institutions and thus on legislative politics within the confines of a 
chamber. A further stream of the literature focuses on inter-institutional decision-
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making, in which at least one of the institutions is conceptualised as a unitary actor. 
These studies have made important contributions to our understanding of legislative 
decision-making. However, the thesis provides strong evidence that it is essential to 
look beyond and merge these established fields (see e.g. Naurin & Rasmussen, 
2011). Bicameral decision-making extends the strategic arena in which legislators 
act. The resulting interdependencies shed new light on EU decision-making and 
bicameral decision-making in general. 
 
The first paper develops a typology differentiating between four distinct coalition 
types subsumed under two scenarios, which capture different dynamics in the move 
from early intra-institutional to final-stage coalitions. The first scenario captures 
inter-institutional decision-making, in which the early-stage coalitions are 
maintained. It distinguishes perfect continuity in coalitions between early and final 
stages, and an inclusionary dynamic, under which further members were added to the 
coalition. The second scenario captures trans-institutional decision-making, 
characterised by an exclusionary dynamic. It distinguishes pure exclusion of 
coalition members between the two stages, and a combination of exclusionary and 
inclusionary dynamics.  
 
The paper provides evidence that one quarter of decision-making procedures was 
trans-institutional in nature, reflecting exclusionary dynamics. This contrasts with the 
conventional wisdom that decision-making in the EU is compromise-based, and that 
acts are made “yes-able” to an ever-increasing number of actors (Hayes-Renshaw & 




This is reflected in the finding that formateurs reduce the effective size of coalitions 
on one of two key dimensions of the EU policy space. There is no significant change 
in the left-right dimension, while the range of the coalition on the pro-anti integration 
dimension becomes more compact. In spite of inclusive dynamics being stronger 
both under inter-institutional and trans-institutional scenarios, this does not increase 
the range of the coalitions. Those who are added to the coalition are “cheap”, i.e. 
there is little accommodation required, and those who are excluded are outliers on 
the pro-anti integration dimension (as paper three confirms for the Council). This 
suggests a more differentiated view of consensual decision-making in the EU. 
 
Formateurs can strategically exploit the move from intra- to bicameral coalitions to 
select a coalition in which they are closer to the mean. This sheds light on the 
varying control mechanisms the chambers have in place. We found a significant 
effect for the rapporteur only. This suggests that the Council presidency might 
already form trans-institutional coalitions at the intra-institutional level since it is the 
second mover in the procedure, or that the Council is in a stronger position because 
its formateur and proto-coalition are located closer to the status quo. Alternatively, 
oversight in the Council functions better. In the EP, the rapporteur is usually in 
charge of a piece of legislation from the first presentation of the Commission 
proposal in committee until the final adoption in plenary. Other party groups have 
resorted to appointing shadow rapporteurs to keep the rapporteur in check. In the 
Council, in contrast, the presidency is charge of a large number of files over a very 
short period. Control therefore takes place through the looming handover of the file 




The second paper further develops these insights by focusing on the legislative 
market for exchanges in which formateurs act in order to facilitate a logroll. 
Controlling for intra- and inter-cameral relations, the analysis suggests that the 
ideological similarity of the formateurs affects decision-making speed, a proxy for 
efficiency of the market. While the optimisation of the coalition takes place along a 
pro-anti integration dimension in the sample of cases that we look at (paper 1), it is 
not the similarity of actors along this dimension that explains decision-making speed 
at large. The paper argues that homophily of actors explains the impact of similarity 
on decision-making efficiency. Rapporteur and presidency hence take national party 
labels as a cue to assess their counterpart in the “calculus of cooperation”. Largely 
irrespective of the relation of the chambers, the formateurs thus impact on decision-
making. They single-handedly transform the legislative process. These results 
suggest that the impact of institutional design and preference alignment of the 
chambers on gridlock and efficiency is mediated by individual persons.  
 
Finally we focused on legislative success and coalition dynamics. We found 
variation at three levels at the intersection of intra- and inter-cameral decision-
making in the Council: across member states, across early and final-stage coalitions, 
and across the pre- and post-enlargement phases. While some states become 
members of the winning majority in the process, others are excluded from it. It 
remains unclear, however, whether those who join the majority are indeed 
accommodated or whether they simply drop their objections. 
 
The factors that affect member states’ likelihood of inclusion and exclusion at the 
bicameral level are located in the intra- and inter-institutional arenas. The results 
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underscore the crucial link formateurs represent in mediating the impact of bicameral 
decision-making. At the intra-cameral level, a larger distance between a member 
state and the presidency increases the state’s likelihood of being excluded. At the 
inter-cameral level the presidency’s distance from the EP mean decreases member 
state’s likelihood of being excluded from a proto-coalition. Interestingly, the 
explanations for inclusion and exclusion differ. While preferences explain exclusion, 
power-related indicators shed light on inclusion. 
 
In sum, each of the three papers supports the crucial role of the formateurs in 
coalition formation. Overall, the empirical results then suggest that differences on the 
integration dimension are most decisive when it comes to trans-institutional 
cooperation. In paper 1, we found that the range of the coalition on the integration 
dimension is reduced in the process of the negotiations, and that the rapporteur 
manages to move closer to the mean of the coalition at the final stage. Paper 3 adds 
to this that member states are likely to be excluded if they differ from the presidency 
on this dimension. However, we also found evidence of similar dynamics on the left-
right dimension after enlargement and among old member states in particular. In 
contrast, it is the left-right dimension that affects the efficiency of exchanges 




The thesis set out a causal mechanism of bicameral coalition formation proposing a 
theory of trans-institutional coalition formation. It has several building blocks that 
together provide a coherent explanation of how coalitions are formed. At its heart are 
178 
 
formateurs, who are delegated power to propose coalitions. The formateurs are 
market makers in a bicameral legislative market for vote trades. They realise some 
requests for changes by matching them across institutional boundaries, while letting 
others fall through. Thereby they propose a logroll within a legislative proposal. The 
constituent parts of this mechanism speak to theories of legislative organisation, 
models of decision-making and the emerging links between the two. 
 
The insight of the conceptualisation of the legislative market as one that surpasses 
the institutional boundaries of a single chamber leads to an extension of standard 
theories of legislative organisation. Distributive and partisan theories of legislative 
organisation are based on unicameral conceptions of the legislative market. They all 
suggest different rationales for an institutionalisation of exchanges in legislatures in 
order to save transaction costs.  
 
The second paper suggests that delegation to formateurs helps further reduce 
transaction costs, and might indeed be necessary in bicameral systems to reap the 
benefits of pre-structured exchanges in committees and parties. This provides a 
strong theoretical rationale to the role of the formateurs. These have been studied 
quite extensively, in particular the EP rapporteur, but have been left largely under-
theorised. The theory I propose highlights the demand for formateurs in bicameral 
decision-making in particular. 
 
This is because actors face uncertainty regarding the enforceability of intra-
institutional solutions to reducing transaction costs. In bicameral systems in which 
the chambers have veto power and are differently composed, the creation of a 
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committee system does not guarantee members that they can implement their 
preferences as distributive theory suggests. Likewise, division of labour within 
parties cannot unveil its full impact on transaction costs if parties do not exert 
authority in both chambers. Delegation beyond party leadership and committee 
systems to formateurs is therefore required in order to endow exchanges across 
institutional boundaries with credibility. 
 
The formateurs can act in the market for exchanges beyond the institutional 
boundaries. While parties and committees may thus pre-structure exchanges, 
formateurs enable exchanges across these boundaries which may otherwise be 
prohibitively costly. Thus, formateurs enable exchanges between individual actors 
rather than chambers and thus facilitate a logroll within a legislative proposal 
between individual constituent actors rather than the institutions as unitary actors. 
 
The micro-mechanism and the dynamics derived from it tie in with a debate between 
two schools of thought that has put the investigation of micro-mechanisms of 
decision-making at the forefront of the research agenda. This debate is often framed 
as one between procedural and bargaining models. The causal mechanism suggested 
here provides different inputs into this debate. It stresses the exchanges between 
individual actors rather than chambers per se, and contains a dynamic element in the 
strategic decision of the formateurs. The distinction between different types of 
coalition dynamics provides leverage to systematise the appropriateness of different 
models to specific situations, and invites studying the scope conditions of when 




The formateurs are crucial in this context. They benefit from their position, which 
might be because they can exploit their function as “relais actors” and the limitations 
in oversight that the principal can accomplish. Alternatively, they might strategically 
choose the intra-institutional coalition to tie their hands in a “nested game” (Tsebelis, 
1990). This link between intra-cameral organisation, and intra- and inter-cameral 
dynamics lends support to a literature that focuses on the interplay between these two 
levels (Diermeier & Myerson, 1999; Gailmard & Hammond, 2011). In line with this, 
paper 3 finds that a larger distance between the presidency and the EP mean on the 
integration dimension leads to more inclusive coalition formation in the Council. 
This supports Gailmard and Hammond’s argument that a chamber may have an 
incentive to be represented by preference outliers in inter-cameral bargaining. 
Forming a surplus coalition, the presidency then increases the threshold for 
agreement (Diermeier & Myerson, 1999).  
 
Normative implications  
 
The elevated position of the formateur comes with great influence, impact and 
responsibility. It ensures that decision-making runs smoothly and provides for an 
overall more efficient process. It has been argued that the institution mitigates 
imperfection and failure of the market in vote trades. Overall, this makes the market 
more efficient. Nevertheless, there seem to be actors that lose out in the process, thus 
incurring relative losses. While the resulting agreements may still leave them better 
off than no agreement at all (Krasner, 1991), this suggests that careful selection and 





The demand for the institution of the formateur with all its powers needs to be 
accompanied by effective intra-parliamentary oversight in the principal-agent 
relation between the chambers and their formateurs. Can the chambers control their 
agents? The thesis discusses the different selection and control mechanisms in the 
two chambers. To succeed in this quest, the Council relies on successive 
Presidencies, which thus have to conceive of their role beyond a division of labour. 
In the EP, it means that party group coordinators and shadow rapporteurs have to be 
carefully selected in order to be able to fulfil their important roles. 
 
The thesis also sheds light on the nature of decision-making in the EU. 
Supermajorities and grand coalitions have often led to an emphasis on consensus in 
the process, which comes with higher legitimacy of the output. The thesis provides 
evidence of the overall inclusive nature of decision-making. Yet it also nuances these 
findings by showing that those who are included are easily accommodated. The 
decrease in the overall range of the coalitions suggests that coalition formation 
becomes more polarised. In fact the frequent exclusion of actors alongside inclusion 
of others suggests that there are winners and losers, raising the question of how this 
might affect the legitimacy of the process and output of European integration (Golub, 
2012b). Stable patterns of winners and losers would amount to government-
opposition dynamics, suggesting coordinated cooperation among actors to exclude 
others from the benefits of legislation.  
 
The findings of the third paper however show that winning and losing in the process 
is not stable across time. Structural disadvantages might undermine legitimacy, but 
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we find that dynamic factors drive exclusion in the legislative process. While 
ideological and integration preferences affect a member state’s likelihood of 
exclusion from a coalition, the direction changes over time. Hence the dynamics in 
the Council do not seem to differ from those in other democratic systems, in which 
national and regional elections change the composition of legislative chambers and 
thus wining majorities. Therefore, we should look beyond any one single legislative 
term if we are to draw normative conclusions from patterns of winners and losers. 
 
Two groups of member states deserve more attention in the future. These are the new 
member states and other net beneficiaries from the budget. They seem to take more 
passive approaches, winning and losing less often than other states. Golub (2012a) 
has explored vote selling as a possible explanation, and did not find support for 
trades of fiscal transfers for influence over policy. In contrast, the result might be due 
to more centrist positions, or because the states have a lower general salience for 
many of the acts under discussion. The latter would be in line with findings on the 
EP, where MEP from new member states act less frequently as rapporteurs (Hurka et 
al., 2014; Hurka & Kaeding, 2012). 
 
Limitations and future research 
 
The thesis has focused on EU decision-making in the 1999-2009 period, and it would 
be desirable to extend the scope of the study in time to more recent procedures as 
well as to other bicameral systems. Likewise, alternative methods of identifying 
coalitions should be explored. Tackling these standard limitations would underscore 
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the claims to robustness and generalisability of the thesis. At the same time, the 
thesis opens up a new research agenda in legislative politics. 
 
The thesis sets out a theory of trans-institutional cooperation, and provides support 
for the underlying causal mechanism. Future research should explore the scope 
conditions of formateurs’ strategic decisions for trans-institutional and inter-
institutional scenarios, as well as the four types of coalition dynamics. This quest 
would also help shed light on when formateurs might strategically choose intra-
institutional coalitions to obtain specific outcomes. 
 
This scope of manoeuvre of formateurs highlights the need for further research 
emanating from the normative implications of the thesis. We need to better 
understand the control in legislative delegations before the conference committee. Do 
legislators hold their agents to account? Some research has focussed on conference 
committee delegations (Rasmussen, 2008), and the normative implications of the 
negotiations between formateurs shifting decision-making from formal public to 
informal secluded areas have been highlighted (Reh, 2014).  
 
The next step is to investigate the mechanisms by which and extent to which 
principals successfully keep their agents in check. In the EU context, this means that 
we need to investigate the interaction between Presidencies and their successors. We 
know surprisingly little about the handover of files and negotiations during trilogues 
between different Presidencies, and to what extent they indeed control each other. In 
a similar vein, we need to investigate to what extent party group coordinators and 
shadow rapporteurs indeed represent effective checks on the rapporteur. While 
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rapporteurship assignment has attracted attention, we so far have little insight into the 
control of these agents.  
 
In addition to these questions immediately raised by the thesis, the novel data on 
early-stage coalitions and the procedure for extracting information from documents 
can shed new light on established questions. For instance, if voting data of final-stage 
decisions in the Council is biased because member states do not want to be seen as 
losers (Novak, 2013), it will be interesting to apply established scaling methods to 
early-stage coalitions as a more direct measurement of the underlying policy space. 
This would strengthen our knowledge of the basis of contestation in the Council, but 
could also be applied to the EP. The data collection effort and method for extracting 
information from these documents can also yield other insights not hitherto 
leveraged. For instance, the thesis did not focus on parliamentary scrutiny 
reservations, but the data extraction procedure can easily be adapted to this end. Can 
member states strategically exploit parliamentary reservations? These are just a few 
questions that the new data would help explore. 
 
In sum, the theory of trans-institutional cooperation and types of coalition dynamics 
developed in the thesis make a contribution that provides leverage for studies of 
legislative decision-making and organisation. Future research should capitalise on 
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